Post-Palestinian Elections: Who Holds Legitimacy and Who Has the Ability to Govern

As nations approach pivotal political moments, the real question is not just: Who will win the elections? But rather, the more crucial question becomes: What will happen after the victory? Will the elections mark the beginning of a new phase in rebuilding the political system, or will they open the door to a new and more complex crisis?

Elections are not the end of the road; rather, they mark its beginning, granting political legitimacy to those who gain the trust of the people. However, at the same time, they place the burden of managing the lives of citizens and making decisions that could determine the future of an entire nation on the winners. Success in elections does not necessarily equate to success in governance, and ascending to power is completely different from managing that power.

In the Palestinian context, this responsibility appears to be more complicated than any ordinary electoral experience. The leadership that will emerge through elections will not operate in an independent sovereign state but in an exceptional reality governed by numerous factors: ongoing occupation, settlement expansion, internal political division, an economy heavily reliant on foreign aid, and political and administrative institutions that arose within the context of the Oslo Accords and the obligations that followed.

Therefore, any discussion about the upcoming Palestinian elections should not be limited to the question: Who has the ability to win? Rather, it should shift to the more important question: Who has the capacity to manage the upcoming phase? Who possesses a clear vision for protecting institutions, providing services, managing internal and external relations, and preventing the Palestinian citizen from paying the price for political disputes?

The experience of the 2006 elections remains a fundamental junction for understanding the nature of the challenges that might face any new elections. Hamas achieved a significant victory in the legislative elections and formed the Palestinian government at a political moment that reflected the desire of a section of the Palestinian street for change and punishment of the existing political reality at that time.

However, that experience revealed that electoral victory alone is not enough to forge a governance capable of facing political complexities. The new government found itself confronted with a highly difficult international and regional reality, as international parties refused to engage with it due to disagreements over its political program and positions towards Israel and previous agreements, imposing political conditions that led to financial and political pressures affecting the government's ability to manage its institutions.

At the same time, internal Palestinian disagreements escalated, culminating in the political division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2007, a division that was not merely a disagreement between two factions but evolved into a national crisis that impacted the Palestinian political system and the lives of citizens and the ability to address external challenges.

Regardless of the assessment of that phase or differing views on responsibilities, the most important lesson to be drawn is that governance requires more than electoral legitimacy; it necessitates the ability to manage reality, build consensus, protect institutions, secure resources, and deal with pressures that any future Palestinian government may face.

Herein lies the question regarding Hamas's participation and any other political force in the upcoming elections. The issue is not only related to the right of any faction to participate, which is a natural political right for any force that believes in adhering to the will of the people, but it also concerns what comes after victory: What is the political project? What is the governance management plan? How will the complex Palestinian reality be addressed?

In this context, the issue of the Oslo Accords arises as one of the most sensitive matters. Since the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, Hamas has rejected the agreement, considering that this path has not achieved Palestinian national rights, while the Palestinian Authority and its institutions have become part of the daily lives of millions of Palestinians through education, health, jobs, services, and daily administration.

This raises a legitimate political question: How can one reject the political path that created these institutions while, at the same time, seek to lead them? Does participating in the authority mean treating it merely as a tool to manage citizens' affairs? Or is there a new vision for its role and future?

This question is not exclusive to Hamas but pertains to all Palestinian forces that critique the existing political path or demand its change. Rejecting any political reality must be accompanied by a practical alternative capable of protecting society and institutions because citizens do not merely live on political stances—they require salaries, hospitals, schools, a functioning economy, and social security.

Moreover, the Palestinian issue cannot be reduced to power management alone; it concerns a people living under occupation and striving for freedom and national rights. Yet the transition from opposition to governance poses new questions regarding the relationship between the national liberation project and the requirements of managing the lives of millions of citizens.

How will any Palestinian leadership balance the project of resistance with the demands of governance? How will it deal with the contradiction between the demands for political or military confrontation and the responsibility of protecting society and preserving institutions? Is it possible to build a strategy that combines defending national rights with managing the daily reality of the Palestinian people?

Posing these questions does not imply rejecting resistance or downplaying Palestinian rights; rather, it means that governance is a responsibility that requires a vision capable of managing tough choices, as political decisions impact not only the leadership but also the lives and future of the people.

Furthermore, any upcoming elections may not grant any faction an absolute majority, which makes political partnership essential. The Palestinian reality has demonstrated that no party is capable of eliminating the other, and enduring internal conflict will only weaken everyone and provide the occupation with a greater opportunity to impose its realities.

Thus, the success of any election should not be measured solely by who wins, but by everyone's capacity to accept its results, respect pluralism, and build a political system capable of managing differences rather than transforming them into open conflict.

And the toughest question remains: Will the upcoming Palestinian elections provide a real opportunity to reconstruct the political system, or will they reproduce a new crisis as occurred after the 2006 elections?

The issue is not solely internal because any Palestinian leadership will confront a complex Israeli reality, especially amid Israeli governments that have expressed their rejection of the Oslo path and work to weaken the Palestinian Authority and undermine the possibility of establishing an independent Palestinian state. This raises a fundamental question: If a newly elected Palestinian leadership emerges, will there be an international and Israeli willingness to engage with it? Or will the Palestinian people find themselves once again facing a crisis between the legitimacy of the ballot box and the rejection of the surrounding political reality? Conducting elections alone is not sufficient; what is required is a national agreement that precedes or accompanies them, setting the rules of the political game, ensuring respect for their results, and preventing a repeat of the scenario of division and confrontation.

The upcoming phase requires a leadership that does not merely raise slogans but possesses a clear vision for reconstructing Gaza, confronting settlement expansion, protecting institutions, managing the economy, and maintaining Palestinian national rights without making the citizen bear the cost of political conflicts.

In conclusion, the upcoming Palestinian elections are not just a competition for power; they are a true test of the Palestinian political system's ability to rebuild itself.

The question that must precede any elections is not merely: Who do we want to win? But the more important question is: Does the winner possess the ability and vision to lead the Palestinian people through one of the most challenging phases of their national cause?

Legitimacy comes from the ballot box, but the value of this legitimacy is measured by the leadership's ability to protect its people, preserve its institutions, and transform popular trust into a political project capable of shaping the future.