The National Committee for Managing Gaza: A Temporary Rescue Opportunity or a Test of National Identity?

The Making of a Void: The Failure of the Authority and Hamas 

In the midst of one of the harshest moments in contemporary Palestinian history, the idea of forming a national committee to manage the Gaza Strip was raised, not as a preferred political option, but as an urgent attempt to deal with a deep political and administrative void imposed by the war and its catastrophic humanitarian repercussions. This idea is simultaneously a direct result of the failure of both the Palestinian National Authority and Hamas, along with the overall national movement, to resolve the most crucial national obligation: to form a unified national consensus government, despite the declared consensus on this in the "Beijing Declaration."

From here, the idea of the committee should not be approached with a logic of prior rejection nor one of excessive reliance; rather, it should be seen as a potential transitional tool, with its success being contingent on clear conditions, while its failure is linked to sliding outside the overall national framework. The committee was not proposed because the Palestinians opted for temporary solutions, but rather it was imposed on them because, up to this moment, they have failed to achieve the essential solution represented by a consensus government that would bear responsibilities in both Gaza and the West Bank.

The idea emerged because both the Authority and Hamas failed, for different reasons, to transition from managing the division to ending it. The Authority remained captive to political and security calculations, failing to propose a unifying formula that responds to the scale of the catastrophe in Gaza. On the other hand, Hamas did not decisively clarify its position in front of mediators and public opinion in a way that paves the way for a real, rather than nominal, unity government.

An Emergency Committee, Not a Political Project

The committee comes in a remarkably severe exceptional context, where an unprecedented destructive war has left a near-total collapse in the administrative and service structure, and has produced a real void in managing people's affairs. Therefore, it cannot be viewed as an alternative political project or a final solution, but rather as a temporary arrangement whose success is measured by its ability to serve the people, prevent solidifying separation, and prepare the ground for the return to a unified national path.

The committee's first opportunity lies in its direct function: organizing relief, managing basic services, and ensuring a minimum level of regular daily life. However, this humanitarian task is inseparable from politics; any glitch in transparency, justice, or efficiency risks turning the committee from a tool to alleviate suffering into an additional burden. Consequently, the trust of the people and social forces becomes a foundational condition for its success, rather than a subsequent outcome of it.

The Danger of Turning the Temporary into a Permanent Chapter

However, the committee's capacity to operate is not only determined by its internal structure but also by the political environment surrounding it. Israel views Gaza as a separate file and seeks to manage its reality in a way that serves the goal of permanent separation between it and the West Bank. The danger here doesn't lie in the establishment of the committee itself, but in its transformation into a prolonged administrative framework that reproduces division under a humanitarian pretext, or in being caught in a power struggle between Hamas, which seeks dominance, and the Authority, which wishes to impose itself as an extension of a non-consensual government. Therefore, the committee's success requires its explicit connection to a single Palestinian identity, along with a clear time frame that prevents consolidating the status quo.

Risks of Administration, Funding, and the Israeli Veto

Here, a highly sensitive question arises regarding the handling of the existing functional structure: the employees of the former Hamas administration and the authority employees who have been working or suspended since the years of division. This is not merely a technical question, but a political-social one par excellence. Gaza includes tens of thousands of employees who have accumulated practical experience under difficult circumstances, and they cannot be bypassed or excluded without significant social and administrative costs.

The Function: Justice and Administrative Professionalism, Not Loyalty

The realistic entry point is to separate the function from the political choice. Any committee seeking success must deal with the workforce as an administrative resource that needs to be organized, not as a battlefield for settling accounts. A transitional formula based on phased integration, professional assignment, and relative neutrality of public function from polarization can be imagined until institutions are unified within a comprehensive national framework.

Connected to this is the issue of funding and salaries, one of the most sensitive topics. The committee does not have financial sovereignty or self-resources, making it hostage to external financing or arrangements with the Authority. Here, financing becomes a double test of relative independence and transparency. Linking expenditure to clear mechanisms and professional oversight reduces the chances of politicization and enhances the trust of employees and the community.

Conversely, there is the danger of Israel seeking to impose a "veto right" on the administrative structure, whether by controlling the movement of individuals or intervening in the selection of employees, as has happened in previous experiences. If this scenario is realized, it will undermine the essence of the national idea behind the committee. Thus, rejecting its transformation into a security selection tool becomes a fundamental condition for its success, despite the narrow margin for maneuver.

National Risks and the Meaning of Identity

The reconstruction file is no less complicated. The question is not limited to who funds, but who decides, who oversees, and how priorities are set. If this file is managed with a technical logic isolated from the national reference, the risk of turning reconstruction into a tool for normalizing separation will remain. However, if it is subjected to a transparent national framework that connects relief with the rebuilding of institutions, it can transform into a political-social lever.

As for the international position, it is governed by delicate balances. The United States shows pragmatism in supporting any arrangement that achieves "stability," without any real willingness to engage in a process that restores consideration for Palestinian identity or opens a horizon for self-determination. In contrast, the Europeans and several active Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, along with Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, can play an important role in assuring that Gaza is not separated by pressuring for temporary arrangements linked to a comprehensive national process, not isolated humanitarian management.

From here, the importance of emphasizing that the committee is temporary and limited in duration arises, and that its existence must coincide with a parallel national path that returns the ball to the Palestinian court. The required path is organized popular pressure to generate genuine political will that leads to the formation of a unified national consensus government as soon as possible, which takes on its responsibilities in both Gaza and the West Bank, and restores unity of decision and institutions.

In conclusion, the people of Gaza should not be left as prisoners of the feeling of disappointment accumulated over years of extermination and siege, nor should they be pushed to retreat as isolated victims disconnected from their national context. What happened in Gaza is not a local fate, but a general Palestinian wound. And the respect for its people cannot be achieved by managing their isolation, but by politically and morally reintegrating them into the heart of a single Palestinian identity.

Gaza: A National Cause, Not a Humanitarian File

Thus, a direct responsibility falls on the active social forces in Gaza, including popular committees, civil institutions, and youth, women, and trade union activities, to handle this phase as a moment of pressure rather than waiting. What is needed is not to defend temporary arrangements for their own sake but to use them as a tool to enforce the necessity of ending the division and building national unity.

This is what the reality dictates, a truth that should not be accepted to continue being overlooked or ignored, which is that Gaza is not just a humanitarian concern or a temporary administrative file, but rather the heart of the Palestinian cause, and the dignity of its people will not be restored, nor the meaning of their sacrifices, except through the unity of national decision and the unity of the political project, and steady progress towards the entitlement of self-determination and the realization of the state of independence.