A Review of the Palestinian Elections, Power Dynamics, and the Future of National Legitimacy

The upcoming Palestinian elections, decided through presidential decrees for their organization in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem, are not merely a long-awaited constitutional obligation, nor just a moment to reshape the legislative council after years of institutional vacuum. Instead, they represent a foundational moment for the reconstitution of the entire official Palestinian political system. Anyone who reads the texts governing the electoral process and places them within the context of the transformations witnessed by the Palestinian cause over the past two decades will realize that the issue transcends the election of a new parliament; it is an attempt to reproduce Palestinian political legitimacy according to new equations. In this framework, the legislative council could serve as a gateway for reshaping the Palestinian National Council, and subsequently rebuilding the supreme reference of the Palestinian political system. Thus, the real question that should precede discussions about the names of winners and losers is not 'Who will win the elections?' but rather 'What political system is intended to be produced from these elections? And are we witnessing a revival of national institutions or a new engineering of the official Palestinian system?'

This question gains legitimacy from the nature of the phase the Palestinian cause is experiencing. For many years, Palestinian division has not merely been a disagreement between Fatah and Hamas; rather, it has transformed into a division in the very concept of legitimacy itself, in defining the national institution, in the function of the Palestinian Authority, and in the position of the Palestine Liberation Organization within the national project. Over time, the unifying institutions have receded, representation mechanisms have been paralyzed, and the Palestinian Authority has become the most present institution in the daily lives of Palestinians, while the role of the PLO has shrunk, despite being intended as the collective framework for all Palestinians both inside and outside the homeland. Therefore, the link between electing the legislative council and reshaping the national council should not be perceived merely as an operational detail but as a reconfiguration of the Palestinian institutional map, with all its political and national implications.

From here arises one of the prominent issues raised by this process. If the national council is considered the parliament of the Palestinian people in all its gatherings inside and in exile, can it be reshaped, directly or indirectly, based solely on elections taking place in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem? How can millions of Palestinians in refugee camps and diaspora be part of the process of rebuilding the institution that represents them all if the starting point is confined to the geography of the Palestinian Authority? This question does not downplay the importance of legislative elections, but rather draws a line between reactivating the institutions of the authority and redefining the supreme national reference for the Palestinian people.

The concern here does not arise from the principle of elections; elections in themselves are a democratic value that is indisputable. Rather, it’s about their use as a mechanism to rearrange the political system without a comprehensive national consensus preceding them. Electoral legitimacy, no matter how important, cannot alone replace the historical national legitimacy upon which the PLO was founded as a comprehensive framework for the various components of the Palestinian people. Therefore, any attempt to transition from one legitimacy to another through a geographically and politically limited electoral path will remain a matter for discussion, not because it rejects democracy, but because it questions its limits when it concerns the representation of a people dispersed between occupation, exile, and diaspora... At the heart of this equation stands the Fatah movement, as it is the force that established the Palestinian Authority, leads the PLO, and represents the backbone of the official institution. However, the movement enters the elections facing one of its most complex phases since its inception. The eighth general conference, despite consolidating the official leadership, did not succeed in resolving questions concerning the movement's future or addressing the organizational disparities that have accumulated over the years. In fact, the conference inadvertently revealed the extent of the gap between the official organizational structure and broad sectors of the cadres who feel they have become outside the sphere of influence. Thus, the real challenge for Fatah does not lie in competing with Hamas or other forces but in its ability to prevent a recurrence of the internal competition experienced by the movement in the 1996 elections to a limited extent and then more clearly and impactfully in the 2006 elections. All indicators suggest that the official list will not accommodate all aspiring candidates, and several prominent figures may find themselves outside the list, opening the door to the formation of independent lists that carry a Fatah political identity even if not bearing the movement's name officially. If this phenomenon occurs, it will not only be an organizational disagreement but a reflection of a deeper crisis concerning the movement's relationship with its base and the way elite are nourished within it. What strengthens this possibility is that the proportionate system encourages the formation of multiple lists, as running outside the official list no longer means a complete exit from the political equation, but may become a means to obtain independent parliamentary representation, which can later turn into a negotiating card within the political system itself. Therefore, competition within the Fatah space may become fiercer than competition between Fatah and other forces... In this context, one cannot overlook what is known as the Democratic Reform Movement led by Mohammad Dahlan, which had previously prepared to contest the 2021 elections with an independent list before its cancellation. Despite exiting the formal organizational framework of Fatah, the movement still considers itself an extension of a part of the movement's history, maintaining a presence in certain areas, especially in Gaza Strip and some camps. If elections take place, it is likely to present itself as a reformist alternative within the same national framework, benefiting from any internal divisions within the official Fatah and the discontent of some of its cadres.

As for Hamas, it enters the elections from a completely different position than in 2006. The movement no longer views the legislative council merely as a legislative institution; rather, it sees it as one of the gateways for influence in reshaping the entire Palestinian political system. Therefore, its participation, if it occurs, will be governed by calculations that exceed the number of seats, extending to its position in the equation of national legitimacy, the future of the PLO, and the nature of the relationship between resistance and political institutions. The movement is expected to attempt to present a list that includes organizational leaders and academic and independent personalities, providing it with a broader national image. It will also seek to exploit any divisions within its rivals while simultaneously being required to address questions concerning its vision for the future of the political system and how to manage the relationship between resistance work and institutional work, questions that will strongly feature in any electoral discourse. Conversely, the Palestinian left appears to be in one of its weakest phases. The regression it has experienced is not only related to previous electoral results but also reflects a structural crisis in its political, intellectual, and organizational project. The left has gradually lost its position as a third force capable of creating balance between the national and Islamic trends, and its electoral presence is limited despite its historical and struggle credentials. Unless it builds a new vision that transcends the traditional legacy, it is likely to remain a marginal player in the next equation.

In the vacuum left by the diminishing of parties, civil society forces, independent figures, businesspeople, and economic elites are advancing. These forces may find in the proportional system an opportunity to enhance their presence, but they simultaneously raise another question: Does their rise represent a natural development in democratic life, or does it reflect a shift of weight from the national movement to administrative and economic elites, potentially leading to a redefinition of Palestinian politics according to criteria different from those that governed it over the past decades?

One cannot downplay the role of clans, large families, and regional extensions. Despite all the manifestations of political modernity, traditional social structures still possess the ability to influence voter behavior, especially in the governorates, towns, and camps. These forces could become a decisive factor in tipping the scales for certain lists, reflecting the continuity of the interplay between the social and political in the Palestinian case.

As for Jerusalem, it will remain a criterion for the legitimacy of the electoral process more than just an electoral district. Conducting elections there reinforces the Palestinian political right, while its suspension or restriction reproduces the issues that emerged in 2021. Therefore, the fate of the elections will remain largely tied to how the Jerusalem file is addressed, viewed as both a sovereign and a national issue before being a procedural matter.

However, the most significant dimension remains related to the Palestinian National Council. Here lies the essence of the problem. Reshaping the national council through the path delineated by the presidential decrees raises deep questions about the nature of national representation, the limits of legitimacy, and the relationship between the Palestinian Authority and the PLO. The national council was not originally an institution exclusive to the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip; it was the political expression of the Palestinian people wherever they may be. Thus, any process intended to reshape it, from the perspective of many researchers and politicians, should be based on comprehensive national consensus and mechanisms ensuring the participation of various Palestinian gatherings, rather than being an extension of an electoral process confined within the borders of the Palestinian Authority.

This discussion should not be understood as a rejection of democracy or a refusal to resort to the ballot boxes but rather as a defense of the idea that democracy itself requires a comprehensive national framework that preserves the balance between electoral legitimacy and the historical legitimacy of the Palestinian people across all its components. Elections can help to reproduce institutions, but they cannot alone resolve the issues concerning the nature of the national project or the identity of the comprehensive political reference. In light of this, the upcoming elections appear to be a historical crossroads. They may present an opportunity to revive institutions if conducted within a comprehensive national consensus that precedes and defines their objectives and limits. Conversely, they may turn into a gateway for reengineering the official political system according to new equations if treated as the sole instrument for producing legitimacy and reforming the national reference. Between these two possibilities, Palestinians face a challenge not only about who will win the majority of seats but also the larger question: What political system is intended to be built, for which national project, and to what degree of partnership and representation?

The future of the Palestinian cause does not hinge on whether elections occur or not, but rather on the nature of the national contract that will be produced by these elections. If elections become a means to strengthen national unity and restore the importance of unifying institutions, they represent a step forward. However, if they turn into a tool to reshape the Palestinian reference without including all components of the Palestinian people, they will continue to raise political, constitutional, and national questions that will accompany their results for many years, for the essence of the Palestinian crisis has never been a crisis of ballot boxes; it has always been a crisis of defining national representation and the nature of the encompassing political project that should remain the property of all Palestinians, not a product of circumstantial equations or transient institutional arrangements.