Amendments to Amendments... When the Electoral Law Becomes a Reflection of Political Confusion

Author: Younes Al-Amouri

The Palestinian scene can no longer bear further political maneuvers wrapped in the language of reform, nor further legal amendments that come to modify previous amendments, as if the Palestinian political system exists in a constant state of trial and error, or as if the rules of the political game can be reset whenever indicators arise that do not conform to the calculations of decision-makers. When the electoral law itself becomes a subject of repeated review, and when not long passes after the issuance of a legal amendment before decision-making circles begin to discuss modifying it again, the issue is no longer related to correcting a fleeting legal defect, but becomes a direct reflection of the state of political confusion that governs the management of Palestinian public affairs, and a clear incapacity to produce a stable and coherent vision for the future of the political system and its institutions...

The paradox is that the Palestinian Authority, which has been talking for years about reform, renewing legitimacy, and rebuilding institutions, seems in many of its steps as if it is reproducing the same crisis with the same tools, but in new formats. Instead of paving the way for real political reform that restores respect to the institutions and puts an end to the dominance of individual decision-making, it resorts to decrees and decisions by law to rearrange the regulating rules of political work, in the absence of the elected legislative institution, and under the lack of genuine parliamentary oversight over the laws that are supposed to regulate the future of political life as a whole. Here, one must ask... how can we talk about political reform while the laws that are supposed to regulate the production process of authority are issued by the executive authority itself..? This is not a formal observation, but a profound political and constitutional dilemma. The electoral law is not an administrative law that can be changed according to the needs of the moment, but rather it is the legal expression of the rules for producing legitimacy. When these rules are amended by top-down decisions, without broad legislative and societal discussion, it weakens trust in the law, and makes the citizen question the extent of the independence of the electoral process, and the ability of elections to produce free results if their rules can be changed whenever the date approaches or political calculations change...

Today, with the talk about reconsidering the number of seats in the legislative council and the possible return from two hundred seats to one hundred and thirty-two seats, the question becomes more urgent... what has happened for the amendment of the amendment to become necessary...? Was raising the number of seats to two hundred a wrong decision from the start...? And did decision-makers discover after its issuance that the new formula does not serve the public interest...? Or have the political circumstances that pushed for its adoption changed...? And if the political circumstances are what has changed, can the laws that define the rules of electoral competition change with them...? And what about other amendments related to the threshold percentage, the conditions for lists, quotas, and candidacy requirements...? Are we facing a comprehensive legal review, or a process of political repositioning expressed through the law...? The problem here is not in the authority’s right to amend the law, but in the timing of the amendment, its nature, and the underlying political aim. A law that changes constantly loses its stability, and elections whose rules change with changing calculations lose part of their credibility. Therefore, the talk about reform becomes questionable when there is no clear and convincing explanation for the reason behind these successive amendments. True reform does not mean amending laws whenever circumstances change, but rather building laws capable of withstanding changes in circumstances, because democratic law is supposed to be neutral towards outcomes, not designed according to expectations.

Thus, the pressing question is... is the electoral law being reformed, or are the outputs of the election being engineered before it is held...? No one can ascertain the intentions of decision-makers, but the public has the right to doubt and question when it sees that the number of seats, the threshold percentage, the conditions for nomination, and the format of lists are all subjects open to amendment, while the overall political picture remains highly nebulous. Each of these amendments can change the balance of power, and every change in the threshold can increase the chances of some lists while reducing others, and any change in the number of seats can reshape representation, and every new candidacy requirement may exclude powers or limit their ability to compete... Here, the electoral law becomes part of the political battle itself. Elections are not just a box, a voter, and a candidate; they are also rules that determine who enters the race, how they enter, under what conditions, what threshold must be exceeded, and how votes are converted into seats.

Therefore, control over the law may sometimes be more impactful than control over the results of the box itself. Whoever has the capability to devise the rules of the game possesses part of the power to determine the nature of the outcomes that can result from it... Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the crisis is the relationship between the legislative council and the Palestinian National Council. The National Council is not a transient institution, but rather the parliament of the revolution and the political and legislative framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and thus linking part of its structure to the results of legislative council elections raises a fundamental question about the nature of legitimacy that it should rely upon. Is the National Council an electoral institution in the traditional sense, or is it a national political institution that is based on consensus and representation of various components of the Palestinian people at home and abroad...? And can the election of the legislative council be the direct path to producing the membership of the National Council, or does the uniqueness of the PLO necessitate a different formula based on national consensus and proportional representation of the components of the Palestinian people...? This question should have been at the heart of any political reform process, but it has remained pending, as have many other issues in the Palestinian political system. The discussion of the National Council without rebuilding the PLO, and the talk about elections without addressing the division, and the talk about consensus without existing consensus, all express one crisis... a crisis of the absence of a comprehensive political project to rebuild the Palestinian system... If the official leadership sees that the National Council should be based on national consensus, this is a political position that can be discussed, but consensus cannot be a slogan used when needed. National consensus is not made by a decision by law, nor can it be compressed into arrangements made within closed political chambers, nor can it be a substitute for elections unless it is real consensus involving everyone. On the other hand, if there is talk of consensus at a time when there are no serious national dialogues capable of producing this consensus, it raises doubts as to whether the aim is truly to protect national unity, or to protect an existing political structure from the strains of elections. Here, a more sensitive matter arises... Is there genuine fear among the official leadership about the outcomes of the elections? And is there a search for a political exit that makes national consensus a veiled substitute for elections, not because consensus is necessarily better, but because elections may yield unpredictable results? This question cannot be ignored in light of the Palestinian political reality that has changed significantly since the legislative elections in 2006, amidst local election results that have revealed deep shifts in public sentiment, and the general lack of trust in existing political institutions.

If elections are held in a fair and free environment, they may open the door to a real shift in the balance of power. This is precisely what some political forces fear, which are used to seeing themselves as having the natural right to manage the scene. But elections cannot be conditional upon their outcomes being satisfactory to the leadership. Democracy does not mean that the public chooses what the leadership wants, but that the leadership accepts what this public chooses. In this context, the crisis of Fatah appears as one of the most crucial factors that cannot be overlooked when interpreting electoral amendments. Fatah today is not the Fatah that was capable of running in a unified list. Organizational and political fragmentation, multiple centers of influence, and a declining ability to control the grassroots are all factors that make the emergence of more than one electoral list from within Fatah a likely affair, perhaps three or four lists, which means that the real danger to the movement may come from within itself before it is from outside... Here, the electoral law becomes a highly sensitive factor. If the movement enters the elections with multiple lists, the threshold percentage becomes of strategic importance, as does the number of seats and their distribution method. Naturally, these matters will provoke delicate internal calculations, as any amendment may affect these lists' chances of surpassing the electoral threshold or obtaining suitable representation. Therefore, the talk about amending the electoral law in light of this reality cannot be divorced from the calculations of political forces, headed by Fatah...

But the question that must be posed to the Fatah leadership above all else is... Is the problem in the law or in the movement? Should the law be amended to fit the crisis of Fatah, or should Fatah be reformed to be capable of participating in elections? If the movement has reached a point where it cannot unify its lists, the solution is not to rearrange the electoral law, but to address the causes of organizational and political fragmentation. Attempting to change the rules of the game for fear of the results of internal division means that the law becomes a tool for addressing a party or movement crisis, rather than being a neutral framework for all forces... The issue at its core transcends Fatah and the Authority, as it relates to the future of the entire Palestinian political system. Do we want a political system that can renew itself through elections, or a closed system that reproduces itself through appointments and top-down agreements? Do we want legitimacy that derives its strength from the ballot box, or legitimacy that relies solely on history and struggle? And can historical legitimacy remain a permanent substitute for popular legitimacy..??

No one denies the historical role of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and its status as the national representative of the Palestinian people cannot be overlooked, but maintaining this status is not achieved by freezing its institutions or transforming it into a closed framework, but by rebuilding it, renewing its legitimacy, and opening its doors to all Palestinian forces and factions. The problem is not just with the elections, but rather with the absence of a formula that combines historical legitimacy with popular legitimacy... This leads us to the essence of what is called political reform. Reform does not consist of changing the number of seats from 132 to 200 and then returning to 132, nor in amending the threshold percentage from one number to another, nor in altering candidacy conditions whenever new calculations arise. These are all important details, but they do not represent reform in themselves. True reform requires rebuilding the political system on clear foundations.. separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, the existence of a functioning elected legislative council, rebuilding the PLO, renewing the National Council, conducting periodic elections, ensuring the peaceful transfer of power and respecting the results of the ballot box...

If the official leadership remains the player that has the authority to amend the rules, define the form of institutions, rearrange laws, and name appointments, and then asks people to trust that the process is reformative, this returns us to the same question... Reform for whom? And for what purpose?

The state of confusion evident in political and legal decisions is not a passing detail. It is a reflection of a deeper crisis in the management of the political system. When decisions are enacted only to be reconsidered, and when amendments emerge only to propose amendments to those amendments, and when reforms are announced without a clear final direction, the message that reaches the street is that the leadership does not possess a stable vision for what it wants to do. This confusion weakens trust, increases doubts, and makes every political step interpretable as merely another maneuver...

Therefore, what is needed today is not a new amendment to the electoral law, but a comprehensive review of the entire political system. It is necessary to clearly communicate to the Palestinians... What is the form of the political system we want? What are the limits of the president's powers? What is the role of the government? What is the function of the legislative council? How is the National Council to be rebuilt? How is the PLO to be renewed? And what is the relationship between the Authority and the Organization? And how can we ensure that the Authority does not become a substitute for the national project, and that the Organization does not become a historical entity detached from the political reality? These questions are not answered by legal amendments, but require political will. And political will is not measured by the number of laws promulgated, but by the extent to which the leadership is willing to open up to society and political forces in shaping the future...

In conclusion, perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the anticipated amendments is that they may create the impression that the leadership is trying to control the future rather than leaving it to the will of the masses... And perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the discourse of national consensus is that it transforms into a veiled eye used to avoid an electoral entitlement that may yield unpredictable results. But genuine consensus cannot be a substitute for democracy; rather, it is one of its forms when it is based on the free will of all parties...

If the leadership fears the results of the elections, the solution is not to amend the law. If Fatah fears the fragmentation of its lists, the solution is not to engineer the threshold percentage. If the PLO fears a decline in its status, the solution is not to freeze the National Council. And if the Authority fears losing its legitimacy, the solution is not to postpone elections or redesign their rules, but to go to the people... The Palestinian people need not amendments to amendments as much as they need a political system that respects their minds and their right to choose. They do not need laws formulated according to the fears of elites, but rather laws that protect their right to shape the future. They do not need reforms that reproduce the same reality, but rather real reforms that open the way to genuine political change...

And the question that will remain, no matter how the numbers of seats, thresholds, and list conditions change, is... Does the Palestinian leadership want real elections that accept their results no matter what, or does it want results that are calculated before they even begin? And does it desire a genuine national consensus, or a consensus used as a substitute for the ballot box? And does it want reform that rebuilds the political system, or new amendments that give the old system another chance to survive?

Answering these questions will determine the future of Palestinian politics, not the number of seats in the legislative council. The problem has never been the number, but rather the political will behind the number. The problem has never been solely in the law, but in who has the right to formulate and amend it. The problem has never been in elections, but in the fear of their outcomes. And unless this cycle is broken, we will continue to spin in the same orbit, changing laws without changing reality, announcing reforms without achieving them, amending amendments, and then returning after months or years to amend them again, while the greater Palestinian question remains suspended... When will the people become the ones with the final word in determining the shape of their political system, and when will laws cease to be tools for managing authority, and instead become tools for building a state, institutions, and a national legitimacy that derives its strength from the people?