Iran Ignites the Region and the Gulf Calculates Its Steps Cautiously

Amid ongoing Iranian escalation, regional fears about the security of the Gulf and the stability of Arab alliances are rising. Repeated attacks on oil facilities and the entry of external actors put the region on the brink of a wide confrontation, while Gulf states are proceeding with extreme caution, calculating their steps, and balancing between deterring Iran and protecting their vital interests.

On the fourth day of the war against Iran, there was a notable decrease in the number of missiles and drones launched by Tehran towards Israel and regional countries. Although the Israeli army does not fully disclose numbers during the war, estimates suggest that the number of launches decreased by about two-thirds compared to the first day of the confrontation, when most Israelis had to remain in shelters for long hours.

However, this decrease in launch volume does not necessarily mean that escalation is receding. The war is expanding geographically through reverberations extending to more Middle Eastern countries. It seems that Iranian leadership bets that igniting a broader regional confrontation may serve as a deterrent to the United States and its allies, and may later create conditions to enforce a ceasefire on terms more favorable to Iran. Therefore, Iran continues to launch missiles and drones in multiple directions, attempting to expand the conflict and raise the cost of war for its adversaries.

In contrast, the United States is attempting to garner broader international support for its military steps, although this effort has so far been limited to the realm of political positions and diplomatic statements. Major European countries, such as Britain, France, and Germany, have yet to initiate joining the military coalition that Washington is seeking to form. As for Arab countries, especially in the Gulf, they are handling developments with great caution, despite the rising anger towards Iran.

This Gulf hesitation reflects not a lack of threat but rather the complexity of political and security calculations. These countries find themselves facing a delicate equation: on one hand, they are exposed to direct or indirect attacks from Iran, and on the other hand, they realize that engaging in an open regional war could pose significant risks to their economic and security stability.

In this context, media reports have quoted a senior official close to the royal family in Saudi Arabia stating that Riyadh may join the fight if its oil facilities come under a new attack. This position reflects the sensitivity that oil infrastructure represents for the kingdom, as any large-scale targeting could represent a strategic blow to the Saudi economy and global energy markets.

This statement came against the backdrop of reports of explosions and damage in several Gulf countries, including the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait, in addition to targeting Saudi oil facilities. Estimates suggest that one of the facilities that was attacked produces about half a million barrels of oil per day, which has already contributed to rising oil prices globally.

However, the notable political paradox in this scene is reflected in the discourse directed towards Arab countries hesitant to join the war. While criticism and pressure are directed at countries still considering their stance, the fact that Israel itself made the decision to confront from the start and began its military operations against Iran days ago is being overlooked. If Tehran, according to the Israeli narrative, is suffering from a decline in its missile capabilities and is seeking support from allies like the Houthis to compensate for this decline, the question arises: why is there pressure on countries still contemplating their position, while the same question is not posed regarding the party that initiated the war and continues to expand it?

Recent developments also indicate that Iran may have misjudged the Gulf position. Iranian expectations were based on the possibility of a divide within the Gulf Cooperation Council, and that most countries would prefer to avoid escalation and maintain their political and economic balances with Tehran. However, initial indicators suggest an increasing tendency towards coordinating positions among the six countries, especially in light of their direct targeting.

Even Jordan, which initially tried to maintain a policy of neutrality, has sent clear messages to Tehran that targeting its security is a red line. Reports indicate that the kingdom participated in intercepting aerial attacks aimed at its airspace, in a step that reflects a gradual shift in its position.

The British Ministry of Defense also announced that F-35 fighters operated in Jordanian airspace and intercepted Iranian drones as part of a defensive operation to protect Jordan, supported by Typhoon fighters and refueling aircraft. This marks the first time a British fighter of this type has shot down a target during an operational mission, reflecting the extent of Western military engagement in protecting regional allies.

Meanwhile, Israeli media reports have revealed ongoing discussions about Israel's possible contribution to protecting American interests in the Gulf region, as part of mutual defense cooperation between Washington and Tel Aviv. The possibility of providing a defensive umbrella for Gulf countries facing repeated Iranian attacks is also being considered.

However, caution should be exercised with much of this news, as a significant portion of it remains within the framework of media leaks and political estimates, not necessarily reflecting actual decisions. Additionally, relations between Iran and some Gulf countries, especially the UAE, remain complicated and intertwined economically, making the shift to direct confrontation a highly sensitive decision.

For this reason, it is unlikely that any Gulf state will unilaterally decide to enter the war. If such a decision is made, it will likely be issued within a collective stance from the Gulf Cooperation Council, after a comprehensive assessment of the risks and implications.

In conclusion, the regional scene appears troubling and open to uncalculated possibilities. Targeting Gulf countries, or putting their economic and energy security at risk, not only threatens to expand the war among states but may also open the door for new actors to enter the conflict arena. The concern lies not only in the possibility of other countries joining the confrontation but also in the emergence of armed groups or transnational networks that may find in this chaos an ideal environment for activity and escalation. In such moments of regional chaos, irregular forces usually thrive, whether motivated by their own agendas or prompted by parties seeking to manage the conflict from behind the scenes. At that point, the war may no longer be merely a confrontation between states but could transform into a regional turmoil that is difficult to control or predict its outcomes.