Why Did the Movement Struggle, Which Was Not Called for by Leaders from Inside Gaza on 26/6?

The struggle witnessed in Gaza on 26/6 can be understood through a set of interconnected political, social, and security factors that made the public response limited, despite widespread anger and suffering among the population.

Firstly, one of the main reasons is that the call for the movement did not come from known and influential leaders within Gaza, but rather from outside the local organizational and social context. This absence of internal leadership or clear community support created a sense of uncertainty among many people about the nature of the call, its objectives, and its representation of their actual needs, which reflected on the level of participation.

Secondly: The priorities of people in Gaza were, and still are, focused on daily survival and meeting basic needs rather than engaging in unclear political movements. The priority was, and still is, to relieve people from hunger, provide food, treat the injured and sick, especially those with chronic illnesses, and secure the minimum essentials for life amidst harsh humanitarian conditions.

There is also an urgent need for reconstruction and securing housing and tents, especially with the extensive destruction that has affected homes, residential infrastructure, schools, universities, and hospitals, alongside the need and preparation for winter and what it requires to protect families from cold and rain. Additionally, priorities include restarting basic infrastructure such as water, electricity, municipal services, addressing the waste crisis, environmental and health issues, in addition to combating the spread of rodents, insects, snakes, and rats in some areas of displacement and destruction, reopening crossings, reopening schools and universities, and restoring the essential services that society needs.

Thirdly: There was no clear and convincing vision among many about "what comes next" after the movement, meaning what the expected political or security alternative would be in the event of any change or vacuum in authority. This ambiguity heightened real fears among people regarding scenarios of security breakdown and the emergence of multiple armed groups in addition to those already existing, undermining the rule of law, which places civilians in greater danger.

Many citizens looked at other experiences that witnessed the collapse or weakness of central authority, where security vacuums led to the rise of multiple competing armed groups, increased displays of violence and violations, and a decline in the law's ability to protect citizens. Therefore, the question for them was not only how change would happen, but what its consequences would be for community security and the daily lives of people.

Fourthly: Security considerations played a significant role in the weakness or absence of participation. Many people approached the idea of the movement with extreme caution due to fears of exposure to death, persecution, arrest, or direct harm, in addition to the fear of slipping into internal confrontations or security chaos that could increase the suffering of the population instead of alleviating it. In an environment burdened by war and humanitarian pressure, the cost of any field step becomes very high for individuals and families compared to uncalculated objectives.

Fifthly: There is a widespread awareness among a large segment of society that any movement does not necessarily guarantee a clear political outcome or direct improvement in reality, against high probabilities of risks, division, and chaos. Many saw that the first beneficiaries of any potential security vacuum would not be the Gazan citizen seeking security, food, and shelter, but rather the armed groups operating outside the law, whether those currently existing or any new groups that might emerge benefiting from the breakdown of the rule of law and the multiplicity of power centers.

Everyone sees that any collapse of the existing regulatory system could open the door for these groups to expand their influence and impose new realities on the ground, threatening community security and increasing the likelihood of violence, chaos, and internal clashes.

Moreover, some in the street believe that the continuation of chaos and internal division may serve external parties seeking to weaken Palestinian society, drain it, and deepen the state of disintegration and division. According to this view, any internal clash or wide security vacuum could weaken the Palestinian community's ability to organize itself and defend its national interests and create conditions more conducive for enforcing new political and security realities on the ground planned by Israel, such as the displacement of populations, establishing new settlements, and turning Gaza into a Trump resort.

At the same time, many Palestinians, despite their anger and suffering, do not overlook major national issues. There is a strong adherence to the idea of a Palestinian state and a rejection of any arrangements perceived as surpassing the Palestinian national will or infringing on the legitimacy of Palestinian national representation.

In conclusion, it can be said that the struggle's failure was not the result of a single factor but rather the result of an interplay between the absence of organized local leadership, the pressure of daily humanitarian priorities, fears of security chaos and civil war, the lack of a clear vision for the day after, in addition to the high personal cost of participation compared to expected goals.

Despite all of the above, this does not negate the existence of a wide state of dissatisfaction and popular anger towards the living and humanitarian reality in the Gaza Strip, which remains deeply felt among large segments of the population. However, this anger was not enough to push large sectors to engage in a movement that they do not see having a clear local leadership, an agreed-upon project, or guarantees to prevent slipping into further chaos, division, suffering, and civil war.