The Occupying State Establishes a Sustainable Occupation Reality in Gaza
As indirect negotiations continue regarding the completion of a ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, Israel is rapidly advancing to impose facts on the ground that make any future political agreement subject to its security and geographical conditions. The Israeli aim is no longer limited to managing the war or exerting military pressure, but is moving towards entrenching a long-term occupation reality that redraws the borders of the strip, reduces its actual area, and transforms more than two million Palestinians into trapped residents in overcrowded and isolated pockets.
In its latest steps, Israel has expanded what is known as the "Yellow Line" east of the Gaza Strip to go beyond the Salah al-Din road, the main artery linking the northern and southern parts of the strip. With this expansion, the percentage of land under direct Israeli control has risen to about 60% of the Gaza Strip's total area of 365 square kilometers.
Originally, this line was a temporary hypothetical boundary within ceasefire understandings, but it is gradually turning into a new actual border. With repeated Israeli incursions to the west, this boundary has come to be referred to as the "Orange Line," in reference to the expansion of Israeli-controlled areas and the erosion of the remaining space for Palestinians.
Today, the Salah al-Din road is one of the most dangerous roads in the strip, having transformed from a lifeline into a constant source of fear due to the repeated targeting of vehicles and pedestrians, under the pretext of their proximity to buffer zones unilaterally defined by the Israeli army without any clear markings. These developments do not seem to be temporary military measures or transient negotiation pressure tactics, but rather reflect a comprehensive Israeli strategy aimed at turning the temporary military occupation into a low-cost permanent reality.
This trend has been clearly articulated by several analysts and those close to decision-making circles in Israel, including Eliyahu Ben Asher from the strategic group in the Likud Party, who believes that the best scenario for Israel is to maintain the current situation without a final resolution. He stated that Israel controls two-thirds of the area of the strip, including the crossings, and that the absence of reconstruction and the increasing motivations for emigration make this reality far better than a scenario involving Israel's withdrawal and the return of the Palestinian Authority. Although this assessment does not represent an officially announced position, it largely reflects the practical direction the Israeli government is taking on the ground.
This vision is based on not fully eliminating the Hamas movement, not withdrawing from the occupied areas, and keeping Gaza in a state of permanent exhaustion that prevents its reconstruction or the return of any form of normal life.
Israel does not need to rebuild settlements to establish a permanent occupation; it suffices to maintain military and security control, prevent the population from accessing their land, and subject the strip to a tight siege, while retaining the freedom for military intervention at any time.
This model is the same one applied by Israel in southern Lebanon and in the occupied Syrian territories, where it imposes continuous security control without bearing the burdens of civilian administration or full legal responsibility. In Gaza, this model is clearly evident in the city of Rafah, which has become nearly empty of residents after extensive destruction, as well as in Beit Hanoun, which has suffered similar devastation, along with the eastern, northern, and central areas that have turned into isolated military belts.
This field path intersects with the Israeli approach in the ongoing negotiations regarding the completion of the ceasefire agreement. Negotiations have stalled on moving to the second phase due to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's insistence on disarming Hamas and Palestinian factions before any Israeli withdrawal or the commencement of the reconstruction process.
In contrast, Hamas emphasizes that the original agreement, supported by a UN Security Council resolution, stipulates completing the first phase first, which includes the Israeli withdrawal, lifting restrictions, and beginning reconstruction, before discussing other political and security issues. However, Israel uses this condition as a tool to delay the transition to the second phase and gain the necessary time to consolidate its military positions and expand its areas of control. Thus, negotiations are turning from a path that should lead to ending the war to a political cover for entrenching its results on the ground.
Israeli policy is not limited to preventing a return to the pre-war status quo; it seeks to re-engineer the Gaza Strip demographically, geographically, and politically by reducing the available space for the inhabitants, preventing real reconstruction, maintaining the crossings under Israeli control, pushing the population towards forced migration, and transforming the destroyed areas into security belts and new actual borders.
In this sense, the war is no longer just a military operation but has become a project to reshape the Gaza Strip in accordance with the Israeli security and political vision for the coming decades.
Among all the scenarios on the table, Netanyahu's government seems to favor maintaining Gaza as a destroyed and besieged area, with Israel controlling most of its land, preventing any real reconstruction or the establishment of an effective Palestinian authority. This scenario achieves several objectives for Israel simultaneously: control of the land without bearing responsibility for the population, keeping Hamas weak but intact to prevent political alternatives, obstructing the formation of a unified Palestinian authority, using the humanitarian situation as a continuous pressure tool, and imposing new borders that the world gradually becomes accustomed to. Thus, negotiations become a means to manage this reality rather than to end or change it.
What is happening in Gaza today is not merely a violation of the ceasefire agreement, but an organized process to produce a sustainable occupation reality. While mediators are preoccupied with attempts to salvage the negotiations, Israel is working to impose new boundaries by force and to transform more than half of the Gaza Strip into a closed military zone. If this trend continues, the second phase of the agreement may become meaningless, as Israel will have effectively achieved its core objectives: controlling the land, disrupting reconstruction, and preventing any political settlement that could lead to an end to the occupation.
The most dangerous aspect of this policy is that it does not require an official announcement or loud decisions; it is enough for the "Yellow Line" to expand a few meters each time, and for the world to remain silent, for the temporary occupation to become a permanent reality.
The Palestinian Home... The New Front for Settlement
When the Pharaohs and Atlas Lions Carried the Palestinian Flag... and Gaza Sang
The Paradox of Abundance: 17 Billion Shekels
From Palestine to Geneva: Governing Artificial Intelligence and Redefining Digital Justice...
Yes to Elections, the Question is How and What is the Objective?
Between Political Discourse and People's Pain... When Review Becomes a National Necessity
Gaza: An Unimplemented Agreement and a War Waged Without Announcement