Gaza Between Conflict Management and the Impossibility of Resolution: An Analysis of Israeli Options

Since October 7, Gaza has transformed from merely a military confrontation arena into a strategic knot testing Israel's ability to resolve issues and the limits of military power in addressing an extremely complex political and humanitarian reality. Over time, it has become clear that Israel faces not a plethora of options but rather a dilemma of alternatives, where security considerations intersect with international pressures, internal divisions, and unresolved "day after" obligations.

In this context, Israeli behavior can be interpreted through three main scenarios, which together form the governing framework for strategic thinking in Tel Aviv.

First: The Option of Total War and Breaking the Rules

This scenario revolves around a return to a long-term war aimed at the complete destruction of Hamas and dismantling its military and organizational structure. Although it is a constant presence in the rhetoric of the Israeli right, its practical implementation encounters a series of structural obstacles.

Total war implies a broader destruction of what remains in the Gaza Strip and a complete collapse of living conditions, making reconstruction nearly impossible and converting the region into a permanent humanitarian burden, not only for Israel but for the international community as a whole. Most importantly, this scenario does not provide a realistic answer to the question of "who governs Gaza after Hamas?"—a question that the Israeli security establishment avoids more than it acknowledges publicly.

Moreover, a lengthy war of this magnitude would deepen Israel's international isolation and subject it to increasing legal and moral pressures, in addition to exhausting the military and the home front at a time when the regional situation is highly fluid and open on multiple fronts.

Second: Accepting the Option of Calm and Reconstruction

The second scenario revolves around accepting a relatively long-term calm formula, coupled with a reconstruction plan led by the United States and its partners, implicitly acknowledging Hamas's continued presence in the scene, albeit with limited capabilities and under strict supervision.

This option provides a temporary exit for Israel, alleviating international pressure and granting it a margin to rearrange its regional priorities, particularly in the face of Iran and its allies. However, its internal political cost is high, as it contradicts the narrative of "total victory" and is seen within the right-wing camp as a retreat from war objectives or an implicit acknowledgment of failure.

Additionally, this scenario remains inherently fragile, as it does not address the roots of the conflict nor opens a genuine political horizon, making any calm susceptible to collapse at the first test and returning the scene to square one.

Third: Conflict Management and Institutionalizing the Intermediate Situation

This is the scenario most in line with actual Israeli behavior and closest to the preferences of the security establishment. This option focuses on prolonging negotiations and political procrastination, while maintaining a level of sporadic localized fighting, similar to the existing model in southern Lebanon.

In this framework, Israel does not seek a definitive resolution or comprehensive settlement but rather aims to keep Gaza in a constant state of pressure, utilizing military and security tools as needed, without sliding into a wide-scale war or committing to a binding political process.

This scenario provides Israel with a degree of strategic flexibility and reduces the costs of major decisions; however, it simultaneously entrenches instability and turns Gaza into an open arena for explosion at any moment, with continuous humanitarian and security implications.

Summary of the Scene

Ultimately, the Israeli options in Gaza reflect a deep strategic crisis that transcends military dimensions to a complex political and moral dilemma. Despite its military superiority, Israel appears unable to impose a final solution and finds itself compelled to manage the conflict rather than resolve it, in the absence of a political partner, the erosion of the legitimacy of force, and changing international sentiment toward open wars.

As for Gaza, it remains the weakest link in a harsh equation, where its crisis is reproduced instead of resolved, and its tragedies are managed instead of ended. In this context, the conflict does not seem to be heading toward a near settlement as much as it is heading to consolidate an intermediate reality, where no war is resolved, and no peace is built, but rather a permanent state of uncertainty, with civilians bearing the brunt of the cost and testing the limits of power in a changing world.