When Will the War End?

Author: رامي منصور

Two years ago, on this very day, October 7, Israel appeared to be on the brink of defeat, at least for a few hours, in a preemptive military operation that its initiators expected would draw or ensnare its allies in Iran and Lebanon, as well as internally in the West Bank, into an uprising and war that would end Israeli arrogance in Palestine and the region.

Two years later, what happened is that Israel took the initiative and waged war against Iran, launching a wide-ranging assault against Hezbollah. It even escalated its aggression by bombarding Damascus, Doha, and Sana'a, hitting five capitals in the region. It asserts that military strength is the foundation, dismissing discussions of normalization or anything else; in other words, it is telling us that it is not a spider's web but a fortified Crusader castle with a long arm.

While Israel has strengthened its military standing regionally through actual displays of power—not just through threats and deterrence—the events of October 7 and the subsequent open war on the Gaza Strip represent a historical moment in terms of a significant decline in Israel's international stature, especially in public opinion, the ramifications of which will extend for years to come.

Despite its bolstered regional position and its attempts to impose military hegemony in the area, this is merely a round in upcoming battles; the war with Iran is far from over, and the same goes for Lebanon. Benjamin Netanyahu declared, during a Jewish New Year celebration held at the Israeli army’s General Staff about two weeks ago, that the coming year would be 'the year of war to eliminate the Iranian axis.'

The decline in Israel's international status, alongside its enhanced regional influence, may be one of the main considerations that led Donald Trump to recently announce his plan to stop the war in Gaza. On one hand, he is attempting to break the isolation that Israel is entering, as seen in the New York Conference recognizing the state of Palestine and supporting a two-state solution, where Israel appeared in an unprecedented international position, even among its staunchest supporters like Britain and France. On the other hand, presenting the plan as being supported by Arab leaders and with their participation aims to alleviate their embarrassment in front of their people, who seem powerless and at their weakest as the extermination in the Strip continues for two years, amid Israel's aggressive actions against Arab capitals. For this reason, Trump also recently reiterated his praise for Arab leaders and Erdoğan.

In reality, the Arab leaders were not informed of the plan announced by Trump; it is different from what he had previously presented to them in New York, which seemed balanced. Even their remarks and amendments to the announced plan were mostly disregarded. Regardless, they blessed Trump's efforts and are currently involved in mediation efforts to stop the war.

The plan, in practice, consists of Israeli conditions presented as an American initiative with Arab approval, and they acquiesced; who would dare to anger Trump and reject his initiatives, even if they are superficial? Woe to the punishment, words and statements will come crashing down upon them.

Conversely, Hamas responded with an unusual reply, avoiding Gaza from 'Trump's Hell' and not compromising by accepting the Israeli conditions for surrender as laid out in the plan. Hamas considers that the issue of Israeli prisoners has become a heavy burden on it and Gaza, used as a justification for continuing and escalating the war, so it accepted the first phase of the plan: the release of prisoners and the cessation of hostilities, and negotiations on the second phase. The prevailing belief is that the Israeli prisoners are Hamas's last bargaining chip to stop the war, but the truth is that what matters to the movement and resistance in Gaza is the issue of disarmament. Surrendering arms while the Israeli army remains in large areas of Gaza means surrender. If the question is: who guarantees that hostilities won’t resume after Israel recovers its prisoners? It also applies to the question: what are the guarantees that the war won’t continue and that the resistance won’t surrender all its arms?

Therefore, the issue of arms and the Israeli pullout from the Strip or repositioning it at its borders will remain the most complex matter in the coming phase.

Returning to the question: When will the war end? Will it renew after the release of the Israeli prisoners?

Before answering, it must be emphasized that Netanyahu wants and insists on maintaining Israeli control over the Gaza Strip, meaning the continuation of the war, and he rejects the presence of international or Arab forces; this is a principled position, as Gaza is considered Israeli land or part of 'Eretz Israel.' He also views the war as a historic opportunity to achieve all his plans, whether in Gaza, the West Bank, or the region, despite the risk of international isolation. He is equally determined to disarm the resistance in Gaza.

In light of these clear factors, agreeing to the first phase, i.e., releasing prisoners, is considered a 'calculated risk.' On one hand, releasing the Israeli prisoners strips Netanyahu of the alleged excuse for continuing the war. On the other hand, halting the war, even temporarily, might allow genuine international and Arab pressure this time not to renew it, as the excuse has vanished.

The next few days are critical regarding ceasefire negotiations, and Netanyahu may thwart them by insisting on the refusal to release Palestinian prisoners such as Marwan Barghouti, by insisting on the requirement for the resistance to surrender its arms, and by binding them to accept all the stipulations of the Trump Israeli plan as they are: either surrender the arms or face war.

However, on the other hand, these negotiations are the closest to the possibility of achieving a cessation of hostilities, even if Netanyahu attempts to renew them after the release of Israeli prisoners, if it happens, there remains hope based on international pressure and global public opinion to end it definitively.