Elections Between National Necessity and the Quality of Electoral Design

Author: Bassem Zakarneh

Elections are not merely a ballot box or a constitutional entitlement that is executed on time; rather, they are a complex political and institutional process designed to reproduce legitimacy, enhance stability, and embed citizens' trust in governance institutions. International experiences have proven that elections are not deemed successful simply by being held but by their ability to produce a more representative and stable political system. Conversely, elections conducted in a divided political environment, under an electoral law that does not ensure justice and balance, or in the absence of a national consensus on their objectives, can transform from a tool for building legitimacy to a factor that exacerbates division, weakens institutions, and creates new political crises instead of addressing them. From here, the real question is not: "Do we hold elections?" but rather: "How do we design elections that enhance the national project, consolidate stability, and grant institutions genuine legitimacy that earns citizens' trust?"

In established democratic countries, electoral law is viewed as one of the most important laws regulating constitutional and political life, as it not only organizes the voting process but also shapes the political system, defines the nature of representation, and directly impacts government stability and institutional efficiency. Therefore, any amendment to the electoral law should not be a response to immediate political considerations but rather based on scientific standards, comparative experiences, and wide national dialogue that ensures a balance between fairness of representation and political stability.

The ongoing discussion today about the electoral law is healthy and necessary; all the remarks raised deserve careful consideration. The electoral law is not merely a collection of legal texts but is the framework that determines the shape of the political system for decades to come. This necessitates that any modification be the result of scientific study and comprehensive national dialogue, away from temporary considerations and immediate political interests.

Firstly: Why do we hold elections?

This is the question that precedes all others and, unfortunately, is the least present in the public discussion.
In political science, the quality of elections is not measured solely by their regularity but by the goals they achieve. Is the objective to renew legitimacy? To end division? To rebuild institutions? To strengthen national unity? Or merely to fulfill a formal requirement?
So far, there is no clear political answer; neither the factions, nor the official institutions, nor even the entities calling for elections have presented a vision explaining to the Palestinian people what will actually be achieved after the elections and what the added political value of this entitlement is.
Holding elections merely for their own sake does not represent a democratic achievement if it is not part of a clear political project agreed upon by Palestinians, defining the expected national goals from this entitlement.

Secondly: Independent national decision

It is a settled principle in democratic experiences that elections should reflect the free national will, not be a response to external pressures. Palestinian decision-making should not be subjected to international pressures, whether European, American, Israeli, or even Arab, without a clear political quid pro quo that serves Palestinian national rights.
If the international community demands holding elections, the question that should reasonably arise is: What will the Palestinian people gain in return? Will these elections contribute to ending occupation? To protecting Palestinian rights? Or to enhancing political recognition of the Palestinian state?
If elections are part of external visions or initiatives aimed at reshaping the Palestinian political system or re-engineering the balance of political representation or influencing the status of certain forces or national institutions, this raises legitimate questions about the extent of the independence of the national decision. Elections should be a means to serve the Palestinian national project and enhance its unity and institutions, not a tool to achieve objectives or priorities that do not stem from the Palestinian national will.

Thirdly: The size of the Legislative Council

The law stipulates increasing the number of Legislative Council members to 200. When compared to the population size and in relation to many parliaments in countries with similar demographic profiles, this number seems excessive both financially and administratively. An increase in the number of council members does not necessarily mean an improvement in the quality of representation or legislative performance; rather, it may lead to increased public expenses, prolonged legislative processes, and complicated decision-making. Therefore, maintaining the previous number of 132 members seems more balanced and harmonious with the Palestinian demographic reality while achieving financial savings under difficult economic conditions and enhancing parliamentary working efficiency without compromising the quality of political representation.

Fourthly: Why are presidential and legislative elections not held simultaneously?
It is a well-known principle in electoral management that integrating simultaneous electoral entitlements achieves three main benefits: reducing financial costs, increasing participation rates, and producing comprehensive political legitimacy.
This raises a logical question: Why shouldn’t a voter receive two ballots on the same day, one for the presidency and the other for the Legislative Council? This option achieves financial and administrative efficiency and prevents the country from organizing two separate elections in a short time while granting the executive and legislative institutions simultaneous and clear legitimacy.

Fifthly: The list system… Is it the optimal choice?

The law adopted the system of complete proportional representation with the homeland considered as a single electoral district.
Although this system achieves a high degree of political representation, its success is linked to the presence of stable and internally democratic political parties capable of producing their leadership according to standards of efficiency and transparency.
However, in the Palestinian case, where parties suffer from division and weakened institutional and organizational structures, the list system may lead to counterproductive results. The closed list grants party leaders the authority to determine the order of candidates rather than the voter, meaning that those who enter the council may be those favored by the party leadership rather than those trusted by the public. The current system also deprives many independent national figures and academic and community talents from running because they cannot form complete electoral lists.
Thus, it is appropriate to revisit the mixed system option that combines lists and individual constituencies, as it is more capable of achieving a balance between party representation and community representation.

Sixthly: Does the current electoral threshold achieve stability?

 

The threshold was set in the draft law at 1%. To understand its impact, we must look at the numbers.

If the number of registered voters is 2.8 million, the threshold is calculated from the valid participating votes.
If the turnout rate reaches 80%, the number of voters will be about 2,240,000, and thus the threshold (1%) equals 22,400 votes. However, if the turnout rate is 40%, the number of voters would be around 1,120,000, making the threshold 11,200 votes only.
This means that a list may enter the Legislative Council with about eleven thousand votes only if turnout is low.

Conversely, if the threshold were raised to 2%, the minimum would become 22,400 votes at a 40% turnout and 44,800 votes at an 80% turnout.
If it reached 3%, the minimum would rise to 33,600 votes at 40% turnout and 67,200 votes at 80% turnout.
Here lies the dilemma faced by any electoral legislator; a low electoral threshold enhances political pluralism but may lead to a highly fragmented council, making it difficult to form a stable majority or pass legislation. A higher threshold limits fragmentation but may deprive emerging political forces of representation.

Therefore, selecting the electoral threshold should not be a political decision but rather a technical one based on the goal intended to be achieved through the electoral system: Is the priority to maximize representation or to enhance parliamentary stability?

Seventh: Elections are not an event… but a comprehensive national process

International experiences in election management confirm that the success of any electoral process does not begin on election day but starts from the moment the electoral system is designed and the political, legal, and institutional environment in which the elections will take place is built. A balanced electoral law, an independent and neutral electoral management body, a judiciary capable of settling electoral disputes, guaranteeing equal opportunities for all competitors, and all parties accepting the election results are essential elements for the success of any democratic process and are no less important than the voting process itself.

Comparative experiences also show that elections held in the absence of sufficient political consensus or without clarity in their national objectives may turn into another phase in political conflict rather than a means to resolve it. Hence, the success of elections is not measured by the participation rate or the number of ballot boxes but rather by its ability to produce stable political legitimacy, enhance citizens’ trust in institutions, and create a political system capable of responding to societal aspirations and facing national challenges.

Eighth: The need for comprehensive national dialogue on the electoral system

If elections will shape the Palestinian political system for many years to come, it is unwise for the discussion around the electoral law to remain confined to political forces or official institutions alone. The electoral system does not belong to any faction, government, or authority; rather, it is a social and political contract that organizes the relationship between the citizen and governance institutions and defines the form of political representation for future generations.

Thus, the need arises to launch a comprehensive national dialogue preceded by the approval of any electoral law involving everyone without exception, including factions, political forces, civil society institutions, professional and labor unions, popular federations, the private sector, independent national figures, Palestinian academics, universities, electoral system experts, and the Central Elections Commission, in addition to benefiting from neutral and specialized international experiences in designing electoral systems and managing democratic processes that align with Palestinian national privacy and enhance the independence of the national decision.

The most stable electoral laws in the world were not the result of temporary political agreements; rather, they emerged from a broad societal dialogue based on scientific expertise and practical experience, aiming to achieve a balance between fairness of representation, political stability, and institutional efficiency while ensuring the widest possible participation of citizens.

The question today is not whether Palestine needs elections; that is undeniable—but the question is: What kind of elections do we want? Do we want elections held merely to fulfill a formal requirement, or do we want elections that rebuild legitimacy, enhance national unity, and produce institutions capable of facing national challenges?

The quality of elections is not measured by the day of voting but starts from the moment the electoral law is drafted and is embodied in the extent to which this law can achieve a balance between representation and stability, pluralism and effectiveness, the right to participate, and the requirements of good governance. Elections are not an end in themselves but a means to build legitimate institutions capable of representing the Palestinian people and defending their rights. The more balanced and just the law is, and the more independent the decision, and the broader the national dialogue around it, the more capable elections will be of producing a stable political system that enjoys citizens' trust and serves the national interest of Palestine above any other consideration.
The establishment of an electoral system that enjoys public trust does not begin with the ballot box but starts with sincere political will, comprehensive national dialogue, and a fair electoral law that places the interest of Palestine above all else. An effective electoral law does not limit its impact to determining the winners in elections but establishes legitimate and effective institutions, enhances the stability of the political system, and deepens citizens' trust in their institutions. History does not remember who held the elections but remembers who succeeded in making them a point of departure towards stability, unity, and state-building.