Fatah Movement Between Individual Loyalty, National Allegiance, and Organizational Commitment

Moreover, as the Fatah Movement has concluded its eighth conference, those who won have won and those who lost have lost. Regardless of personal reservations some may have about the proceedings of the conference, the results, and the mechanisms adopted to bring them about—which, of course, received broad welcome from the winners—tensions have heightened among the majority of losers. This could lead to serious repercussions if the new and renewed members of the Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council do not take heed, as these resentments will accumulate and roll like a snowball, sweeping everyone in its path. Especially as the legislative elections are coming in November, as announced by President Mahmoud Abbas in his opening speech at the conference.

Undoubtedly, if the Fatah Movement is strong and cohesive, the Palestinian national factions will be strong, and thus the Palestine Liberation Organization, as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people, will also be strong. It is true that the currents surrounding it regionally, Arably, and internationally are currently moving counter to the Palestinian clock, but the justice of the Palestinian cause imposes itself and its centrality makes it top the list of priorities, despite the ongoing fluctuations that largely stem from the Palestinian political performance.

The strength of any movement, party, or faction is not measured by its internal elections, but by the general elections in which the majority of the population participates, with differing loyalties and affiliations. Hence, the Fatah Movement, which has been considered the backbone of the Palestine Liberation Organization and a protector of the national project that it adopted—based on building an independent Palestinian state within the borders of June 4, 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital—faces increasing structural challenges between individual loyalty, national allegiance, and organizational commitment, especially in light of the noticeable deterioration following the departure of the martyr symbol Yasser Arafat and the ongoing geographic separation of Palestine after the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, as well as the corruption that has eroded the bones of many of its leaders and members.

Many observers and specialists in Fatah affairs see that what is happening in the movement now is merely loyalty to influential individuals, without loyalty or organizational commitment to the movement, prioritizing personal and factional interests at the expense of the organizational interests of Fatah and the higher national interest. This is due to the infiltration of opportunists and mercenaries into the movement's membership and the exclusion and marginalization of the majority of the organizational cadre that owe their loyalty to Palestine and Fatah, and who are dissatisfied with the deteriorating conditions of the movement, which has negatively affected its popularity in the Palestinian street that has lost confidence in it. This was evident in the 2006 legislative elections, which Hamas won, prompting President Mahmoud Abbas to postpone the elections that were scheduled to take place in May 2021 indefinitely at the time, citing Israeli refusal to hold them in Jerusalem. The main reason for the postponement was the divisions and disagreements that had crippled the movement then, which confirmed the likelihood of a catastrophic loss for the movement should these elections proceed.

The largest cadre within the Fatah Movement emphasizes the necessity of loyalty to Palestine, Fatah, and the national constants as a whole—not to individuals or certain leaders—while emphasizing the need to strengthen the movement's membership on the basis of allegiance and national and organizational commitment based on the competence, integrity, and historical, struggle, cultural, and national depth of the members.

Therefore, to address the looming dangers facing the Fatah Movement, and the repercussions of the eighth conference and its effects on the upcoming phase, the movement's institutions, led by the new and renewed Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council, face significant responsibilities. The movement must either exist and regain its popularity and the trust of the masses or not exist, which would increase fragmentation among its ranks, and consequently fuel the appetites of those seeking to pounce on the national project and end the Palestinian cause. Therefore, if true will and independence of decision are present, the movement must begin working on several fronts:

1. The Internal Organizational Front: Unifying the ranks of the movement, organizing the internal house, renouncing internal disputes, and restoring respect to the marginalized and "the sidelined," bringing together all Fatah members within the occupied territories and abroad in a single stream, whose only loyalty is to Palestine and the movement. Conduct a comprehensive review of the conditions of the movement. It is no longer a secret that there are currently several currents within the movement that are different and pulling against each other to the point of postponed clash if not remedied quickly, with the unifying slogan being "Fatah is the mother of the masses." Maybe the results of the Central Committee elections carried several messages, the most prominent of which is the current of the brother, the prisoner leader Marwan Barghouti, who swept the votes, and the win of two released prisoners, which indicates the adherence to the cause of prisoners and martyrs who have recently been targeted by halting their salaries without providing a worthy substitute that honors their struggles.
Observers believe that the names mentioned in the list of successful candidates from the Revolutionary Council include a good number of fighters who, if national will is present among the movement's leadership to act and grant them a wide margin to work, will have a prominent role in swaying Palestinian public opinion and restoring popular confidence in the movement.

2. The Gaza Strip Front: Restoring geographical unity with the Gaza Strip and commencing national reconciliation at whatever cost with all national and Islamic factions, even if this leads to painful concessions that would serve the higher national interest of all parties, without harming the interests of the Palestinian Arab people, under the slogan: "Palestine unites everyone."

3. The National Authority Front: Clarifying roles between the authority framework and the organizational framework, and ending the overlap between Fatah’s institutions and its bureaucratic authority apparatus, which have negatively impacted the Fatah Movement—especially the presidency of the authority and the presidency of Fatah—potentially hindering the granting of privileges in exchange for loyalty, while distancing the detrimental overlap of the authority’s positions, which sometimes have to favor the occupation and regional and international parties, thus allowing the movement a wider margin to work and freeing it from bearing the negative consequences of the authority’s policies. This will facilitate renewed engagement in popular and militant work, which will undoubtedly restore public trust in the movement and its leadership and strengthen its position in the street.

4. The Arab and International Front: Fatah must restore its consideration among Arab and international parties and re-establish networking with them and with global liberation movements, regaining their trust which has recently shaken, in order to enhance support for the Palestinian struggle and serve the rights of the Palestinian Arab people in freedom and independence.