The War on Iran: A Moment of Israeli Supremacy or the Beginning of a Long Exhausting Conflict?
During the week of Operation “Lion’s Roar,” Israel is attempting to portray its war against Iran as a decisive and swift strike. However, an analysis of the military and regional realities reveals a different situation: an open war on multiple fronts, pressures within Iran, tensions in Kurdistan, and a long-term depletion that may extend for months. Firepower alone will not resolve the confrontation, and the conflict is transforming into a test of patience and strategy, with outcomes determined by on-the-ground realities rather than announced plans.
On the seventh day of the operation, Israeli commentator David Gerstel published what resembles a daily military report on the war’s progress. However, reading this report reveals that it does not merely provide field data but also reflects the prevailing mindset among part of the security and media establishment in Israel, where the presentation of military facts is mixed with political language seeking to establish a narrative of superiority while managing expectations simultaneously.
One of the first things that catches attention in this discourse is the emphasis on the volume of firepower. The mention of using more than 6,500 munitions thus far, compared to only about 3,700 in the previous operation, is not just a technical detail; it is also a political and psychological message. The aim is to confirm that Israel is waging a different war in terms of scale and capability, relying heavily on aerial and technological superiority.
However, this superiority does not negate operational constraints. The war against Iran is fundamentally different from the confrontations Israel has engaged in Lebanon or the Gaza Strip. The long distance, the complexity of the airspace, and the need for extensive coordination with the United States complicate and exhaust this war significantly. Consequently, the report itself admits that the strikes in Tehran rarely exceed two or three daily, even though theoretical military assessments suggest the possibility of conducting more.
Conversely, the Israeli discourse seeks to highlight the decline in Iranian missile capabilities by pointing to a reduced number of missiles launched daily. However, the paradox is that the report itself hints at a possibility of exaggeration in these estimates, referencing an example from the Gulf War when the United States claimed to have destroyed more launch platforms than Iraq originally possessed. This reference reveals an implicit acknowledgment that military evaluations during wars are often more optimistic than reality would allow.
At the same time, it is evident that the Israeli goal is not limited to weakening Iranian military capabilities. The strikes targeting military industries and the security infrastructure of the regime suggest an attempt to create long-term conditions for destabilizing the regime itself. Nonetheless, the Israeli discourse acknowledges that regime change will not necessarily be achieved solely through military strikes but through "other factors," referring to internal pressures, covert operations, or regional shifts.
On the level of regional fronts, it seems that Israel is trying to keep its confrontation with Hezbollah within controllable limits. Airstrikes in Lebanon continue, but without expanding ground maneuvers so far, reflecting caution against opening a broad front in the north while Israel is preoccupied with the war against Iran.
At the same time, the pressure on Iran is not limited to direct military strikes. Israeli reports indicate an intensification of air raids along the border with Kurdish areas, targeting the Basij forces and internal security. Despite repeated talk about the possibility of Kurdish groups moving inside Iran, current indicators do not suggest significant field transformations, making this issue more of a potential pressure card than an already open front.
In the broader regional context, Azerbaijan emerges as one of the parties cautiously monitoring the escalation, following provocative steps that included withdrawing diplomats from Iran and arresting individuals suspected of being linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. These developments reflect an expansion of the tension circle around Iran and the war transforming into a multi-front exhausting scenario, where direct military pressure combines with internal system exhaustion through potential chaos in Kurdish areas and regional pressures surrounding it, strengthening the hypothesis that the Israeli-American strategy aims to weaken the regime on all fronts rather than simply achieving traditional military resolutions.
In the broader regional scene, Arab countries seem to be in a position of cautious observation. They are not engaging in the war directly, yet at the same time, they maintain open channels of communication with various parties, reflecting a complex regional environment in which countries are trying to avoid being drawn into a full-scale confrontation while maintaining a degree of political flexibility.
However, what this discourse most reveals is the ideological tone that seeps into its conclusion. The war is portrayed as a rare historic opportunity to reshape the balance of power in the region, especially in light of the Israeli mobilization following the events of the October 7, 2023 attack and extensive American military support.
Nevertheless, this vision carries an obvious paradox. While the war is presented as an unprecedented moment of superiority, the discourse itself acknowledges that the war may extend for weeks or more, and many of its elements remain ambiguous. This suggests that the declared confidence in military superiority does not eliminate the fact that the war is still open to complex scenarios.
Here lies the most significant paradox. Wars that begin with the logic of “historical opportunity” often turn into long exhausting conflicts in the Middle East. While air power can destroy facilities, launch pads, and command centers, it does not necessarily guarantee the achievement of the major political goals for which wars are fought.
Thus, the real question is not just about the number of targets destroyed or missiles launched but whether this war can truly produce a new political reality. Wars may begin with detailed plans, but in the end, they are written on the ground with realities that no pre-existing plan can fully control. In this distance between the plan and reality, the true outcomes of wars are always determined.
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