After Genocide: How is Palestinian Legitimacy Crafted Outside the Will of the People?

The genocide that the Gaza Strip has experienced did not turn into a moment of political accountability or a comprehensive national review; rather, it was quickly utilized as an entry point to re-engineer the Palestinian political system from the outside. While Palestinians remain trapped under rubble, displacement, and the collapse of living conditions, the "post-war" phase is managed by international-security logic that does not see the Palestinian people as a source of legitimacy but rather as a population that must be controlled and managed.

In this context, both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas operate within a similar logic, despite their contrasting rhetoric: searching for external legitimacy that ensures survival or a return to the political scene, even at the expense of popular will and national unity. Thus, Palestinian legitimacy is being redefined after the genocide, not as an expression of people's choices but as a political product defined by major powers.

The Palestinian Authority continues to reproduce a familiar model in the region, where legitimacy is derived from abroad rather than from society. The Authority today operates within an international framework in which its role and function are being redefined under American, European, and Arab supervision, with implicit Israeli approval viewing its continuation in its weak form as a guarantee for managing the conflict without a radical solution. In this context, the international community does not engage with the Authority as a representative of the Palestinian people's will but rather as a "modifiable partner" in post-war arrangements.

As for what is called "reforms", it cannot be understood as a neutral administrative or financial path, but as an integrated political project for rehabilitating the Authority functionally according to clear security prerequisites: ensuring security, preventing resistance, managing the population, and building institutions capable of implementation without objection. Despite the accumulated concessions, the outside world seems unsatisfied, pushing for further entanglement, in a relationship closer to political blackmail than to any real reform process.

On the other hand, Hamas operates within the same logic, albeit with different tools. After the genocide and widespread destruction, the movement seeks to reposition itself as a political actor that cannot be overlooked, by attempting to extract external recognition that secures its position in the upcoming political system. Despite its rhetoric rejecting international guardianship, its practical behavior indicates a clear pursuit of external legitimacy amid unprecedented international intervention in governance, administration, and security details.

Some statements from Hamas leaders, including those that seemed like a direct appeal to the American administration, reflect the scale of the transformation imposed by genocide: from a rhetoric of challenge to a rhetoric seeking a place within a framework being shaped outside Palestine. This transformation cannot be separated from the reality that Gaza's future has become hostage to international arrangements rather than the will of its people.

In this sense, the Palestinian scene after the genocide seems to be entirely managed from outside the borders. The United States seeks to determine the shape of the next phase: who governs Gaza, how it will be rebuilt, and what type of Authority receives the "green light". Europe positions itself as a conditional funder based on "political discipline", while Israel, despite being the perpetrator of the genocide, remains the most influential party, seeking to ensure that any future Authority operates within its security concept and prevents the return of resistance in all its forms.

In this climate, legitimacy turns into a commodity managed through back channels: restoring the Authority with new faces, or conditional integration of Hamas into the power equation, as long as both parties comply with what is asked of them. Meanwhile, the Palestinians — survivors of death, displacement, and destruction — are the last to be consulted about their future.

The most dangerous aspect is that these formulations not only exclude popular will but also redraw the boundaries of Palestinian possibilities: an Authority without sovereignty, factions with conditional legitimacy, and a political process devoid of its democratic and moral content. Instead of the post-genocide phase being a moment to rebuild the Palestinian political system on the foundations of participation and accountability, it turns into a moment that confiscates the right of Palestinians to choose their leadership and shape their future.

The genocide experienced by the Gaza Strip has not turned into a moment of actual accountability, neither internally nor internationally. The Palestinian distance between decision-making powers and national institutions remains clear, as responsibilities for what transpired over the past two years have not been acknowledged, nor has any party been held accountable for the accumulated failures that weakened the Palestinian Authority and opened the door to international hegemony. Thus, the absence of accountability and recognition of mistakes has become a fundamental condition for reproducing dependency, and any possible national project has been reduced to mere management of Palestinian existence according to external powers' criteria. Ultimately, Palestinian legitimacy remains governed by international approval rather than the will of the people, and the national project continues to retreat in the face of accumulated failure and political blackmail.