Bennett-Lapid: A Rise Without a Resolution in the Face of a Right That Reproduces Itself

The developments in the Israeli political map indicate a reshaping of the internal scene, where the Bennett-Lapid alliance appears to be one of the most prominent positions of the center, but at the same time reveals transformations in alliances, fragmentation in right-wing positions, and the rise of forces waiting for a decisive moment.

The alliance seems to have succeeded in achieving its primary goal: solidifying Bennett as the leader of the camp opposing Benjamin Netanyahu and preventing its votes from fragmenting. However, this very success has produced a deeper dilemma: the displacement of part of its natural base, the "non-Bibi" right-wing voters who do not see themselves in partnership with Lapid. This is not a marginal leakage, but a decisive block capable of tilting the elections. This group does not return to Netanyahu out of ideological reasons but due to the absence of an alternative. Herein lies the contradiction in the polls: stability in the size of the camp, contrasted with an inability to make decisive moves.

At this specific point, neither Avigdor Lieberman nor Yoaz Hendel appears as secondary allies, but rather as a balancing condition.
Lieberman has a proven ability to attract secular right-wing voters, but he encounters a clear ceiling among conservative voters. In contrast, Hendel approaches this group but lacks sufficient weight to cross the decisive percentage alone. In other words, each of them possesses half of the solution. Thus, the alliance between Lieberman and Hendel becomes not a tactical option but a structural necessity. It is the only framework capable of containing the hesitant right-wing votes and preventing their migration towards Likud or "religious Zionism," without imposing their forced integration into the Bennett-Lapid alliance.

Conversely, Gadi Eisenkot's movements seem more like an attempt to fill this void, but they face clear limitations. Adding security figures such as Yoram Cohen or professional figures like Shaul Mofaz enhances the image of "competence," but does not address the core issue: the absence of a coherent electoral base. The polls do not indicate actual expansion but rather a redistribution within the camp itself.

However, reading this scene remains incomplete without incorporating the factor of political timing. As noted by the writer and editor of Haaretz, Aluf Benn, it is not just about who allies with whom but about who captures the moment of transformation before its features become clear. The announcement of the Naftali Bennett - Yair Lapid alliance at this early stage cannot be separated from a political assessment of an existing tremor forming within Benjamin Netanyahu's camp, which may not be limited to a decline in his position but also to reopening the question of his leadership, amid indicators of a fragmentation of the center of power in Israel and a reshaping of its balances before the electoral resolution.

Here, the alliance takes on a different dimension: not just an attempt to organize the camp but a race to position oneself in the "day after Netanyahu." This assumption, even if it does not materialize, already affects the behavior of the actors and pushes Bennett to take a step toward occupying the position of the "ready alternative" before the right-wing house is rearranged from within.

In this context, understanding Bennett's move becomes closer to the logic of the "first initiator": jumping early into the leadership center, hoping that any tremors in Netanyahu's position will lead to a wide rearrangement in the political map. But this wager carries a profound paradox: the closer Bennett gets to the center of opposition as an alternative leader, the further he moves away from the right-wing base he needs to win.

The matter does not stop at partisan calculations but intersects with a broader political environment characterized by multiple crises surrounding Netanyahu: ongoing judicial pressures, internal tensions, criticisms of the government's performance in the war, and a decline in international support. These combined factors do not necessarily mean an immediate end for Netanyahu, but they open a window for the possibility of change, which Bennett seeks to anticipate.

Conversely, Bennett also bets on a scenario of relative disintegration within the right-wing camp in the absence of Netanyahu, where Likud votes may be distributed among more than one pole or drawn towards more extreme figures like Itamar Ben Gvir. In this case, Bennett attempts to present himself as a "restorer" of the right, capable of combining security discourse with governmental experience, without being tied to Netanyahu's legacy.

However, this bet faces two main constraints: first, Netanyahu's absence—if it happens—may also open the door for the rise of right-wing alternatives from within Likud itself, not just from outside. Second, Bennett's ability to attract this block remains conditional on not fully dissolving in a center led by Lapid.

Here lies the paradox: the more Bennett tries to expand the center of the camp, the more he narrows his right-wing margin. This is not a crisis of the alliance but a crisis of structure. Approaching the center in Israeli politics does not come without a price—unless accompanied by the construction of a parallel right-wing arm.

As for Eisenkot, his choice to run independently reflects a bet on his ability to assert himself as a leader above this fragile balance. But recent experience indicates that the existence of multiple leadership centers within the camp does not produce strength but rather conflict that drains it—especially in an indeterminate transitional moment.

Here the question is no longer: Did the Bennett-Lapid alliance succeed? But rather, can this success endure in a dynamic political environment, whose features are defined not only within the camp but also according to the fate of its main opponent? So far, the camp has succeeded in preventing collapse—but it has not yet succeeded in building a path to power. The key to that is not in its center, but to its right, and perhaps also in what will happen on the other side of the political map.

This discussion of the "day after" scenario within Benjamin Netanyahu's camp does not mean that the right in Israel lives in a state of fragility. On the contrary, general trends indicate a consolidation of the right-wing inclination as a political and societal choice that transcends individuals.

In this context, hypotheses emerge regarding the identity of those who may fill any potential leadership void, including what analysts like Amit Segal suggest about the possibility of Avigdor Lieberman's rise. However, this hypothesis does not reflect a change in the balance of power within the right but rather expresses an internal search for alternative leadership within the camp itself.
Here intensifies the paradox of Bennett: while he attempts to advance from the center of the camp as the "alternative," the right may be reproduced from within it, and under new leadership that is not part of this alliance—returning the crisis to its origin: power at the center is not sufficient as long as the resolution is shaped on the right.