The Major Gap in the Post-War Plan for Gaza: Everyone Talks About Hamas... No One Talks About the State

An Israeli National Security Institute (INSS) paper on the future of Gaza post-war raises the question that has been occupying the security and political establishment in Israel for months: how can Hamas’s return to power in the Strip be prevented?

The paper suggests a combination of continued military pressure, establishment of local Palestinian administrations, launching reconstruction projects in areas from which the movement is removed, and a gradual involvement of the Palestinian Authority and other local forces in managing civil and security affairs.

These ideas may seem practical from a crisis management perspective, but they also reveal a fundamental gap in the prevailing thinking about Gaza. The entire discussion revolves around how to distance Hamas from power, while the more important question almost disappears: what political system is supposed to replace it?

The problem is that most proposed visions treat Gaza as a space that needs administration, rather than as part of a political project that should culminate in the establishment of a stable state and institutions. Thus, the focus is on individuals, factions, and alternatives rather than on the nature of the system itself.

Palestinians are constantly asked who should rule Gaza: Hamas? The Palestinian Authority? A transitional government? Local committees? Tribes? Groups supported by the occupation or from abroad?

But the natural question in any other part of the world is completely different: why should people even choose between these armed or semi-armed alternatives? Why shouldn’t the goal be to build a single state that monopolizes power, law, and legitimate force?

If the problem is the existence of an armed force outside the state framework, then replacing one armed force with another does not solve the problem. If the proliferation of power centers is a cause of chaos and instability, then creating new centers of power under different names will not lead to building a stable system, but to the reproduction of the crisis in new forms.

The names and loyalties may differ, but the outcome remains the same: multiple weapons, multiple references, and the absence of a single authority capable of enforcing the law on everyone.

The ordinary Palestinian citizen does not need a new faction to govern him, nor a new militia claiming to protect him; what he needs is functioning institutions, an independent judiciary, professional police, and a political authority that derives its legitimacy from the people, not from weapons.

Thus, the core of the discussion must shift from the question of "Who will govern Gaza?" to "How will Gaza be governed?".

Will there be one law applied to everyone? Will there be elected and accountable institutions? Will there be a single security apparatus subject to a unified political decision? And will everyone, including Hamas and other factions, be subject to the same rules?

These are the questions that create states, not those related to the distribution of influence among competing powers.
But there is another question that is no less important and is absent from most Israeli proposals about the next phase: If Israel is demanding that Hamas give up its weapons, what is the alternative that will protect the entire Palestinian society?

The logical answer must be the existence of a capable and legitimate Palestinian national authority that monopolizes weapons and provides protection for all citizens. The issue is not just about the future of the movement or its cadres, but about the future of more than two million people living in the Strip.

And if some plans talk about local forces or armed groups or new networks of influence managing some areas, the concern is not limited to the possible targeting of Hamas elements; it extends to the possibility of new power centers emerging that impose their will on the population outside the framework of law and institutions and engage in vengeance or retribution or create new forms of chaos.

Recent history in many conflict areas shows that dismantling an armed force does not automatically lead to the establishment of a state. In many cases, a vacuum arises that is filled by other groups, leading communities to transition from the dominance of one power to another without reaching the rule of law.

Thus, the Palestinian who does not belong to Hamas or any other faction has a fundamental interest in ensuring that the end of the war is the beginning of a system that protects everyone equally, not the start of a new conflict between competing forces for power and influence.

The real way out does not lie in replacing one faction with another or one local authority with another but in a comprehensive political project that leads to a Palestinian state with unified institutions, an elected authority, an independent judiciary, and a single official security apparatus that monopolizes weapons and is subject to the law.

In such a model, neither Hamas nor anyone else would be an exception, but all movements and factions would turn into political parties working in the public domain according to agreed-upon democratic rules, while the state alone assumes responsibility for security and law enforcement.

This goal may seem distant in light of war, division, occupation, and a lack of trust, but it remains more realistic in the long term than any attempt to manage Gaza through temporary arrangements or competing authorities or multiple power centers.

Perhaps the fundamental problem in most discussions about the future of Gaza is that they are preoccupied with the wrong question. Instead of focusing on individuals, factions, and temporary alternatives, attention should be directed towards building the institutions and rules that govern political and security life for everyone. States are not built merely by changing the ruling party but by establishing a system based on law, accountability, and the monopoly of legitimate power over weapons.

However, achieving this goal will not be accomplished merely by declaring it but requires a realistic political path that addresses the existing division, provides popular legitimacy, and establishes capable governance and services, reconstruction, and citizen protection. Therefore, the real question is not just who will govern Gaza after the war, but how to transform the post-war phase into a step towards building a capable and unified Palestinian state instead of merely being a new chapter in crisis management.

Only then can the success of any post-war plan be measured: not by its ability to exclude one party or replace another, but by its ability to bring Palestinians closer to a state governed by institutions and law that grants its citizens security, representation, and dignity on an equal footing.

Thus, the success of any post-war plan is not only measured by its ability to prevent Hamas from returning to power but by its ability to answer a much larger question: Does this plan lead to the establishment of a real Palestinian state, or does it set the stage for a new phase of crisis management? So far, it seems that everyone is talking about Hamas while no one is talking enough about the rest of the Palestinian people and their right to protection and their right to a state, institutions, and a single law that applies to all. This may be the biggest gap in the entire discussion surrounding the future of Gaza.