Israel Between the Iran Dilemma and the Drain of Lebanon

Some Israeli analyses in the newspapers reveal a growing state of concern within the political and military institutions in Israel, at a moment when the war seems open on multiple fronts, while the difficulty in translating military superiority into clear political achievements increases. As Israel prepares for the possibility of resuming confrontation with Iran, its forces are increasingly sinking into a draining reality on the Lebanese front, amid rising human losses and the absence of a clear political or military horizon for the war. These analyses reflect a state of frustration and confusion within Israel, but they do not necessarily mean that Israel is undergoing a "strategic collapse," as some observers claim. Israel still possesses significant military and intelligence advantages and enjoys broad American and Western support. However, the current crisis lies in the inability of this superiority to produce a clear political or military resolution, whether in Gaza, Lebanon, or even in confrontation with Iran. Since the withdrawal of the Trump administration from the nuclear agreement in 2018, Israel, under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has relied on a "maximum pressure" policy against Iran, considering it the shortest way to push Tehran to retreat or accept new American-Israeli conditions. However, subsequent developments have shown that this policy has not achieved its goals completely; rather, it has contributed to accelerating the Iranian nuclear and missile programs and turned the conflict into an open confrontation that is difficult to resolve quickly. Despite American and Israeli strikes, Iran has shown no willingness to make substantial concessions, while Washington itself seems hesitant to engage in a wide regional war. Trump's particular hesitation stands out, as he realizes that any open confrontation with Iran could turn into a long and costly war economically and politically, at a time when he faces internal challenges regarding inflation and declining popularity. Therefore, Trump's sometimes contradictory statements—between threats of attack and retreat—reflect an attempt to balance support for Israel while avoiding being dragged into a war with unpredictable outcomes. Some Israeli analyses also reveal an implicit acknowledgment that military superiority, regardless of its size, is not sufficient alone to impose decisive political results. Israel is capable of inflicting widespread destruction on its adversaries, but it faces increasing difficulty in translating this superiority into a "stable and long-term victory image." Perhaps for this reason, some Israeli writings tend to use dramatic language and sometimes exaggerated warnings, not only to describe the reality but also to pressure the government, hold political leadership accountable for failures, or push for a change in war management. However, the most evident crisis appears on the Lebanese front. After long months of war, it does not seem that the Israeli army has succeeded in fundamentally changing the ground reality. Israeli forces are concentrated within a limited border strip, while Hezbollah continues to impose the equation of attrition through drones, ambushes, and daily clashes. Some discussions within Israel reveal a growing concern that the situation in southern Lebanon may transform into a modified version of the "security zone" experience in the 1990s, when Israeli forces turned into daily targets inside Lebanese territory. Israeli officers have spoken about their forces avoiding operations during the day for fear of drones and deferring many of their operations to nighttime, reflecting the extent of the challenge imposed by Hezbollah on the movement of the Israeli army in the field. However, these comparisons, despite their importance, do not necessarily mean that Israel is experiencing a complete repetition of the experience of withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, as much as they reflect a growing anxiety about slipping into a long war without clear objectives or the ability to decisively resolve it, amid a gradual erosion of the deterrence image that Israel has tried to repair since the beginning of the war. There are also unprecedented internal criticisms directed by officers and military leaders at the military institution itself in Israel. There is clear talk about weak discipline, repetitive operational errors, lack of strategic thinking, and even about a "military climate" that criminalizes professional doubt and considers caution a sign of weakness. These criticisms reflect a deeper crisis within the Israeli army, which has engaged in continuous wars in recent years without managing to produce a combat doctrine capable of dealing with unconventional wars. The recurring solutions are still based on "more destruction" and "more firepower," despite the accumulated experiences in Gaza and Lebanon proving the limitations of this approach. It seems that the military institution has become a prisoner of a political discourse that raises the ceiling of objectives to a level that is difficult to achieve. The slogan of "absolute victory" promoted by Netanyahu and his government has gradually become a burden on the army itself, as the ground reality does not provide any indicators of its possibility, while human losses increase and the internal front in the north erodes. In articles by several Israeli analysts, including Amos Harel in Haaretz, there is talk about a state of paralysis within the Israeli ruling system, amid the absence of a genuine strategic discussion regarding the objectives and implications of the war. The political and security institutions seem incapable of shaping a clear vision, while the military institution fears colliding with the far-right current within the government for fear of being accused of defeatism or negligence. Ultimately, this picture drawn does not depict an "Israeli collapse" as much as it portrays a state facing a growing strategic dilemma. Israel still possesses tremendous military power, but it finds it increasingly difficult to translate this power into a decisive political achievement or long-term stability. Perhaps the most important paradox lies in the fact that Israel, which entered these wars under the slogan of "restoring deterrence," finds itself today in front of a more complex reality: open fronts, drained forces, and increasing internal pressure, while the political leadership appears unable to acknowledge that military power alone is insufficient for achieving victory, and that wars that begin without realistic objectives or a clear political horizon can quickly turn into a long and costly attrition for everyone.