Authority Between Contraction and the Danger of Disintegration: What is the Solution to Redefine the National Project?

The Palestinian crisis can no longer be reduced to an imbalance of power with Israel, nor to the bias of an American administration here or the regression of a European position there. We are at a historical stage that transcends diplomacy and daily policies, raising the question of meaning and function: What remains of the national project when the authority, which was born as a transitional framework towards statehood, today finds itself more like an administrative apparatus managing a population under occupation, if not within the context of its own plan?

Under the rapid creeping annexation in the West Bank and the Judaization of Jerusalem, the ongoing blockade, the obstruction of Gaza's reconstruction, the fading of any political horizon during the Trump administration, and the international community's contentment with a "two-state solution" discourse lacking any binding tools, the challenge is no longer simply external to Palestine. The deeper danger is the gradual transformation of an authority that is supposed to be temporary into a permanent administrative reality, stripped of sovereignty and prospects. This erosion does not manifest as a thunderous collapse, but in the form of a slow habituation to contraction.

The most likely scenario in the near term is a formal existence for the authority, increased financial and political tightening, a faster expansion of settlement realities, and an accumulated decline in popular trust. Yet, it is not entirely a predetermined path. Even amid this erosion, the question remains: Is the function of the authority redefined, or is the crisis managed at a minimum?

Redefinition means transforming the authority from a service apparatus into a tool of societal steadfastness; from managing salaries to protecting land; from waiting for external transformation to investing internally. It means redirecting resources towards supporting productive sectors, fortifying Jerusalem and threatened areas, enhancing the local resistant economy, and opening the public space for genuine political participation that restores trust. National reform here is not merely a moral demand, but a condition for political survival. An authority lacking social legitimacy becomes more vulnerable to any external pressure.

However, erosion could slip into functional disintegration or chaotic collapse, under accumulated financial-security pressures. Here, it is no longer a question of managing contraction, but rather confronting a void. The void in the Palestinian context is not neutral space, but an open invitation for external arrangements, internal chaos, or coercive re-engineering of the political system. Thus, thinking about a backup national framework—a "broad coalition of political and societal forces capable of managing an organized transition"—is not a subversive act, but a preventive measure that protects society from the collapse turning into liquidation.

Conversely, the possibility of re-establishment remains, even if it seems less spontaneous. This path can only be realized by rebuilding national representation on comprehensive democratic foundations, redefining the relationship between the PLO and the authority, and formulating a political contract that defines the function of the authority as a tool subject to the national project, not a substitute for it. The essence of the transformation is shifting the weight center from reliance on the outside to regaining legitimacy from within, so that society itself becomes a pressure lever to redefine the direction.

In this context, a call for National Council elections or engaging people in a draft constitution emerges. In principle, renewing representative legitimacy and formulating a new constitutional contract are undeniable national requirements. However, the value of any electoral or constitutional process is not measured by its announcement, but by its political conditions. Elections held amidst deep geographical and political divisions, and without prior agreement on a comprehensive national program, could turn into a reproduction of existing balances of power or into a mechanism for crisis management, not resolution. A constitutional discussion in the absence of actual sovereignty, and ongoing erosion of geographical space, is nothing more than a false compensation for a field failure, or an internal rearrangement of the system without touching the essence of the impasse.

The problem does not lie in elections or constitutions, but in the danger of shifting the compass from the priority of liberation to the question of management. When the struggle shifts from protecting land to organizing texts, the national project becomes vulnerable to being reduced to a limited governance engineering, while realities on the ground are redefining borders and sovereignty without waiting.

Hence, the central question arises: Who has the ability to break this trajectory?

The answer does not lie in a single institution, nor in a specific faction, but in what can be termed as the "historical bloc", a wide alliance of social, cultural, syndical, economic, and political forces, whose interests intersect in protecting the national project from final contraction.

The responsibility of this bloc is not limited to criticism or issuing statements. Its responsibility is historical on three interconnected levels:

First, impose the priority of political unity as a condition for any electoral or constitutional process. There is no meaning in renewing procedural legitimacy without restoring at least minimal unity and a shared program.

Second, restore the public space as a domain for discussion, accountability, and participation. Legitimacy is not regained by a top-down decree, but by re-engaging society in defining the course.

Third, convert steadfastness from rhetoric to public policy by supporting local production, protecting land, fortifying civil peace, and building networks of community solidarity capable of absorbing shocks.

The historical bloc is not a new party, but an organized collective consciousness, pushing to redefine the function of the authority before it is redefined from the outside. It is the force capable of preventing erosion from becoming fate and collapse from turning into liquidation, and elections or constitutions from becoming mere cosmetic tools to fill the void.

The current moment of contraction carries a deep paradox: the narrower the political space, the greater the burden of internal responsibility. Either the national project is reproduced from within, or it is reshaped from outside. It is not enough to wait for changes in administrations or shifts in international positions. History does not grant peoples the luxury of a long wait when the land itself is in a phase of redefinition.

So, what is to be done?

It is neither a coup nor an adventure, but a transition from crisis management to redirecting the course. And if the moment is one of contraction, the response is not retreat, but a reordering of power balances within society itself. Here, responsibility transforms from a moral question to a historical duty on the broad national bloc.

First: Establish the national minimum base; the first step is neither elections nor a constitution, but a political agreement on undisputed priorities: halting creeping annexation, lifting the blockade on Gaza, protecting Jerusalem, and preventing the entrenchment of geographical and political separation.

This minimum is not a factional program, but a unifying umbrella that suspends secondary disputes. Without this foundation, any political process, "electoral or constitutional," becomes merely a reproduction of division not transcended.

Second: Restore the public space as a sovereign internal domain; legitimacy cannot be regained without reopening the public sphere.

Political freedom is not a luxury, but a condition for mobilization. It requires freeing trade union, student, and civic work from restrictions, and restoring consideration for public debate as a corrective tool, not a threat to stability. The authority that fears its society loses its ability to represent it. And the society that is excluded from decision-making loses its readiness to defend it.

Third: Redefine the function of the authority practically; instead of remaining an apparatus for managing salaries and services, it should be transformed into a tool of steadfastness:

• Redirect budgets towards productive sectors, agriculture, and small industries.

• Support the resilience of areas threatened by annexation through genuine, not symbolic, empowerment plans.

• Transform municipalities into institutions of community protection, not platforms of administrative competition.

Here, the economic dimension becomes part of resisting imposed realities, not just managing a financial crisis.

Fourth: Rebuild national representation; addressing the erosion of legitimacy controlling the national destiny must start from acknowledging its failure, leading to the construction of a democratic national representation that responds to current priorities in enhancing the people's ability to withstand and preserve the collective identity, the right to self-defense, and confronting plans that liquidate the right of return and self-determination. As for the constitutional discussion, it must be linked to redefining the national project and the function of the authority, not entrenching the existing situation that has led the national cause to this deadlock, as anything else becomes merely a diversion conflicting with popular priorities, especially in light of the absence of genuine sovereignty and imminent existential threats.

Fifth: Build a transitional safety net; In light of the possibility of collapse or forced transformation, a non-confrontational national backup framework capable of managing any sudden transition must be established.

This framework includes characters, community forces, and factions that agree in advance on protecting civil peace and preventing the void from turning into chaos or guardianship. Preparedness for the worst-case scenario is a condition for preventing it.

Sixth: Shift the center of gravity from the outside to the inside; this does not mean closing the door to diplomacy, but rather rearranging priorities. External dependency without internal grounding turns into a long wait. However, when the outside relies on cohesive internal legitimacy, it becomes a supporter, not a substitute. For the bargaining power is not derived from statements, but from the unity and resilience of society.

Seventh: Shape the historical bloc as a carrier of change; the historical bloc is not a slogan but a cumulative process of alliance among cultural elites, unions, the business sector, youth forces, and political leaderships prepared to make mutual concessions for the greater project. Its role is not to topple the regime, but to redirect it. It is not about contesting legitimacy, but recovering it.

This roadmap does not promise quick solutions, but prevents erosion from becoming destiny, collapse from becoming liquidation, and elections or constitutions from becoming merely cosmetic tools or diversions to buy time. It shifts the question of "what to do?" from a rhetorical level to an organized action level.

The question is no longer: Will the circumstances change?
But: Will a collective will form capable of transforming the moment of contraction into a moment of re-establishment, before Palestine is redefined from the outside, not by the Palestinians themselves?