Iran Alone... Between the Storm of Protests and Indicators of the Upcoming War

There seems to be a near consensus among researchers and analysts on two interrelated matters: first, that the behavior of U.S. President Donald Trump represents one of the most unpredictable political patterns, as his foreign decisions have been marked by a striking degree of sharp volatility and rapid shifts, oscillating between a rhetoric of de-escalation and a tone of escalation, and changing priorities without clear precedents, making it extremely complicated to anticipate his future directions, especially regarding Iran.

Second, the regional and international scene has become more complex since October 7, 2023, as many rules governing the international system, and particularly U.S. and Israeli political behaviors, have changed dramatically. New patterns of using force have emerged, and the boundaries that previously governed military and diplomatic engagements have eroded, making the region more fragile and less predictable.

Despite this ambiguity, the possibility of military confrontation with Iran appears today to be higher than it has been in the past. Notably, if an initiative occurs, it is likely to come directly from the United States this time, rather than through Israel, contrary to what happened in the recent twelve-day confrontation.

This assessment is based on the nature of recent U.S. and Israeli statements, which have increasingly focused on supporting protests within Iran, alongside strategic Israeli steps - that go beyond the dimensions of a potential war with Iran - such as enhancing military presence in the Red Sea, recognizing "Somaliland," and declaring a state of emergency in several hospitals. Although the implications of these steps vary, the recent indicator can be interpreted in the context of internal readiness for new escalation possibilities.

This trend is explained on two interconnected levels; at the first level, Washington continues to deal with the Middle East as a realm that needs to be reshaped, ensuring near absolute strategic superiority for Israel. Dr. Azmi Bishara indicates that this logic is based on solidifying Israel as a central leadership power in the region, pushing the entire region to operate within a framework dominated by power balances that favor the Israeli-American project. This vision reflects in the marginalization of international law and treating the region according to the principle of power; that is, those who possess power have the right to shape policy and arrange security priorities.

At the second level, the United States views weakening Iran or altering its political structure as a crucial step to complete the process of rearranging the region, as Iran is considered the last regional power center capable of disrupting the Israeli-American project, whether through supporting resistance movements or through its military, missile, and nuclear capabilities. From here, limiting Iran is not a separate objective, but rather a continuation of the logic of hegemony that governs the first level.

In this context, a series of questions arises about the possible scenarios within Iran itself. The ongoing internal protests in Iran have become a highly influential factor in Washington's calculations. If the U.S. notices that the protests are expanding to threaten the system's structure, it may prefer to postpone military action to let internal pressure play its role and work to support it through various means, both directly and indirectly. However, if it appears that the regime is capable of absorbing waves of popular anger and that the protests are likely to recede, the option of a strike may be reconsidered as a tool to prevent the regime from regaining the initiative.

However, understanding the Iranian scene requires looking at the structure of the regime itself. Over the past years, Iran has proven that it is accustomed to fighting its struggles independently, without waiting for anyone, or pressuring its allies to engage in its wars. Conversely, the relationship between Iran and the United States has witnessed an unprecedented deterioration in trust levels; after the recent war and the U.S. discourse regarding the use of negotiations as a tool for deception and maneuvering, Tehran has become more convinced that any negotiating path with Washington may fundamentally serve as a means to buy time or gather information, rather than a gateway to a genuine political settlement. This lack of trust directly reflects Tehran's reading of any U.S. military or political movement.

Internally, the Iranian regime displays a remarkable degree of flexibility and dynamism in managing security and military files, with Iranian institutions increasingly inclined to review their experiences and correct shortcomings, accumulating expertise while relying more on self-capabilities rather than pivoting to Russian or Chinese support, as is sometimes portrayed in some media analyses.

At the same time, Tehran seems open to rebuilding new relationships with countries that have had tensions between them and Tehran, driven by the conviction that Israeli expansion in the region will compel various parties to cooperate at some stage, regardless of conflicting or intersecting interests.

Returning to the scenario of escalation, it is likely that the United States -not Israel- will be the party to initiate an attack, as an Israeli attack, with its symbolic and historical weight in Iranian consciousness, will likely lead to enhanced internal cohesion and create a national alignment around leadership, providing the regime with a wide opportunity to exploit the strike, both mobilizationally and politically.

Nevertheless, one cannot dismiss the scenario of an Iranian initiative to attack if the leadership senses that the U.S. strike has become inevitable. Tehran may see that a preemptive strike either against Israel or against direct U.S. bases may offer it a chance to break the rhythm, change the rules of engagement, and impose high costs on its adversaries before confrontation reaches its most intense stages.

The scenario of the Iranian regime's collapse remains one of the most unlikely and complicated paths at the moment; its occurrence would not lead to any form of stability but would produce a wide regional vacuum that Israel would hasten to exploit to enhance its dominance and re-engineer the security framework in the Middle East to serve its strategic interests. This vacuum is likely to raise the cost of direct threats to Arab countries that have begun to clearly feel the magnitude of this danger, especially after the recent Israeli bombardment of Doha last year.

However, focusing the discussion on the scenario of complete collapse may obscure another path that is equally realistic, where one of the paths that cannot be overlooked involves merely replacing some symbols of the ruling leadership class within the regime without affecting its fundamental structure.

This vision is based on replacing specific figures deemed -from the American perspective- the most hardline or most influential in shaping nuclear and regional policies, while maintaining the political and institutional structure of the state as it is. This model draws on the recent experience in Venezuela, at least in its general framework, where Washington sought to change the head of power or the ruling elite without dismantling the system itself, even though the political conditions and social environment in Iran differ radically from those in Venezuela.