Palestinian Elections: Between Impossibility and Possibility

Author: Ibrahim Abrash

If legislative elections are held next November, they are supposed to be legislative elections for a limited self-rule authority, whose reference is the Oslo Agreement, which is not recognized by Israel or Hamas and those who orbit around them. The elections will also be based on the amended 2003 electoral law, which requires candidates to accept the reference of the Palestine Liberation Organization and international legitimacy decisions. This is the first dilemma that will face the elections, in addition to the security situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

There are also other complications regarding the post-elections that we have previously pointed out in an earlier article, such as the ability of a government led by Fatah to perform its duties in the Gaza Strip if the problem of Hamas's weapons is not resolved, and the relationship of this government with the technocrat committee headed by Ali Shaath, and with the Council of Peace and Mladenov. Conversely, if Hamas wins, will the government it forms be able to exercise its powers, whether in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip as a whole? There is also the issue of the presidency; if presidential elections are not held before the legislative elections, there will be competition and conflict over who will lead the legislative council, as they will become the interim president of the authority after the absence of President Abu Mazen, and this "interim" period may extend if our internal affairs remain as they are.

Nevertheless, Hamas's announcement through Bassem Naeem about its participation in the legislative elections and the initiation of side dialogues between Fatah and Hamas regarding these elections, as we have previously called for, is a positive step unless it is merely a maneuver by Hamas to buy time and shift the responsibility for failing to conduct elections to Fatah and the president. If Hamas had entered the 2006 elections based on the conditions set by the leadership, which are the same conditions required now, everything that has occurred, including destruction and genocide, or at least the losses would not have been of this size and nature.

If Hamas's intentions are genuine this time, its participation through representatives of its own and not in its official name and capacity may be an exit from many internal crises and will benefit Hamas, as it will allow it to remain in the political scene through its presence in the legislative council, especially if there is an agreement to form a joint electoral list from figures with broad consensus to form a non-factional technocrat government that all political and social components can agree on, not just the parties.

This proposal may seem closer to a dream or political hallucination in light of the gap between positions and the lack of clarity in Hamas's stance on amendments to the electoral law, and the Israeli opposition to any Palestinian consensus. However, if the intentions are genuine away from grand slogans and claims of victory and external pressures, what we have suggested may be a glimmer of hope to save what can be saved, whether in Gaza or the West Bank, in the face of external demands for reform.

Finally, does this flood of presidential decrees to hold elections for the Fatah Movement conference, for the National Council, for the legislative council, and to establish a constitution for the state express the president's conviction that the circumstances have become suitable for all of this and activating a democratic process that leads to the rotation of power? Or is it the fear that what is to come will be worse than maintaining the status quo? Or are there external pressures accompanied by reassurances and promises from the US, European, and Arab sides that there are good tidings for the authority after the Israeli elections and resolving the issue of Hamas's weapons?