Fatah Conference: The Old Political Order Remains

The eighth conference of Fatah concluded amidst widespread attention, not only because it is the largest movement conference in the Palestinian arena but also due to the extraordinary moment facing the Palestinian cause and the region. Thus, the evaluation of the conference should not be limited to its organizational results or the names of the winners and losers; they are not the actual decision-makers. Instead, it should stem from a deeper question: Did the conference succeed in providing new answers about the reasons (and roots) of the deep and complex impasse that the movement and the Palestinian political system are experiencing, and how to overcome it? Organizationally, it can be said that the conference succeeded in convening and reproducing the leadership institutions of the movement; however, the old political order remained intact despite the significant renewal in some names. The change of personnel did not accompany a change in the political path or performance, nor did it include new individuals who adopt alternatives to the current situation and are ready to fight for them. In fact, most of the newcomers are old faces. The conference affirmed, in adopting the speech of President Mahmoud Abbas delivered at its opening, the continuation of the same path that has led us to the catastrophe we are living. The conference did not witness any dialogue regarding the political program or any issue, unlike those related to the competition for positions, influence, and winning membership in the Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council. It did not have a profound or even superficial review of the movement's journey since the last conference, nor did it reflect on the lost opportunities or on the reality of where the Palestinian cause stands today, surrounded by existential challenges and risks and available opportunities. The Fatah Conference leaned towards rearranging internal balances rather than bringing about a genuine political or ideological transformation; it did not provide a solution to the impasse but rather exposed and deepened it further. This is particularly evident in what is happening in the Gaza Strip, which is experiencing a new Nakba and an ongoing aggressive war even during the truce, amid attempts to impose colonial guardianship over it, falsely called a Peace Council, with Palestinian, Arab, and international cover. In the West Bank, actual annexation and the imposition of Israeli sovereignty are accelerating in the presence of international and Arab silence, relying on a sterile Palestinian strategy based on survival, waiting, withdrawing excuses, and neutrality, despite its failure to achieve its goals. Within the Palestinian interior, organized crime is surging, and racist policies are deepening. Therefore, there is little significance in the fall of symbols from the old guard or the non-candidacy of some historical leaders, if there is no capable alternative to overcome the impasse through crystallizing a comprehensive vision, new strategies, and leadership that rises to the level of this historical moment. There is no value in new individuals if there is no new vision and performance, and without empowering them to effectively lead by providing the requirements and skills necessary for leadership in this new phase, which represents the most dangerous stage the Palestinian cause is going through. It is true that holding the conference itself is not a simple matter given the complicated political, security, and internal circumstances, and it has shown Fatah's continued ability to maintain its relative cohesion, despite the state of regression it has suffered since the signing of the Oslo Agreement, which initiated its transformation from a national liberation movement to a ruling party under occupation. This journey has reached a stage of managing populations under occupation, without will, vision, or appropriate resistance for the current phase, or a practical plan to end the occupation and realize the independence of the State of Palestine, or even to adopt an alternative option. The survival of the authority, and specifically the leadership, has become the actual goal, until God decrees a matter that has been enacted. This is despite the internal differences and disputes likely to escalate after the conference, especially in light of what has transpired since the previous conference regarding the marginalization of the movement and the selection of the preparatory committee (which included many of the same candidates) from among the conference members who will later elect it, which undermines the credibility and legitimacy of the conference. The conference reflected the continued centrality of Fatah within the Palestinian political system, and that it remains the most influential framework within the authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization, despite clear changes in internal balances of power. For example, Majed Farraj won second place after the imprisoned leader Marwan Barghouti, and in third place came Jibril Rajoub, fourth Hussein al-Sheikh, Deputy President, fifth Leila Ghanem, and sixth Mahmoud al-Aloul, the deputy head of the movement. These results, in addition to the fall of members such as the chairman of the National Council and the secretary of the Executive Committee and a member of it, may prompt a reconsideration of their representation and positions within Fatah, the Authority, and the Organization. No candidate from outside Palestine won, despite the fact that half of the Palestinian people are in exile, reflecting the dominance of power centers of influence, money, and security within the Authority and its bureaucratic apparatus over the movement. A clear imbalance in the representation of provinces was also observed, as Ramallah got the majority, followed by Nablus, while Hebron, the largest governorate, received limited representation, and the same goes for the Gaza Strip compared to its size and role. However, "organizational success" is insufficient to judge the political or national success of the conference. The fundamental crisis facing the movement is not merely an internal election crisis; it is a crisis of a national project, role, and function, and a crisis of an absent organization and an authority on the verge of collapse. Therefore, the real question is: Why did the conference not conduct a deep political review of the previous experience? The answer is that a serious review would lead to a change in the course, which means a confrontation with the occupation and what it requires in terms of costs, even though it is possible and necessary to adopt a resistance at a reasonable cost. Why was a new vision that fits the ongoing transformations not presented, despite the dead end we have reached, which gives national unity around the possible goal or goals the importance it deserves, and there is no explanation for the lack of response to this except for the prioritization of individual interests over the public interest? This is the reason that explains the absence of a real intention to achieve the widest possible degree of political participation by changing the decision-making mechanism within Fatah, and thus within the Authority and the Organization, where authority and decision are practically concentrated in the hands of the president and a limited number of assistants, away from the institutions. Without changing the decision-making mechanism, no progress can occur. The large competition for membership in the conference and candidacy for the Central Committee and Revolutionary Council does not indicate vitality but rather a loss of trust in the leadership and a decline in standards. After the Palestinian division, the political impasse has severely worsened; the legislative council was dissolved, and the executive, legislative, and judicial powers were concentrated in the hands of one person, not one faction, making it difficult to say that "Fatah" is leading the authority; the president now manages the authority through a network of individuals, some from "Fatah" and others from outside it, in the name of the movement and employing its popular weight and the history of its struggle. If dialogue and competition within the conference genuinely revolved around ideas, programs, and plans, the geographic origin of the winners would not be of great importance, as they are all supposed to be carrying out tasks related to the national project and its derivatives, not serving their regions or their cronies or