Israel: When Politicians Hesitate... the Army Advances

Recent Israeli reports on Gaza and Lebanon reveal a phenomenon worth noting, not only to understand the current war's trajectory but also to grasp the nature of the relationship between the military establishment and political leadership in Israel. While it may initially seem that the discussion revolves around two different fronts and distinct field conditions, a careful reading of the leaks and assessments issued by the Israeli army shows a single line of thinking governing the military establishment in both arenas.

In a report published by "Haaretz" regarding Lebanon and Iran, senior military officials expressed their concerns about the decision to cease hostilities, considering that political hesitation provides Iran with the opportunity to impose a "linking of fronts" equation, limiting future Israeli military action. According to the report, the army did not only present its security assessments but pushed for the expansion of military operations against Iran and Hezbollah, warning that any retreat or halt could lead to a deterioration of deterrence and weaken Israel's ability to achieve its strategic objectives.

At the same time, other reports about Gaza, including statements attributed to the Southern Command leader, revealed that the military establishment does not see the war's objectives as exhausted yet. Instead of discussing ending the war or transitioning to a political phase, the focus within the army is on how to continue exerting pressure on Hamas, whether through military operations or through tools of siege, economic strangulation, control of humanitarian aid, and even reviving models like "humanitarian carrots" and alternative distribution mechanisms that were promoted during previous stages of the war.

What connects both cases is that the military does not act merely as an executive body implementing government decisions; it also plays a proactive role in shaping policy itself. When the political level is subjected to international or internal pressures pushing it towards calm or settlement, the military establishment steps forward to present a different vision based on the necessity of continuing the war, exerting pressure, and not retreating from declared objectives.

This phenomenon is not new in Israel. Since the establishment of the occupation state, the army has occupied a central position in political life and decision-making. Its role was not limited to executing the goals set by politicians; it frequently participated in defining those goals and in shaping the strategic visions that guided the policies of successive governments. This was evident in pivotal wars Israel has experienced, where senior generals played influential roles in determining the direction of security and military policy.

Scholar specializing in the triangle of military-community-politics, Professor Yagil Levy, addressed this complex relationship between the military and politics, noting that the military establishment possesses a wide margin of independence and influence, and does not hesitate at times to oppose or pressure political leadership when it believes that their decisions do not serve what it considers the strategic interests of the state or the military establishment itself. Additionally, other Israeli academics and writers, including Israeli linguistics professor Aidan Lando, have repeatedly criticized the growing role of the military establishment in steering political decisions, warning against the transformation of security and military considerations into a dominant framework for policy-making in Israel.

From this perspective, the current war appears as a clear example of this overlap. The reports issued by the army not only reflect professional assessments or security concerns, but also carry a political stance regarding the future of the war and its objectives. When the army warns against halting operations in Lebanon or calls for continued pressure on Gaza through siege and assistance control, it is not only discussing military means, but also defining what Israeli policy should look like in the upcoming phase.

Moreover, these reports indicate that despite years of war accompanied by exhaustion, international pressures, and increasing criticism, the military establishment does not seem to be in a position of reconsidering the objectives initially set but is rather in a quest for new tools to achieve them. Instead of reevaluating the viability of the war or the limits of military power, the discussion revolves around how to continue exerting pressure, develop its tools, and expand its areas.

Therefore, it may be more accurate to say that the debate within Israel does not focus on the war's objectives so much as on the means and timing. The core goals related to weakening Hamas, reshaping the security and political reality in Gaza, and maintaining freedom of military action in the region continue to enjoy broad support within the military establishment, perhaps appearing more entrenched therein than among certain political leadership circles.

Thus, when politicians hesitate or face pressures pushing them towards a settlement, the army does not retreat to a neutral executor position but advances to the forefront as a partner in shaping policy and determining the course of the war. Perhaps this is why the Israeli military establishment, after all that has occurred since October 7, continues to speak in terms of completing objectives rather than finishing the war. While the politician preoccupies himself with the calculations of internal and external pressures, alliances, and settlements, the general continues to think in terms of open warfare, searching for new tools to achieve the same objectives, either through military force or through siege, strangulation, and re-engineering the reality in Gaza and the region. This may indicate that the essence of the Israeli scene today is closer to a fixed truth: when politicians hesitate, the army advances.