The Israeli Opposition… A Partner in Netanyahu's Strength / Mustafa Ibrahim

Some Israeli analyses tend to place the blame for the continuation of the war and the expansion of confrontations solely on Benjamin Netanyahu, but this reading ignores a fundamental fact that the Israeli opposition itself has been, and still is, one of the most important sources of strength that Netanyahu relies on for survival and continuity.

According to some critical Israeli analysts of Netanyahu, the opposition, instead of forming a real political alternative or leading a serious accountability process for the government after the failure of October 7, has practically contributed to raising Netanyahu's ceiling and granting him a political and popular safety net. By engaging in the state of national Zionist consensus, it has turned into a protective wall preventing his downfall at many junctures that could have ended his political future.

The opposition could have capitalized on the Israeli anger after October 7 to showcase Netanyahu's failures and his inability to lead. He is a politician who has historically been known for hesitation and fear of making decisive decisions when their political cost is high. However, what happened was exactly the opposite, as he succeeded in turning the failures of the army and security agencies into an opportunity to rearrange the balance of power within the occupying state, avoiding personal accountability for the disaster, and indeed refraining from acknowledging any political responsibility for it.

Netanyahu was able to tame the security and military establishment and utilize its failures for his benefit, while the opposition was preoccupied with participating in crisis management more than holding those responsible accountable. Instead of exposing to the public the extent of political and security failures, it preferred to join the state of public mobilization under the banner of supporting the army and national unity, which granted Netanyahu the time and political cover needed to restore his image.

In his relationship with former US President Donald Trump, Netanyahu knows well when to back off and when to push forward. He understands the nature of American politics as well as Trump's personality and calculations. Thus, even when facing American pressures, he tries to turn them into political assets domestically.

Every confrontation or disagreement with Washington is marketed within Israel as proof of the independence of Israeli decision-making and Netanyahu's ability to say 'no' to the American president when it comes to what the Israeli right calls the supreme national interests.

For this reason, Netanyahu does not view his disagreements with American administrations as an existential threat. He has engaged in political confrontations with successive American administrations, from Bill Clinton to Barack Obama and Joe Biden, and he knows that the United States will remain compelled to deal with him as long as he remains prime minister.

As for the real danger to him, it does not come from Washington, but from losing his position. He knows that leaving the premiership means losing influence and political immunity, and perhaps a return to courtrooms or the margins of political life. Therefore, he fights all his battles as personal and political survival struggles, not merely disagreements over public policies.

This is why focusing on Netanyahu's personality becomes essential in any serious political analysis. The decisive factor in Israel is not only the nature of the system or the balance of power, but the person who holds the authority to make the final decision. Under Netanyahu, these powers have concentrated more than ever in the hands of the prime minister.

However, the responsibility does not rest solely on Netanyahu. The Israeli opposition repeatedly makes the same mistake over and over. When the guns roar, opposing voices retreat, and most of their leaders return to align behind the government under the banner of 'national unity' or 'support for the army.'

With the exception of limited voices such as Yair Golan, real criticism disappears and difficult questions are absent, while political discourse becomes another version of the government’s rhetoric. Figures like Naftali Bennett, Gadi Eisenkot, Avigdor Lieberman, and others, despite their awareness of the extent of the failures that Netanyahu has led Israel into, hesitate to engage in a real political confrontation with him on issues of war and military escalation, fearing the loss of voter support or appearing weak in the eyes of the Israeli public.

It seems that the obsession with opinion polls, the number of seats in the Knesset, and the thirst for power drives many opposition leaders to adopt the same security discourse promoted by Netanyahu, instead of presenting a different political and strategic alternative. Thus, their competition turns into a bidding war over who appears more hardline, rather than a competition on how to extricate Israel from its escalating crises.

The result is that Netanyahu succeeds time and again in portraying himself as the sole leader capable of managing crises, while his competitors become mere diluted copies of him. Instead of being alternatives to him, they become part of the political environment that allows him to continue and remain.

However, it is wrong to reduce this outcome to the performance of the Israeli opposition alone. Netanyahu has also benefited from the mistakes of Israel's adversaries and enemies. Since October 7, the calculations of Hamas, the performance of Hezbollah, and Iranian policies, to varying degrees, have contributed to providing the environment that allowed him to rebuild his political status despite his responsibility for the largest security failure in Israel's history.

Instead of leading the results of the war to his political downfall, Netanyahu found himself able to invest in the continuation of confrontations and the multiplicity of fronts to convince Israelis that Israel faces ongoing existential threats and that any change in leadership during this stage could carry greater risks.

Various forces have misjudged how to manage the conflict with Israel, as they have misunderstood Netanyahu's ability to exploit wars and crises to his advantage. Often, steps that were supposed to weaken him turned into factors that helped him strengthen his political position and reproduce himself as an indispensable leader in the eyes of a large part of Israeli society.

Recent years have proven that military strikes alone have not resolved the conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, or with Iran. Despite targeted assassinations, bombing raids, and ongoing escalation, Israel has not achieved the declared political objectives, while security and regional challenges have become more complex. In contrast, the forces confronting Israel have not succeeded in preventing Netanyahu from turning these confrontations into a political lever that enhances his staying in power.

What Israel needs, according to this critical perspective proposed by some voices within it, is not more slogans or new rounds of escalation, but a comprehensive review of the policies that have led to this deadlock.

Wars are not the end of the road, but rather the beginning of new paths. Success is not measured by the number of targets bombed, but by the state's ability to build a more stable political and security reality.

The opposition that merely echoes the discourse of strength and fears confronting Netanyahu at critical moments does not provide a real alternative but becomes an indirect partner in prolonging his leadership. Ironically, many of his domestic opponents, as well as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran abroad, have contributed through their political and military mistakes to strengthening his political position and providing him with additional reasons to continue in power, so that the failures that should have accelerated his downfall turned into new opportunities for rebuilding his image and reinforcing his status within Israeli society.