Will Iran Succeed in Breaking the Zionist-American Project?

Let us hypothetically imagine, for the sake of analysis and provoking thoughts, that the Iranian revolution had erupted during the time of Gamal Abdel Nasser rather than Anwar Sadat. It is likely that he would have been very happy about it and would have realized immediately that revolutionary Iran had become a strategic depth for Egypt in confronting the Zionist movement. There would have been room for fruitful cooperation between two countries whose leadership could have spared the region numerous futile conflicts that have ravaged it for decades, and the Zionist-American alliance would not have been able to penetrate and tear apart the region as is happening now. However, fate decreed that this revolution erupted during Sadat's time, after his visit to occupied Jerusalem, not before it.

When the initial signs of this revolution began in 1978, Sadat had turned his back on the liberatory legacy of the Egyptian national movement with its various tributaries, not just Nasser's legacy, and started down the path that led him to visit occupied Jerusalem in 1977, claiming at the time that the United States held 99% of the cards, and that rapprochement with it could help reach a comprehensive political settlement for the conflict with Israel, which would lead to its withdrawal from the Arab territories it occupied in 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. Despite the negative Israeli response to his reckless gamble, Sadat persisted in his delusion and insisted on continuing the path he had chosen for himself, accepting President Jimmy Carter's invitation for direct negotiations with Menachem Begin, to be held at Camp David under his auspices. However, these negotiations resulted only in framework agreements, which his closest aides warned him against accepting, yet he stubbornly proceeded to sign them, causing a deep rift in the Arab system, exemplified by the relocation of the Arab League's headquarters to Tunisia and the establishment of an Arab front opposing Sadat's approach, termed the "Steadfastness and Confrontation Front."

The new leaders of the Iranian regime seem more determined

A few months after those momentous events, the pressure from the Iranian street reached its peak, leading to the Shah's flight (1/16/1979) and the return of Imam Khomeini from his French exile (2/1/1979). The Iranian revolution continued its course until it succeeded in overthrowing the old regime and declaring the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran (2/11/1979). What is striking here is Sadat's complete disregard for what was happening, perhaps under the illusion that the United States would not allow one of its most important allies in the region to fall so easily, and would swiftly act to restore the Shah to his throne as it had done before with Mohammed Mossadegh's revolution in the early 1950s. This explains his decision to host the deposed Shah in Cairo, a move that challenged the Iranian people's will and insisted on continuing the path that led to the signing of a separate peace treaty with Israel (3/26/1979), which marked a major turning point in the region's history.

With the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran, on one hand, and Egypt's Sadat administration renouncing armed struggle against the Zionist project, on the other, the Middle East entered a new phase that heralded the onset of severe storms. Before the eruption of this revolution, the Arab world was divided between two camps: one seeking a peaceful settlement at any cost, and the other rejecting a settlement on Israeli terms and demanding the continuation of armed struggle, leading to significant confusion in the cards. Although Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was one of the most enthusiastic Arab leaders for the establishment of the "Steadfastness and Confrontation Front," seeking to lead it, the success of the Islamic revolution turned his calculations and priorities upside down, explaining his decision to launch a war on Iran, mistakenly thinking it would be an easy target due to the prevailing chaos and the new regime's inability to consolidate its footing, assuring himself he would achieve an easy victory that would help assert his control over the Gulf region and then focus on managing the conflict with the Zionist enemy from a position of power. However, what happened was the opposite; this "strategic blindness" led Saddam to become mired in Iranian quagmire for more than eight years, dragging the whole region into the embrace of the Americans, especially after his invasion of Kuwait following the end of the Iran war, and pushing the Gulf Arab states towards the "Camp David approach," abandoning support for the Palestinian cause, paving the way for the United States to infiltrate the region and invade, occupy, and destroy Iraq.

Sadat promoted the idea that managing the conflict through political means yields better results

On the other hand, the new Iranian regime feared the possibility of a repeat of what happened to Mossadegh's revolution, when American intelligence conspired against it and successfully restored the fleeing Shah to power a second time. Thus, the hardline wing of the student movement took over the American embassy in Tehran and held its staff hostage for 444 days, beginning a quest for means that would enable the new regime to build strong front-line defenses to fortify the revolution against attempts to abort it. It became active in building bridges with forces opposed to American and Zionist policies in the region, closing the Israeli mission in Tehran and gifting it to the Palestine Liberation Organization in recognition of it as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. When Israel invaded Lebanon and managed to expel the Palestine Liberation Organization to Tunisia, the Iranian regime immediately began supporting efforts to establish Hezbollah, which focused much of its activity on resisting the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Once the war with Iraq ceased, Iran began to concentrate its efforts on military manufacturing and achieved a major leap in this field. When the United States exploited the September 11 attacks (2001) to invade Afghanistan and occupy it, then swiftly turned to invade and occupy Iraq, Iran realized it would be the next target, so it became active in aiding the forces seeking to resist the American occupation, which later enabled it to build strong centers of influence in a country that had, until recently, been waging a long war of attrition against it. Iran continued its efforts on this front until it was able to form (and lead) the "Resistance Axis" that is currently engaged in the ongoing armed conflict with the Zionist-American project, ignited by the first spark of the "Flood of Al-Aqsa" (10/7/2023), which has since expanded to include not just Gaza, but also the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and has reached Iran itself, the head of the "Resistance Axis." Since Israel could not wage war alone against a state the size of Iran, Netanyahu repeatedly sought to drag the United States into participating in a war that he had dreamed of launching against Iran for years. This was finally achieved not just once but twice: first, in a limited confrontation that lasted 12 days, where the American role was restricted to performing tasks that the Israeli war machine could not accomplish, namely destroying nuclear facilities. The second: in an open war that is still raging at the time of writing this. Because this is a comprehensive war aimed at overthrowing the Iranian regime and opening the way for total hegemony over the region, the United States has taken up the leadership position in it, while the Israeli role has receded to the background, illustrating that the Zionist-American project for hegemony over the region is one indivisible entity, and that this hegemony can only be completed by removing the only obstacle that has come to stand in its way, namely Iran.

Management of the armed conflict post-1973 shifted to non-state forces

No one can predict the duration of the war currently waged against Iran or what results and consequences it will yield, but all evidence indicates that it will be decisive in determining the fate and future of the conflict with the Zionist project and the fate and future of the entire region. Regular Arab armies fought the initial rounds of armed conflict with the entity in the years: 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973, and Israel was able to fight in all of them alone and achieve impressive results at the same time. When Sadat decided to abandon the weapon by declaring the 1973 War to be the last war, he was keen at that time to promote the notion that managing the conflict solely through political means helps achieve better results, a notion that has proven completely false. Israel's appetite for expansion and annexing more territories opened up, evidenced by its repeated invasions of southern Lebanon and its refusal to withdraw to the 1967 borders in negotiations held with Syria before Hafiz al-Assad's departure. Since none of the Arab armies dared to wage war against Israel since 1973, despite all the crimes it committed, management of the armed conflict shifted to non-state forces, whose role began to thrive after the victory of the Iranian revolution, achieving significant accomplishments that paved the way for establishing the "Resistance Axis," of which Iran became the only party qualified to lead. When Hamas succeeded in igniting the "Flood of Al-Aqsa," a new round of armed conflict emerged that resembles none of its previous rounds. For the first time in the history of this conflict, the United States is participating with Israel in a comprehensive war ignited by a Palestinian faction resisting the Israeli occupation of its land, targeting the destruction of a non-Arab state that has become the only state engaged in armed conflict with Israel, while the Arab armies remain in the shadows, doing nothing.

The course of this war indicates that Israel and the United States have not (as of the time of writing) achieved any of the goals they sought, despite an initial blow that toppled the head of the Iranian regime and a large number of first-line military and political leaders. It appears that their new leaders are more determined and capable of managing a long-term war of attrition, and thus may succeed in destroying the aura of the Zionist-American project in the region, helping to halt its expansion, which could hasten its collapse in the foreseeable future.