Were Palestinians Harder on Themselves than Their Opponents?

When reading the history of the Palestinian cause from the beginnings of the colonial project in Palestine, through the phase of Israeli occupation, then the era of the Palestine Liberation Organization, up to the stage of division between Fatah and Hamas, the follower comes away with a series of shocking observations that are difficult to ignore.

Alongside the significant imbalance in power with the occupation, the Palestinian experience reveals a painful truth that Palestinians have often been fiercer in confronting one another than they have been in facing their political and military opponents. Internal conflicts have drained an enormous amount of national energies and wasted historical opportunities that could have been utilized to strengthen the resilience of Palestinian society and build more robust and effective institutions.

Perhaps one of the most prominent manifestations of the crisis is the weak ability to manage relations with the Arab world and its political systems. For decades, many Palestinian policies and positions have been built on emotional bets or unrealistic assessments of the nature of regional and international interests. Each time, the Palestinian public has been surprised by the actual level of Arab support, as if they were rediscovering that nations act according to their national interests rather than slogans or emotions.

However, part of this recurring shock is attributed to the political discourse presented by some party leaders to the Palestinian people, when they raised expectations to unattainable levels and linked the future of the cause to factional calculations or personal bets more than to a realistic reading of the balance of power and regional transformations.

Within Palestinian society itself, the crisis has not been limited to managing the conflict with the occupation; it has extended to managing society itself. Political competition has often turned into a state of sharp polarization, where organizational loyalty has taken precedence over competence, and party interests have been prioritized over national interests, which has weakened institutions and lost large sectors of society confidence in political elites.

Reviewing the Palestinian experience is not aimed at self-flagellation or absolving the occupation of its historical, legal, and moral responsibilities, but rather aims to understand the reasons for national stagnation. Nations that do not review their mistakes are doomed to repeat them, and just causes do not triumph by virtue alone; they also need wise management, strong institutions, and leaders who can place national interests above narrow party considerations.

After more than a century since the beginning of the conflict, perhaps the most important question now is not: Why have others let us down? But rather: What have we done to avoid this disappointment? And how can we build a national project capable of transcending the mistakes of the past and restoring the Palestinian people's confidence in their future?

A sincere answer to these questions may be the first step towards emerging from the cycle of repeated failures and transitioning from a culture of justifying mistakes to a culture of review, reform, and building.