An Economy Without Access: Why Isn't Palestinian Exporting a Growth Driver?

Exporting is usually summoned as the magic recipe for coming out of recession: "Expand markets, increase exports, and the growth wheel will turn." However, this discourse overlooks a fundamental question in the Palestinian case: Do we even possess the ability to export? Or are we merely engaging in a productive activity called exporting, without the tools that would make it a sustainable economic policy?

In natural economies, exporting is a sovereign decision managed by the state through an integrated system: access points, agreements, export insurance, and logistical infrastructure that reduces costs and increases certainty. In Palestine, however, exporting is not just a market issue; it is a series of external controls that start at the crossings and end with specifications, procedures, and timing. Here, competition shifts from a production race to a logistical gamble.

When Access to the Market Becomes a Privilege, Not a Right

The Palestinian exporter does not grapple with the question of "How much can I sell?" as much as they face the question of "Will I arrive on time?" Delays, inspections, re-examinations, and uncertainty in crossing times add a hidden cost known in economic terms as the cost of uncertainty. This cost does not appear in accounting tables, but it clearly reflects in the final price, in lost contracts, and in the erosion of trust among importers.

The numbers here are not mere details: According to the latest available data, the value of Palestinian exports in 2023 did not exceed about $1.5 billion (goods and services), which is approximately 8% of the GDP— a modest percentage compared to small, open economies where exports exceed 20-40%. More importantly, over 80% of exports are directed to a single market (Israel), revealing a sharp geographic concentration that reflects not so much a trade preference but rather access restrictions, transforming "exporting" from a diversification policy into a state of high market dependency and fragility.

Export Sectors... and the Most Time-Sensitive

The structure of Palestinian exports mainly comprises agriculture and food—olive oil and derivatives, dates, vegetables, and fruits—then stone, marble, and building materials, leading to light and artisanal industries, reaching up to emerging digital services. Notably, these sectors, despite carrying local added value and wide employment, are largely the most sensitive to time and crossing costs. This means that the export structure itself is structurally prone to what can be termed "the cost of uncertainty." When arrival times become unpredictable, the product loses part of its competitiveness even before being judged on its quality or price. Ironically, the only sector showing relatively faster growth is digital services—least reliant on physical crossings—in a clear signal that where the burden of time is reduced, performance rises.

Export Without Policy... Activity Without Path

When we call for increasing exports, we assume there is a national export policy in place. But what does this policy practically mean? It typically includes stable crossing arrangements, trade agreements that open markets, tools for securing exports and sharing risks, and a logistical system that reduces costs and enhances reliability. In the Palestinian case, most of this framework is absent. There is no national umbrella for securing exports, no capacity for direct trade negotiation on access conditions, nor control over crossing times. As a result, exporting becomes an exceptional activity reliant on individual initiatives, rather than a developmental path led by the state and the private sector within a common vision.

Export Council... An Institution Without Sovereign Tools

It may be said that Palestine has an institutional framework for exporting through the Palestinian Export Council and the related national strategy. This is true in form. However, the issue is not in the absence of institutions, but in their actual capacity to manage the "act of exporting" itself. The council, as a coordinating platform between the public and private sectors, plays an important role in planning, support, and promotion, yet operates within a space devoid of sovereign tools at the crossings, no powers for direct trade negotiation, and no national mechanisms for securing exports or reducing the risks of time and uncertainty. The continued concentration of exports in one market and the persistence of the most significant sectors being the most sensitive to time indicate that the problem is not in a lack of strategies, but in the absence of control over the conditions for accessing the market.

Closure of the Karama Crossing... When the Eastern Lung Is Cut Off

The fragility of the export structure is clearly manifested in the impact of the closure of the Karama Crossing, the primary outlet for exports heading east and to Arab markets. The closure means not just a delay, but an actual disruption of exporting, because the alternatives offered are either unavailable, costly, or unsuitable for time-sensitive products—particularly agricultural and food items. Here, the question no longer remains logistical but structural: An economy dependent on a single outlet loses its ability to reach its natural markets as soon as that outlet is closed. More importantly, this disruption does not affect a specific shipment but hits the contractual trust with importers in Arab countries, excluding Palestinian products from supply chains that require regularity and predictability in timing.

Financially, unified official figures for the overall losses resulting from the closure are not available, but sectorial estimates indicate that the costs of delaying or canceling shipments—particularly agricultural and food—could incur direct losses to exporters of thousands of dollars per shipment (between partial/full damage, re-storage, and additional fees), not to mention indirect losses represented in lost future contracts and erosion of trust among importers. With recurring closures or disruptions, losses are not measured by a shipment here or there but in millions of dollars annually at the sector level due to increased logistical costs and the exclusion of Palestinian products from regional supply chains that require strict timing regularity.

From Procedural Problems to Structural Impasses

What has been discussed might seem like procedural obstacles that can be improved through training or streamlining procedures. However, the essence of the problem is structural: The act of exporting itself is not in the hands of the Palestinian economy. As long as the crossing decision, its timing, and the market entry criteria are not managed within a sovereign framework, then any technical improvement will have limited effect. This explains why exporting does not turn into a growth engine even when numbers rise during certain periods: Growth based on activities over which we have no control remains fragile and quickly retracts.

What Does Building the "Act of Exporting" Practically Mean?

If the essence of the crisis is structural, then the next question becomes: What does practically building the "act of exporting" mean? One cannot leap over the political reality, but work can be done on areas that reduce the fragility of exporting and restore its economic policy significance. Building this "act" does not only mean demanding that the producer be more competitive but also providing a framework that protects time, secures risks, and makes market access a right rather than a gamble. This starts from national tools—albeit limited—to share the risks of delays and uncertainty, from smart investment in logistics that mitigate the effects of time, and from selecting markets and routes that are less sensitive to fluctuations and building long-term relationships with them. It also entails redirecting part of the added value towards digital and cognitive services that minimize reliance on physical crossings, and seeking unconventional regional integration formulas that create "functional outlets" even in the absence of full sovereignty. In summary, competitiveness is not only built inside the factory but also at the market gate.

Conclusion

Exporting in Palestine is not a numbers problem, but a question of sovereignty over the economic act. Unless we transition from talking about "increasing exports" to building the conditions for "export capacity," exporting will remain an individual heroic activity without a public policy capable of generating sustainable growth. An economy that produces but does not reach is an economy that operates without outlets. Restoring the meaning of exporting begins with acknowledging that the market alone is not enough—we need a framework that protects time, secures risks, and grants the producer the right to access before demanding competition.