The Consequences of the War on Iran
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The Consequences of the War on Iran

Palestinians, as usual, are engaged in debates about the potential outcomes of the American-Israeli war on Iran, whether in geographical or temporal terms, as well as the possible scenarios following one week since its onset. This preoccupation is not merely an academic interest; rather, it is essential for understanding the transformations in international and regional relations, as well as the trajectory of Palestinian political forces and their future directions, networks of relationships, and alliances, regardless of the war's outcomes, duration, or geographical scope. The shifts that have occurred in the declared objectives of the U.S. administration during the first seven days—from weakening the Iranian political system to overthrowing it—necessitate a different use of force, transitioning from reliance on naval airstrikes to deploying ground forces. This is currently impractical due to a lack of military presence in areas adjacent to Iranian borders and the Gulf states' reluctance (so far) to engage in this offensive coalition, as well as internal political considerations in the United States. The U.S. may leverage local forces to instigate a coup against the ruling regime, whether by mobilizing the Iranian street with large numbers, recruiting military leaders to conduct a coup against the political system, or arming ethnic groups. The latter would extend the duration of this war, especially considering the opposition of allied countries like Turkey, whose national interests and security are at stake. Conversely, the political system in Iran seems inclined to prolong this war, based on a policy of strategic patience, despite the significant human, material, and political losses it is enduring under the fire of U.S.-Israeli aggression. Iran is relying on: (1) the personality of the U.S. president, who is eager for rapid results from the military operation; (2) the pressure from Gulf Arab states, which are now under fire from Iran without being part of the war, fearing its expansion; (3) the exacerbation of the global economic situation due to stalled supply chains for energy resources ('oil derivatives') from the Arabian Gulf, which accounts for more than a quarter of maritime oil trade and nearly one-fifth of global oil and derivative consumption, owing to military operations and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, impacting economic recession and the storage capacity for oil and gas in Gulf states; (4) betting on transformations within U.S. politics, whether in Congress, with resistance to this war from lawmakers, and some of President Trump’s allies, along with pressures from the upcoming midterm elections in November; (5) and the financial cost of the war on the U.S. treasury. In my view, no one today can predict the course of this war and how far it might expand regarding ongoing shifts in its objectives, applying a zero-sum perspective. The Americans and Israelis launched the first strike by assassinating a key religious and political symbol of the Iranian political system, precluding any possibility of negotiations. The Iranians responded by launching missiles at military and civilian installations in Arab countries and Turkey, which weakened or made any potential intervention to stop the war nearly impossible. Moreover, the geographical front is likely to expand with Hezbollah’s involvement in this conflict, adding to the existing risks in Lebanon. However, it is certain that the extensive human, material, and economic losses in the region and on a global scale will not be the only outcomes. The transformations resulting from them in the nature of the international system, the rules of international relations, and investment trajectories in energy resources will be the most significant factors at the end of this war, irrespective of its duration and geographical areas. Clearly, this requires immediate reflection and scrutiny from Palestinian factions and political and social forces in their orientations and alliances, aimed at achieving the interests of the Palestinian people, rather than merely their partisan interests.
This article expresses the opinion of its author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of Sada News Agency.