Current Situation Assessment .. In Light of the American-Iranian Agreement

Assuming the accuracy of the circulating data regarding an American-Iranian understanding aiming to end the state of open conflict in the region and to recalibrate the engagement on various fronts, including the Lebanese front, the region appears to be poised for a delicate transitional phase that may represent a strategic turning point in the ongoing conflict that has lasted for years... In this context, Israeli positions that are rejecting or cautious, particularly those of Benjamin Netanyahu, should not be interpreted as a decisive indicator of the failure of this path; rather, they should be viewed as part of a political and negotiating battle through which Israel aims to improve the terms of the next stage and reduce the gains that Iran and its allies may achieve.

The initial reading of the scene indicates that the American administration has become more inclined to solidify regional arrangements that reduce the likelihood of a comprehensive explosion in the Middle East, especially in light of the accumulation of military, economic, and political burdens resulting from multiple wars in recent years... From this perspective, any American-Iranian understanding will not be limited to the nuclear issue alone but will naturally extend to regional influence and hot fronts, primarily including Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and possibly Gaza to varying degrees...

In contrast, Israel views any understanding of this kind with concern. The Israeli security establishment believes that the problem lies not only in the Iranian nuclear program but also in the regional structure that Tehran has built over the past decades. Therefore, a significant part of the Israeli objection relates to the fear that the consolidation of the calm may lead to the transformation of existing Iranian influence into a permanent reality implicitly recognized by the international community...

As for expected Israeli reactions, it is likely that we will witness an escalation in political and media rhetoric during the upcoming phase. The Israeli government will try to suggest that it has not abandoned military action freedom and still retains the right to respond and intervene whenever it sees its national security threatened. However, the difference between rhetoric and reality may be significant. Israel understands that entering into an open confrontation with American will carries strategic risks that are no less dangerous than the risks it claims to be confronting.

The internal Israeli consideration plays a crucial role here. The approaching Knesset elections make Netanyahu more sensitive to any step that may be interpreted within Israeli society as a concession or retreat. Therefore, he is expected to continue using harsh language against Iran, Hezbollah, and Lebanon, even if the field events trend towards calm. Netanyahu understands that a significant part of his electoral base views military decisiveness as the preferred option, and his political opponents will try to exploit any flexibility to weaken his political image.

On the Lebanese front, the general trend seems to lean towards solidifying the cessation of hostilities and gradually transforming it into a more stable formula. After a long period of mutual exhaustion, most parties realize that returning to comprehensive war would incur a high cost that is difficult to bear. Therefore, American, European, and Arab pressures will focus on preventing the collapse of calm and potentially turning it into a relatively permanent course.

The upcoming phase is likely to witness some continued minor violations and security friction, whether through localized operations, calculated strikes, or exchanged field messages. However, if such events occur, they will likely be within limits that prevent slipping into a wide confrontation. The priority for most regional and international players will be to prevent the complete reopening of the Lebanese front.

Regarding direct or indirect negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, they are expected to gain additional momentum if a supportive international and regional umbrella for calm is established. These negotiations will not necessarily be political in the traditional sense but may focus on security, border, and technical files related to ceasefire arrangements, disputed points, mutual withdrawals, and international monitoring mechanisms... In this context, negotiations could become a key tool for managing the post-war phase. Washington will be interested in achieving a tangible accomplishment that prevents a resurgence of confrontations, and the international community will view any progress in this path as a gateway to broader stability in Lebanon and the region.

The most important question relates to the possibility of Israel completely withdrawing from southern Lebanon. Here, a distinction should be made between desire and political feasibility. Theoretically, if sufficient security guarantees are provided to Israel within broader arrangements sponsored by the United States and other international powers, withdrawal becomes a feasible option. However, this withdrawal will not be easy or swift, as the Israeli political establishment will seek to present it to public opinion as part of a deal that achieves clear security gains, rather than a result of pressure or defeat...

Therefore, the most likely scenario is a gradual or phased withdrawal linked to a comprehensive package of understandings that includes security arrangements, international monitoring, and mutual guarantees. An immediate and unconditional withdrawal remains less likely in the near term, especially given the current Israeli political climate... If these arrangements succeed, the likelihood of effectively stopping the war in southern Lebanon becomes relatively high. However, what is meant here is not complete peace or the end of the historical conflict, but rather a transition to a model resembling long periods of calm that the Lebanese-Palestinian borders experienced in earlier phases. This means that the conflict remains politically and strategically ongoing, yet militarily recedes to controllable low levels... Ultimately, it seems that the region is heading, according to this hypothesis, towards a phase of reorganization of balances more than heading towards a phase of definitive resolution of conflicts. The potential American-Iranian understanding may impose a new ceiling on movement for all parties involved, including Israel. Netanyahu's refusal, despite its political and media importance, may not be sufficient to derail a path supported by broad international backing, but it may succeed in delaying it or modifying some of its clauses... Therefore, the prevailing trend in the coming months could be the transition of the Lebanese front from the logic of open war to the logic of negotiation supported by mutual deterrence, with increased chances of solidifying the ceasefire, continuing efforts related to the Israeli withdrawal, and the growing importance of border and security negotiations. The decisive factor will remain linked to the ability of the United States to oblige all parties to the outputs of any new regional understanding, and to the willingness of the Israeli government, especially given electoral calculations, to adapt to a strategic reality different from that which prevailed in recent years.

In a reading of the position of the Lebanese resistance – Hezbollah, it can be summarized as follows:

The resistance's position in Lebanon regarding any potential American-Iranian understanding cannot be reduced to a logic of immediate gain and loss, but must be understood within a broader framework regarding the redefinition of priorities for the upcoming phase. The resistance, after long months of confrontation and exhaustion on the southern front, appears more concerned than any other party to determine whether the proposed understandings will actually lead to the establishment of new rules of engagement that prevent Israel from exploiting the results of the war politically and militarily, or whether they will constitute merely a temporary ceasefire that reignites the reasons for explosion later on... From this perspective, any American-Iranian understanding is not viewed within the resistance's environment as a final settlement of the conflict, but as a framework for managing a transitional phase that may prolong or shorten depending on the behavior of the various parties. The historical experience since 2000 has reinforced in the resistance a firm conviction that Israel often treats agreements and international resolutions as circumstantial tools related to the balance of power, rather than as permanent strategic commitments. Therefore, the primary criterion for the resistance will not be the announcement of the agreement itself, but the ability of this agreement to impose practical commitments on the Israeli side.

In this context, the caution that the resistance may show towards the Israeli positions rejecting or hesitating about any American-Iranian understanding can be understood. These positions, from its perspective, express not only a political disagreement between Washington and Tel Aviv but also reveal the existence of a current within the Israeli establishment that still bets on continuing the project of weakening the resistance axis through military, security, and economic pressures. Thus, the resistance will view Israeli rejection as a signal that requires vigilance rather than as a sufficient reason to dismiss the hypothesis of calm... It is likely that the resistance leadership will view the expected Israeli media escalation during the upcoming phase as part of an indirect negotiation process occurring at multiple levels. Israel understands that any new regional understanding might impose additional restrictions on its military action freedom; therefore, it will seek to raise the ceiling of political and security rhetoric to obtain as many guarantees and concessions as possible. Meanwhile, the resistance will also try to maintain the existing balance of deterrence and prevent the new understandings from becoming a platform for imposing political or security conditions that affect the essence of its role or capabilities...

At the operational level, the primary priority for the resistance during the upcoming phase seems linked to maintaining elements of power that it considers the real guarantee for any long-term stability. The Lebanese experience over past decades has shown that political and diplomatic balances remain fragile unless they are based on a tangible balance of deterrence on the ground. Hence, we can expect the resistance to adhere to an approach that separates calm from abandoning military capabilities. It may engage in new security arrangements or field understandings, but it will not view them as a substitute for the deterrence equation that it considers the cornerstone of any sustainable stability... Regarding the fate of the resistance within the new regional scene, discussing its diminishing role or the end of its strategic function seems premature. Even if the American-Iranian understanding succeeds, the structural reasons that led to the emergence of the resistance axis in the region will not have disappeared. The Arab-Israeli conflict will remain, the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories will remain, and files related to sovereignty, borders, and regional influence will remain open to varying degrees. Thus, any anticipated transformation will be closer to a political and strategic repositioning than to a complete termination of the role performed by the resistance.

Conversely, the resistance understands that the regional and international atmosphere is changing. Therefore, the next phase may witness a gradual transition from the priority of open military confrontation to the priority of consolidating the political and strategic gains that have resulted from years of conflict. This does not mean abandoning the option of resistance, but rather managing this option within different circumstances that require a higher degree of political flexibility and engagement in more complex regional arrangements...

From another angle, the public Israeli positions regarding a potential American-Iranian agreement may contain an important contradiction. The more the level of public Israeli objection rises, the more some circles of the resistance become convinced that the agreement includes elements that do not fully align with the Israeli vision. On the other hand, if Israel succeeds in modifying some clauses of the understanding or imposing additional conditions through political pressure on Washington, the resistance will seek to evaluate whether those amendments affect the core of the balances that were formed after the war or not. Therefore, the upcoming phase will likely be characterized by a careful follow-up of all executive details rather than by general political slogans... If the negotiating process succeeds in reaching stable arrangements on the Lebanese front, the resistance may find itself facing a new challenge that differs from the challenges of war. The next challenge will not only be how to manage military deterrence, but also how to manage the phase of relative stability without allowing Israel to transform the security calm into long-term political or strategic gains. This explains the expected focus on files of complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Lebanese territories, solidifying Lebanese border rights, and enhancing international guarantees related to preventing attacks and violations...

Ultimately, if the hypothesis of the American-Iranian understanding proves correct, the resistance in Lebanon will not treat it as the end of the conflict phase, but as the beginning of a new stage in managing the conflict with different tools. Its perspective on Israeli positions will be governed by a fundamental rule that the Israeli rhetoric, no matter how heightened, only acquires its true meaning through what is translated on the ground. Therefore, the decisive factor for the resistance will not be the magnitude of declared Israeli objections but the ability of the United States and the international community to impose effective commitments that prevent Israel from re-establishing the conditions for previous confrontations. At this precise point, it will be determined whether the region is indeed heading towards a phase of relatively long-term stability or merely towards a temporary ceasefire preceding a new round of conflict under different conditions.