תוצאות המלחמה על איראן

 

הפלסטינים, כהרגלם, engaged in discussions about the outcomes of the American-Israeli war on Iran, whether on a geographical or temporal level, as well as the potential scenarios a week after it began. This preoccupation is not merely an intellectual engagement but rather a necessity for understanding the transformations in international and regional relations, as well as the trajectory of Palestinian political forces and their future orientations, their network of relationships, and alliances, regardless of the results, duration, and geographical scope of this war.

The transformations that have occurred regarding the objectives announced by the American administration in the first seven days, from weakening the Iranian political system to its overthrow, require a different use of force, moving from reliance on maritime airstrikes to deploying ground forces, which so far is not feasible due to practical reasons such as the absence of military presence in areas adjacent to the Iranian borders and the Gulf states' unwillingness (so far) to engage in this offensive alliance, as well as internal political reasons in the United States. This is unless local forces are used to pounce on the ruling system, whether through mobilizing the Iranian street to protest in large numbers, recruiting military leaders to coup against the political system, or armed ethnic groups that are either armed or being armed. The latter implies extending the duration of this war, as well as considering the opposition from allied nations to the United States, like Turkey, regarding their interests and national security.

On the other hand, the political system in Iran seems to be aiming to prolong this war, relying on a policy of strategic patience, despite the significant human, material, and political losses it is facing under the American-Israeli aggression. It depends on (1) the personality of the American president, who is anxious to achieve quick results from the military operation. (2) The Arab pressure from Gulf states that are now under Iranian fire without being part of the war and fear of its expansion. (3) The exacerbating global economic situation due to the stoppage of supply chains for energy sources "oil derivatives" from the Arabian Gulf, which constitute more than a quarter of the oil trade transported by sea and about one-fifth of the global consumption of oil and its derivatives, due to military operations and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz whether on the level of economic stagnation or the storage capacity of oil and gas extracted in the Gulf states. (4) Betting on transformations within the corridors of American politics, whether in the American Congress with the existence of opposition to this war among representatives and senators on one side, and some of President Trump's allies on the other side, and the pressures of conducting midterm elections in the coming November on a third side. (5) The financial cost of the war on the US Treasury.

In my opinion, no one today possesses the ability to predict the course of events in this war and the extent of its expansion regarding its ongoing objectives, or using a zero-sum theory in its proceedings; for the Americans and Israelis made the first strike by assassinating the religious and political symbol of the political system in Iran, which made it impossible to think of negotiations, and the Iranians launched missiles at military and civilian facilities in Arab countries and on Turkey, making the possibility of intervening to stop the war weak or impossible, not to mention the widening geographical front with Hezbollah joining this war and the existing risks in Lebanon.     

However, it is certain that the significant human and material losses in the region and the economic impact on the international level will not be the only reckoned factors, but the transformations resulting from them in the nature of the international system and the rules of international relations and pathways for investment in energy sources will be the most present by the end of this war, regardless of its duration and its expanses. It surely requires, without waiting, scrutiny and reflection from the factions and Palestinian political and social forces in their orientations and alliances to achieve the interest of the Palestinian people rather than their factional interests.