Why Has the Arab League Lost Its Credibility and Can It Be Rebuilt?

The appointment of Nabil Fahmy (75 years old), former Egyptian Foreign Minister, a few days ago as Secretary-General of the Arab League by consensus of member states, succeeding Ahmed Aboul Gheit, passed by without any public interest; the league has lost its credibility among the Arab street. His appointment did not raise any reservations from any Arab country, unlike before when several states competed to have the secretary-general from among them.

This coolness may be due to everyone — states and peoples — being preoccupied with the threats, dangers, and wars occurring in the region, which have left severe repercussions not just on the targeted states like Palestine and Lebanon, but on the entire supposed Arab world. Furthermore, Iran's targeting of Gulf countries and Jordan without a unified Arab reaction also reflects the retreat of Arab nationalism.

Everything that was once gambled on in terms of Arab joint action leading to Arab unity, or at least maintaining the bare minimum of Arab cooperation and solidarity — even if only formally — within the framework of the League is now up in the air; even Egypt's call last March to activate the Arab joint defense agreement and form a joint Arab force received no response.

The decline of the League's status can be attributed to several reasons:

1- The emergence of populist tendencies in several countries against Arab nationalism.

2- The constraints of its charter, which requires consensus among states for binding decisions to be issued.

3- Its failure to resolve any internal conflicts or disputes within the states themselves, many of which have escalated to the level of war and armed confrontation.

4- The bureaucracy of its operations and the inefficiency of the majority of its employees, who are often appointed based on loyalty to the state rather than competence and belief in Arab joint action.

5- The lack of belief among Arab leaders themselves — especially the new generation — in Arab joint action, with none of them willing to concede to any other leader for the sake of common Arab interests.

6- External interventions by countries hostile to Arab nationalism in Arab affairs, trying to pull some Arab states or segments of their populations towards foreign axes based on sectarian or religious grounds, or through economic incentives, all under the pretext of maintaining national security.

7- The decline of national culture and Arab nationalist thought in favor of an ideological religious expansion that does not believe in nationalism, or in favor of a culture of globalization.

Since its establishment in 1945, eight figures have held the office of the League's secretary-general (all from Egypt except one from Tunisia). It is no exaggeration to say that Aboul Gheit's term was the worst; during his tenure, the chaos of the "Arab Spring" continued, Arab-Arab disputes deepened, and aggression from neighboring states (Israel, Turkey, and Iran) escalated, intervening in the internal affairs of more than one state. His term also witnessed the second wave of normalization, as Aboul Gheit rejected the passing of a Palestinian resolution condemning the normalization of relations by the UAE and Bahrain with Israel, which contradicts the decisions of Arab summits and the Arab Peace Initiative, as well as the genocide and ethnic cleansing against the Palestinian people and the violation of Syria by neighboring states. Moreover, Aboul Gheit was accused — rather than working to resolve the internal issues — of bias towards one side over another, and "renting" the League to the highest bidder; at times, he catered to Qatar as its influence rose in the region, and at other times to the UAE, all of which diminished what little credibility the League had left.

Nabil Fahmy's appointment comes at a sensitive and dangerous time for the Arab nation as a whole, including those who believed they were protected by American and Western military bases or that their normalization with Israel would safeguard them, or those who thought that their sectarian religious ties with neighboring countries would provide protection and replace their Arab depth. Can Nabil Fahmy reform the League, restore its prestige, and amend its charter, backed by Egypt's steadfast position under President Sisi? Or will his term witness the League transition from a state of clinical death to receiving the final bullet? This is what we hope does not happen, nor do any Arab wishes, especially after the failure of bets on external interventions and the narrow populist bets.