Before It's Too Late: Why Saving Palestinian Institutions Has Become a Condition for Reform Success Rather Than a Substitute for It?

For years, the international community has linked its support for the Palestinian Authority to the implementation of political, administrative, and institutional reforms. In principle, there is no disagreement about the importance or necessity of these reforms; enhancing transparency, combating corruption, renewing political legitimacy, and improving the efficiency of public institutions are legitimate goals agreed upon by both Palestinians and their international partners.

However, the pressing question today is: Do the Palestinian institutions still have enough time and capacity to implement these reforms before they reach a stage where rescue becomes difficult?

The most dangerous aspect of the current international approach is the assumption that Palestinian institutions will remain capable of functioning regardless of how delayed support is and how crises accumulate. The reality, however, suggests otherwise.

Reform cannot succeed in institutions that are gradually losing their ability to perform their core functions, and it is unreasonable to demand that an authority suffering from a persistent financial crisis carry out extensive reforms while simultaneously struggling to maintain a minimum level of operational capacity.

In recent years, the Palestinian Authority has taken steps in response to repeated international demands, including forming a technocratic government, appointing a vice president, conducting local elections, implementing changes and restructuring a number of institutions and security agencies, extensive retirement provisions, taking measures against individuals accused of corruption, and making amendments to sensitive political and financial files.

Some may see these steps as insufficient, and that may be true; however, it is difficult to claim that nothing has changed or that all international demands have been ignored.

Here arises a central question:
If reforms have begun, where is the support that helps ensure their success?
And if institutions are responding to international demands, where are the incentives that encourage the continuation of this path?

The message reaching the Palestinian street today is that the list of conditions continues to expand while political and financial support remains delayed.

But reality does not wait; a doctor in a government hospital cannot continue treating patients indefinitely while facing a worsening livelihood crisis, and a teacher cannot continue his educational mission for many years in a state of persistent financial uncertainty.

The civilian and military employees upon whose stability institutions depend cannot forever be expected to endure while accumulating debts and family obligations.

Talking about the crisis of the Palestinian Authority is not just about employee salaries or financial shortfalls, but rather about the sustainability of the institutional framework upon which all Palestinian life depends. The Palestinian Authority is directly or indirectly responsible for the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of families, for managing schools, hospitals, civil and security institutions, and essential services. Any additional decline in its ability to function will not merely weaken a governmental institution but will also have economic and social repercussions that will affect the entire Palestinian society.

In Gaza, the situation appears more urgent; the injured and ill cannot wait for the completion of reform programs before receiving treatment, children living in tents cannot wait for years of political consultations before finding shelter to protect them from the winter cold and the summer heat, and families that have lost their homes cannot postpone reconstruction until international discussions on conditions and procedures conclude.

In the West Bank, Palestinian communities facing settler attacks, home and vehicle arson, destruction of farms, theft of livestock, and assaults on farmers and herders cannot wait for a new political horizon to take shape or for future negotiations that may or may not occur.
Therefore, the question that must be asked in Brussels, Washington, and donor capitals is not only: What reforms are needed?

But also: What will remain to be reformed if the erosion of Palestinian institutions continues?

If you truly want reform, then your current policies may make reform impossible. The international community constantly speaks about preventing chaos, avoiding security vacuums, ensuring a stable future for Gaza after the war, maintaining stability in the West Bank, preventing the rise of more hardline forces, and protecting political and financial investments that have been poured into building Palestinian institutions over the past decades.

But achieving these goals requires first preserving the institutions capable of implementing them.
If the current erosion continues, Europe, the United States, and Israel may face a new reality characterized by the collapse of the administrative and institutional partner that the international community has relied on for decades, disrupting any future plans for reconstructing Gaza, increasing the likelihood of chaos and instability, and losing the institutional framework necessary to implement any future political agreement, as well as the loss of a significant portion of the investments made by donor countries since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, and declining chances for a political solution in favor of more hardline options from various parties.

What is required today is not to abandon reform or ignore the real problems within the Palestinian political system; rather, what is needed is to save the very possibility of reform itself by providing urgent support to prevent institutional and financial collapse, recognizing the reform steps that have been taken, building on them, and adopting the principle of "support in exchange for progress" instead of "support after the completion of reform."
Reform needs institutions capable of functioning, employees capable of continuing, and a society that has at least a minimal hope for the future.

Before it's too late, the most important question for the international community may not be how to reform Palestinian institutions, but rather how to prevent their collapse first.