The Future of the Palestinian Cause After the Founding Historical Leadership: Arafat and Abbas

Although the entire internal Palestinian political situation is controversial nationally and internationally, the leadership institution is the most contentious, especially after the death of President "Abu Amar" in 2004, where President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) faces a strategic challenge in balancing the conflicting roles of his leadership of the "Palestine Liberation Organization" as a national liberation movement, and his administration of the "Palestinian National Authority" as an administrative ruling entity constrained by agreements.

It is true that even in the time of "Abu Amar", his leadership and Fatah movement, in general, faced intense threats and harsh criticisms, even from within the movement, such as the split of Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal), and the split sponsored by Syria in 1983, as well as the exit of some leaders from Fatah like Munir Shafiq and Nagy Allouch, in addition to the division caused by Hamas. Moreover, Abu Amar faced strong opposition and accusations from within Fatah in the last two years of his rule, reaching the point of forming a rival Fatah front against him. Despite the challenges and fierce opposition from some Arab regimes faced by the leadership, the presidency and leadership remained cohesive, with "Abu Amar" remaining a symbol of Palestinian nationalism, respected by the entire populace during his life and after his death, including his opponents in other parties and movements.

As for President Mahmoud Abbas, who came at a more difficult time after the confirmation of the failure of the Oslo Accords, the leadership institution has weakened and lost some of its prestige, with increasing critical voices against him for various accusations, including: recognizing Israel, conceding 78% of Palestine, signing the Oslo Agreement, opposing armed resistance, repeating his stance on the "futility of the rockets" launched by Hamas, and the corruption within the authority, along with the president's focus on the United Nations and the shifts in global public opinion. Additionally, there were accusations of corruption and mismanagement within the authority, and these accusations were amplified, reinforced, and promoted either by the Zionist entity or by Hamas and Islamist movements.

It is true that "Abu Mazen" does not possess the revolutionary charisma of "Abu Amar", nor his popularity or history of struggle, but objectively, most of the issues that underlie the accusations against President "Abu Mazen" began during President "Abu Amar's" time and with his blessing; such as the mutual recognition agreement between the organization and Israel, the signing of the Oslo Agreement, and security coordination, and even the accusations of authority corruption.

We will not revisit the writing about the crisis of the national project, nor absolve the leadership - whether (Arafati) or (Abbas) - from responsibility for the current state of affairs; but they are not the only ones responsible. There are also Palestinian and Arab entities that share this responsibility. The main reason is the imbalance in the power dynamics between Palestinians and Israelis and the major collapses within the (allies) camp, such as the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp, coinciding with the collapse of the Arab regional order during the second Gulf War, along with the Israeli right's relentless work to undermine the Oslo Agreement after the assassination of "Yitzhak Rabin" in 1995.

On the other hand, in order not to overindulge in self-flagellation for Palestinians and President Abu Mazen, a lot of disinformation lies behind some accusations against President "Abu Mazen" and the Palestine Liberation Organization, including the "concession of 78% of Palestine"; as for this subject, the Palestinians did not have possession of all of Palestine to concede 78% of it to the Jews, but rather all of Palestine was occupied. As for the president's description of the rockets as futile, it has indeed been shown that they were more than futile; they brought destruction to Gaza and to the national cause. We can also add the president's call for international protection from the United Nations General Assembly; had that protection been available at that time, what happened in Gaza at least would not have occurred.

President Abu Mazen possessed a realistic vision that accompanied him since the early seventies, seeing that military action and direct confrontation with Israel would not achieve the Palestinian people's goals of freedom, but this vision conflicts with the prevailing popular culture in Palestine and the Arab world, as well as with the concepts and strategies of traditional national liberation movements. The main weakness of this vision is its lack of a national strategy to embrace it and for appropriate tools of action; even the popular resistance he called for was not activated.

All of this has led to an imbalance in managing the conflict with the enemy and mismanagement of the internal situation, especially his poor choice of advisors and close aides; these were significant reasons for the corruption of the authority and the alienation of the people from it, along with the decline in the president's popularity. This close circle exploited his advancing age and the heavy responsibilities to push him towards issuing hurried and ambiguous presidential decrees without a pressing national necessity for these decrees, and this circle also controlled the mechanisms for implementing the decrees without in-depth consultations or returning to the relevant authorities, to enhance its influence.

At this advanced age, the president's insistence on holding onto power, where he insists on dying as a president, poses an obstacle to change, providing a justification for those in his generation to cling to their positions at the top of the pyramid, whether in the executive or central committee or at the head of their parties. The president is also criticized for resorting to unilateral appointments, even regarding the selection of his successor, and we do not know why the president insists on clinging to power and all the presidencies?

Is it love for power, one who said at the beginning of his term: If five people demonstrated against me, I would resign, and on another occasion said: “If two Palestinians came out against me demanding my resignation, I would be the third and I would resign”? Or is it a lack of confidence in those around him to ensure the continuity of power without its collapse along with the collapse of Fatah and the organization? Or does he still gamble on being president until he witnesses the establishment of the independent Palestinian state? Or are there other calculations in the president that we do not know and that the close circle surrounding the president knows?

What we hope for from the president is to work on separating the presidencies - the Palestine Liberation Organization, the state, the authority, and Fatah movement - because if this combination is possible and justified in the presence of historical leaders like Abu Amar and Abu Mazen, it is not guaranteed that whoever succeeds the president can bear this responsibility. In this context, we suggest separating the presidency of the Palestine Liberation Organization from the other presidencies, and that the organization's headquarters be relocated from Ramallah to outside the occupied territories, to be more free and able to represent all the people and preserve the continuity of the national cause until the establishment of the Palestinian state in fact and not just on paper.