"Arafatian" and "Abbasid": Break or Continuity?

While it is true that Palestinians are a significant factor in the Middle East equation and that there will be no peace in the region without a fair solution to the Palestinian issue leading to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, due to the complexities of the Palestinian issue, the overlap between national, sectarian, Islamic, and international aspects, and the religious and political dimensions, as well as the unique relationship between Judaism and Christianity, etc., the shifts in the trajectory of the issue - whether negatively or positively, whether related to military and jihad capabilities or political leadership (whether Arafatian or Abbasid) - are not solely linked to the pure Palestinian will. In fact, regional and international changes, neighboring countries, and major powers play a crucial role in the progress of the issue and in what is politically achieved or what setbacks it suffers.

Therefore, we do not believe that there is a complete rupture between the "Arafatian" and "Abbasid" periods, but rather a continuity with different tools and different personalities. Arafat used the "olive branch and the rifle" to maneuver within the international system and to push his peace agenda after the National Conference in Algeria in 1988, while Abbas, after witnessing Arafat's fate, relied on diplomacy and international law, ruling out the option of armed struggle. Both operated within the confines of "Oslo", but Arafat attempted to break the ceiling when he reached a dead end at "Camp David 2". Had Abbas followed Arafat's revolutionary and jihadist approach, he would have faced the same fate as Arafat, Abu Jihad, Abu Iyad, Abu Al-Mustafa, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, or Marwan Barghouti and many others. However, Mahmoud Abbas chose to preserve what remains of the ceiling, even if it is limited to the Palestinian Authority and the two-state solution, in order to prevent a total collapse.