Maariv: Dermer Against the Partial Deal and Netanyahu Stuck in His Political Calculations

SadaNews - The Israeli newspaper Maariv revealed that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, wanted by the International Criminal Court, is facing one of his most complex political dilemmas since the outbreak of the genocide war on Gaza, following the approval of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) for a partial prisoner exchange deal.

Political analyst for the newspaper, Anna Braski, states that this step has placed Netanyahu between two difficult choices: either accept the deal, which could lead to the disintegration of his right-wing government, or reject it and continue the war, risking the loss of American support.

The correspondent highlights the characteristic hesitation that marks Netanyahu's positions, which strengthens the role of Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer, who leads the camp opposing the deal by warning that the partial deal will give Hamas an opportunity to reorganize, at a time when Israel fears that President Donald Trump's patience may run out, as he might lose patience with a long war lacking a clear horizon, and begin to call for a swift end to it.

Braski claims that Hamas's partial approval did not come out of nowhere, but rather came under the pressure of the Israeli plan to invade the city of Gaza (Gideon Vehicles 2), noting that this is the first time since the resumption of the war on Gaza that the movement has shown readiness to enter into a partial agreement, which immediately stirred internal debate in Israel about the appropriate response.

The correspondent ignores that Hamas has dealt positively several times with the plan of American envoy Stephen Witkoff for a partial deal, while Netanyahu's government has repeatedly rejected it, including the latest version of it.

Attempting to Burden the Americans with Netanyahu's Conditions

The political correspondent emphasizes the variance within the Israeli government in dealing with Hamas’s acceptance of Witkoff’s plan. On one hand, there is Dermer, close to Netanyahu and considered "Israel’s man in Washington," who believes that reaching a partial agreement would be a serious strategic error.

Dermer sees that the solution lies not with Hamas but with the United States, as Washington must adopt the five Israeli principles as the final form of the war, which Netanyahu announced, namely:

1. Disarming Hamas.

2. Recovering all prisoners.

3. Completely disarming Gaza.

4. Imposing Israeli security control over the region.

5. Establishing a civilian rule that is neither linked to Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority.

Dermer believes that American acceptance of this vision would give Israel a double gain; if Hamas accepts the plan, it would be a complete victory, and if it rejects it, Israel would gain American legitimacy to continue the war.

Conversely, the head of the National Security Council, Tzachi Hanegbi, and others present an alternative approach, based on breaking the usual pattern and accepting to save what can be saved now. They argue that waiting for a "comprehensive deal" may waste an immediate opportunity to free some prisoners, and that the internal and international reality can no longer bear further procrastination.

The writer notes that Dermer's plan faces a significant obstacle, as Hamas's initial acceptance of a partial deal undermines his argument before the White House, as the American administration may see that the presence of a real opportunity for a deal, even a limited one, makes it illogical to wait for a comprehensive plan that may never materialize.

Moreover, the partial deal grants Hamas a timeframe of between two to three months, which it could use to strengthen its power and reorganize, and perhaps seek to impose an "alternative end picture" with the help of the Americans themselves, a scenario that Dermer sees as the most dangerous.

Braski states that Netanyahu is fully aware of Dermer's analysis, but, by his inherently hesitant instinct, is closer to Hanegbi's position, that is, to continue with the "artificial respiration" policy: another partial deal and another truce, then continue fighting.

However, the situation this time is different from previous ones, as both Europe and the United States have begun to lose their patience regarding a long war that has yet to be decisive. Public pressure inside Israel has reached unprecedented levels, with families no longer accepting new excuses.

Political Calculations

According to the political correspondent, the dilemma does not stop at the security and political level, but extends into internal calculations. Netanyahu's acceptance of a partial deal would nearly mean the collapse of his current government, as the two extremist ministers, Betzalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir, would hasten to withdraw from the government, depriving him of his parliamentary majority.

However, she points to the former defense minister and head of the State Camp party, Benny Gantz, who recently called for the formation of a "prisoner rescue government," indicating his readiness to rejoin the coalition in the name of "national responsibility."

She states that if Netanyahu decides to accept the deal, he could summon Gantz and also acquire a safety net from opposition leader Yair Lapid, building a more stable alternative coalition led until the next elections, which may be advanced.

Yet, should Netanyahu refuse the deal, he would remain a prisoner of the "hardline camp" represented by Smotrich and Ben Gvir, with all the risks that may ensue from that, both internally and externally.

Braski asserts that Netanyahu has always relied on procrastination and postponing difficult decisions throughout his political career, but this time he faces a different situation. Time is running out, and American and European pressures are escalating, while the families of the prisoners can no longer accept to wait. He understands that his hesitation could define his historical image: will he be remembered as the one who defeated Hamas and ended the war with victory, or as the one who failed on October 7, 2023, and also failed in post-war management?

Braski concludes her article by posing the question that Netanyahu is expected to answer clearly: Will he accept a partial deal now at a direct political price, or will he go to the end in his bet on the American umbrella? Moreover, she concludes that until he makes the decision, "Netanyahu remains suspended between two worlds, but this time he will not be able to escape, as, in the end, he will be judged not only by what he did but also by what he dared not to do."