Forbidden Recovery

Recovery in Palestine is not a natural health path that goes through stages of pain and then healing; it is instead a national project that is besieged every time it approaches completion. Here, illness is not a fleeting symptom but a political, security, and economic structure imposed, making recovery a resistant act in itself.

For decades, the Palestinian people have lived under the weight of a prolonged occupation represented by the occupying state, an occupation that does not suffice with controlling land but also excels in managing fragility: economic fragility, geographic fragility, and national unity fragility. The West Bank is not like Gaza, Gaza is not like the imagined Palestine in the collective consciousness; and Jerusalem, that central knot, is being pushed towards its symbolic and demographic isolation. Thus, the national space is reshaped into an archipelago of isolated islands, making comprehensive recovery closer to the impossible.

However, while preventing recovery from the outside is understandable within the logic of conflict, the Palestinian tragedy lies in another complexity: the internal division. Since the events of 2007, the Palestinian arena has lived a political and geographic division between Fatah and Hamas, a division that has not only weakened the structure of the political system but also diminished the citizen's trust in the possibility of revival.

The most dangerous aspect of the division is not the multiplicity of programs or differences in perspectives, but its transformation into a self-standing structure with its own interests, networks, and privileges. When this happens, ending the division becomes a threat to stable equations of influence, and national recovery becomes a burden on some elites who have become accustomed to managing the crisis rather than solving it. Here lies the deeper meaning of "forbidden recovery": that the external interest in maintaining weakness intersects with the internal reluctance or inability to produce a unifying moment.

Gaza, after repeated rounds of war, offers the clearest example of this delayed recovery. A city with destroyed infrastructure and exhausted residents, yet with an extraordinary life force. However, reconstruction does not transform into an integrated sovereign project, but into a conditional relief path, constrained by political calculations and security restrictions. Thus, reconstruction turns into managing pain, not into establishing a new phase.

In the West Bank, the picture appears less bloody, but more complex. A fragile economy relying on work permits and a market subject to external control, and a political arena restricted by agreements that can no longer produce a sovereign horizon. The result is a state of "tense stability"; stability that does not allow for complete explosion, nor does it provide the conditions for true recovery.
Palestinian recovery cannot be solely economic, nor political alone. It is a comprehensive process that begins with rebuilding trust within society, completed by reforming the political system on the basis of partnership and accountability, and ends with redefining the relationship with the world as an active participant, not merely a recipient. The state that does not own its economic decision, does not monopolize its security tools, and does not unify its political discourse, will remain a prisoner of perpetual fragility.

Arab experiences from Lebanon to Iraq and through Libya demonstrate that the most dangerous threat to recovery paths is the transformation of division into fate, and dependence on daily politics. However, the specificity of the Palestinian case lies in the fact that the occupation is not a fleeting factor, but a standing structure, which makes recovery conditional on an extremely complicated regional and international balance of power.
Nonetheless, betting solely on the outside is a strategic mistake. Regardless of how imbalanced the power equations are, the inside remains the starting point. Restoring the status of the comprehensive national project, prioritizing institutional logic over factional logic, and renewing legitimacy through democratic tools, are all indispensable conditions. Recovery begins with recognizing that division is not destiny, and managing collapse is not a solution.

Palestine does not need an additional heroic discourse, but rather internal political courage that places the interest of the homeland above the interest of organizations, and the interest of the Palestinian child above the interest of leaders. Only this transformation can turn recovery from a postponed dream into a possible path.

Recovery in Palestine is not forbidden by geography, but rather obstructed by politics. When this politics is reshaped on the basis of unity, dignity, and sovereignty, recovery becomes a historical act that no one can prevent.