The Israeli Opposition... A Partner in Netanyahu's Power Fabrication / Mustafa Ibrahim

Some Israeli analyses tend to place the sole blame for the continuation of the war and the escalation of confrontations on Benjamin Netanyahu, but this reading overlooks a fundamental fact that the Israeli opposition itself has been, and still is, one of the most important sources of strength upon which Netanyahu relies to remain in power.

According to some critical Israeli analysts, instead of forming a genuine political alternative or leading a serious accountability process for the government following the failure of October 7, the opposition effectively contributed to raising Netanyahu's ceiling and provided him with a political and popular safety net. By engaging in the national Zionist consensus, it became a protective wall that prevented him from falling at several junctures that could have ended his political future.

The opposition could have capitalized on the Israeli anger after October 7 to showcase Netanyahu's failures and his inability to lead. He is a politician historically known for his hesitation and fear of making decisive decisions when their political costs are high. However, what happened was the exact opposite, as he succeeded in transforming the failures of the army and security agencies into an opportunity to rearrange the balance of power within the occupying state, avoiding personal accountability for the disaster, and even refraining from acknowledging any political responsibility for it.

Netanyahu was able to tame the security and military establishment and use its failures to his advantage, while the opposition was more preoccupied with managing the crisis than with holding those responsible accountable. Instead of revealing to public opinion the extent of political and security failures, they preferred to join the state of general mobilization under the banner of supporting the army and national unity, which gave Netanyahu the necessary time and political cover to restore his image.

In his relationship with President Donald Trump, Netanyahu knows well when to pull back and when to push forward. He understands the nature of American politics as well as Trump’s personality and calculations. Thus, even when under American pressure, he tries to convert it into an internal political asset.

Every confrontation or disagreement with Washington is marketed within Israel as evidence of the independence of Israeli decision-making and of Netanyahu's ability to say "no" to the American president when it comes to what the Israeli right regards as national interests.

For this reason, Netanyahu does not treat his disagreements with American administrations as an existential threat. He has engaged in political confrontations with successive American administrations, from Bill Clinton to Barack Obama and Joe Biden, and he knows that the United States will remain compelled to deal with him as long as he remains Prime Minister.

As for the real danger for him, it does not come from Washington, but from losing his position. He knows that leaving the premiership means losing influence and political immunity, perhaps even returning to court or to the margins of political life. Therefore, he fights all his battles as personal and political survival battles, not merely disputes over public policies.

For this reason, focusing on Netanyahu’s personality becomes essential in any serious political analysis. The decisive factor in Israel is not only the nature of the system or the balance of power, but the person who holds the authority to make the final decision. Under Netanyahu’s rule, these powers have concentrated more than ever in the hands of the Prime Minister.

But responsibility does not rest solely on Netanyahu. The Israeli opposition repeats the same mistake time and again. When the guns start roaring, opposing voices retreat, and most of their leaders return to align behind the government under the banner of "national unity" or "supporting the army."

With the exception of a few limited voices like Yair Golan, real criticism disappears, difficult questions are absent, and the political discourse becomes another version of the government's narrative. Figures like Naftali Bennett, Gadi Eisenkot, Avigdor Lieberman, and others, despite their awareness of the extent of the failure Netanyahu has led Israel to, hesitate to engage in a real political confrontation with him on issues of war and military escalation, fearing to lose voters' support or to appear weak in the eyes of the Israeli public.

It seems that the obsession with opinion polls, and the number of seats in the Knesset, and the desire for power pushes many opposition leaders to adopt the same security discourse that Netanyahu promotes, instead of providing a different political and strategic alternative. Thus, their competition becomes a bidding war on who appears more hardline, rather than a competition on how to extract Israel from its escalating crises.

As a result, Netanyahu successfully presents himself time and again as the sole leader capable of managing crises, while his competitors become mere diluted versions of him. Instead of being an alternative to him, they become part of the political environment that enables him to continue and survive.

However, it is wrong to reduce this outcome solely to the performance of the Israeli opposition. Netanyahu also benefitted from the mistakes of Israel’s adversaries and enemies. Since October 7, the calculations of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iranian policies, to varying degrees, have contributed to creating an environment that allowed him to rebuild his political status despite his responsibility for the largest security failure in Israel's history.

Instead of the war results leading to his political downfall, Netanyahu found himself capable of leveraging the continuation of confrontations and multiple fronts to convince Israelis that Israel faces ongoing existential threats and that any change in leadership during this period could carry greater risks.

Many forces have miscalculated how to manage the conflict with Israel, as they have misjudged Netanyahu's ability to use wars and crises to his advantage. Often, steps that were supposed to weaken him turned into factors that helped reinforce his political position and reproduce himself as an indispensable leader in the eyes of a large part of Israeli society.

Recent years have proven that military strikes alone have not resolved the conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, or with Iran. Despite assassinations, bombings, and ongoing escalation, Israel has not achieved the political objectives it declared, while security and regional challenges have grown more complex. In turn, the forces confronting Israel have failed to prevent Netanyahu from transforming these confrontations into a political leverage that reinforces his power.

What Israel needs, according to this critical perspective proposed by some voices within it, is not more slogans or new rounds of escalation, but a comprehensive review of the policies that led to this deadlock.

Wars are not the end of the road, but rather the beginning of new paths. Success is not measured by the number of targets that are bombarded, but by the state's ability to build a more stable political and security reality.

As for the opposition that limits itself to echoing the rhetoric of strength and fears to confront Netanyahu at crucial moments, it does not offer a real alternative but becomes an indirect partner in prolonging his leadership. Ironically, many of his domestic adversaries, alongside Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran abroad, have contributed, with their political and military mistakes, to enhancing his political position and granting him additional reasons to remain in power, turning the failures that were supposed to hasten his downfall into new opportunities to rebuild his image and strengthen his position within Israeli society.