Lebanon in the Heart of War: How the Relationship with Israel and Iran is Being Reshaped

 

Lebanon has no longer remained just a side arena in the American-Israeli war against Iran; instead, it has gradually transformed into a central knot in managing the conflict, serving as a real laboratory for redrawing regional balances. While negotiations between Washington and Tehran appear to be in a fluctuating path of advancement and stagnation, on the ground, particularly in southern Lebanon, military realities are being established that may prove more decisive than any postponed political agreement.

This transformation is not only evident in military facts but is also clearly reflected in the Israeli reading of the nature of the conflict. According to analysts close to decision-making circles such as Eliya Ben Asher and Doron Kadosh, a ceasefire is no longer seen as an ultimate goal or an entrance to a settlement, but rather as a tool for re-engineering the security environment. The basic idea here is that the conflict is not intended to end, but to be managed under new conditions that readjust its balances.

Within this framework, the Israeli discourse has seen the rise of a perception that considers the "Lebanese state" no longer a serious actor that can be relied upon in any agreement. Referencing past experiences, such as the 1983 agreement, is not presented as a historical reference as much as it is a political message that any agreement with a state that does not have real decision-making power in the south is a hollow agreement. Thus, discussions of "peace" or even of integrating Lebanon into broader regional arrangements become merely theoretical propositions disconnected from reality, as the equation shifts from "peace for security" to "control for deterrence".

This transformation directly reflects how a ceasefire is defined. Instead of being an expression of mutual de-escalation or reciprocal withdrawal, it becomes a tool that may allow for establishing a long-term military presence within Lebanese territory. In this context, limited control is not seen as a reluctant option but rather as a more sustainable strategic choice, as wide expansion may later necessitate a withdrawal, while partial control allows for a longer stay. Thus, a new equation begins to crystallize in Israeli thinking: the less control there is, the longer the staying duration.

Simultaneously, it becomes clear that Lebanon is no longer a standalone file; it has become part of a larger negotiation basket with Iran. The United States seeks to de-escalate the Lebanese front to avoid the war's expansion and prepare a more stable environment for negotiations, but it encounters an Israeli vision that considers the current moment an opportunity that should not be missed to reshape the rules of engagement. This disparity reflects not merely a tactical difference but reveals a deeper gap in the approach: Washington tends to contain escalation, while Tel Aviv seeks to exploit it.

From this perspective, the American pressure to halt military operations should not be understood as a response to humanitarian or political considerations, but rather as a strategic constraint limiting the ability to achieve field gains. The data presented by Israeli reports indicates that what is happening transcends just a traditional military confrontation and transforms into a systematic process of reshaping the operational environment in southern Lebanon. Extensive targeting of infrastructure, destruction of villages, and the expansion of ground operations are all steps aimed at creating a "militarily deactivated" area, making any future activity considerably costly.

In this context, the goal does not seem to be the elimination of Hezbollah, which Israel recognizes as difficult, but rather to reshape the deterrence equation by raising the cost of confrontation to an unprecedented level. The implicit message is clear: any future attack will not be merely a limited clash but could open the door to territorial loss and widespread destruction.

On this basis, the outcomes of the war are measured not by its conclusion but by its next form. If it ends with a ceasefire while Israeli forces remain inside Lebanon and continue their military operations, then this signifies a change in the rules of engagement in favor of Israel. Conversely, if it results in a complete withdrawal and imposes restrictions on such activities, the result will be a reinstatement of the previous deterrent equation, with internal implications for Israel, especially in its northern regions.

However, the most complex paradox lies within Lebanon itself, where this regional scene is accompanied by an internal division regarding the nature of the proposed options and the limits of possible concessions. This discussion occurs under a reality that indicates that the decision is no longer entirely internal but has become distributed among regional and international forces, making Lebanon closer to being a tool within equations larger than itself rather than an active party in determining its path.

In light of all this, it seems that any ceasefire, if achieved, will not be the end of the war as much as it would be a repositioning phase. Israel is trying to establish a new reality on the ground, Iran is attempting to rebuild its capabilities, while the United States works to prevent a comprehensive explosion without losing its pressure cards. Meanwhile, Lebanon remains at the heart of this equation, not as a maker of it, but as a territory being reshaped.
At this point, the question changes. It is no longer about whether the shooting will stop, but rather what reality will be imposed when it does.