From Authority Born of the Uprising... to an Uprising Seeking Leadership

Author: Jamal Zaqout

The current Palestinian moment is no longer just another round of conflict with the occupation, but rather an existential test where all elements of danger intersect: a devastating war on the Gaza Strip, unprecedented terrorist settlement escalation in the West Bank, and rapid attempts to impose lasting realities on the ground, against a backdrop of a clear collapse of the international justice system and the inability of the international community to stop the crime or deter its perpetrators.

The settlers' ISIS-like actions, under the protection of the terrorist occupation army, are not isolated assaults but a daily declared war on Palestinian existence, as if the Tel Aviv government is racing against time to impose a new reality. In contrast, the official Palestinian leadership appears trapped in a state of political paralysis, possessing nothing but the rhetoric of "regional and international communications" that have neither stopped the killing, prevented settlement activities, nor protected any human life.

The problem here is not just the limited tools available but rather the absence of a vision capable of rebuilding the elements of Palestinian strength. The occupation has never sought excuses; its project predates all justifications. Those who believed that leaving Gaza to drown in the blood of its people would protect themselves or what remains of Palestine have discovered that the colonial project does not compartmentalize its objectives; what is happening in the West Bank, including Jerusalem, confirms that Jewish terrorism targets the entirety of Palestinian existence.

Yet, the refrain of "do not give them justifications" continues to be repeated, to the point that defending one's home and land, as well as dignity, is portrayed as crossing political taboos. Herein lies the tragedy: not only is it an attempt to restrict the people's right to resist the occupation, but it also burdens the victim with the responsibility for the crimes of the occupier.

But the deeper question is: how did we arrive at this moment? The invocation of 1948 is not a call to the past, but an attempt to understand the mechanisms of defeat when organized national action is absent. At that time, Palestinians, amidst deep internal and regional imbalances, relied on promises of protection while the Zionist project had a clear plan and organized tools to determine the realities on the ground.

Today, the circumstances are different, but the historical lesson remains. Arab armies no longer speak of confrontation, and the question is no longer how to prevent the occupation from implementing its project, but rather how to negotiate with it about the limits of its crimes. Here, reliance on the outside has shifted from a political tool to a substitute for building self-power.

Perhaps the most tangible comparison is not only between 1948 and today but also between the experience of the first intifada and the current reality. The first intifada was not merely a popular confrontation with the occupation; it was a model for building national strength from within society. It arose from the concept of comprehensive popular resistance that includes civil disobedience, strikes, boycotts, and the organization of education, social care, local production, and all forms of organization that enabled Palestinian society to manage its life and enhance its resilience.

The unified national leadership derived its legitimacy from the people; its mission was not to manage the population under occupation but to build the community's capacity to resist it. The nuclei of a "people's authority" emerged; an authority of popular committees that caters to citizens' needs and protects their steadfastness, not an authority that controls their sustenance or fails to provide the minimum requirements for their lives.

The emergence of the authority and the question of the popular movement

However, the comparison with the first intifada is incomplete without addressing a more pressing question: what happened to popular Palestinian action after the establishment of the authority?

Since the establishment of the national authority, the spirit of popular resistance has not disappeared, nor has the community ceased to innovate new forms of protest and confrontation. However, notably, the most significant waves of popular action witnessed in recent years did not originate from the centers of authority's existence but rather often from areas where the authority has no direct presence or ability to contain, primarily including occupied Jerusalem.

The 2017 Jerusalem uprising against the electronic gates, the successive popular uprisings defending the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the city, as well as the waves of anger known as the knife intifada, all revealed an important political truth that Palestinian society still possesses the capacity to initiate when it feels that its existence and dignity are threatened.

Here arises the big question: is the problem in the absence of the people's readiness for action, or in the nature of the political structure that emerged after Oslo, which gradually separated the society from its national project?

In the first intifada, the leadership emerged from and led the community, whereas after the establishment of the authority, a different model emerged; it became the center of decision-making while the community's ability to produce its independent tools diminished. Rather than being national institutions an extension of the people's vitality, part of the society feels that what is required of it is to adapt to a limited political reality, not to reshape it.

The issue is not about having a national authority in principle, but rather about its function, role, and structure. The question is not only whether the authority continues or not; rather, what kind of authority do we want? And what is its purpose in a phase where the occupation still exists?

Is it an authority to manage the population under occupation, adapting to the limits imposed by the occupation? Or is it a tool to enhance the community's resilience and build its political and organizational capacity in order to end the occupation?

As for the current Palestinian impasse, it is not only characterized by the failure of the authority. The deeper problem lies in the inability to acknowledge failure and review the course, and in the transformation of paralysis into a condition that is defended while the occupation continues to alter the realities on the ground. The authority that was established as a transitional phase towards freedom and independence finds itself, after more than three decades, facing fundamental questions: If it has not ended the occupation, stopped settlement, protected the land, and provided the citizens with a minimum of economic and social security, what grants it the right to continue in its current form as the leadership of the national project?

Here, the question becomes legitimate: what kind of leadership concept is this?

Leadership is not a permanent privilege or a monopoly of representation. Its legitimacy is not granted forever, but rather earned through its ability to perform its national functions. And when it loses this function, changing and renewing the leadership becomes a national necessity, not just a struggle for power.

However, exiting the crisis cannot be achieved by replacing names with names, nor by redistributing positions, but rather by rebuilding the concept of leadership itself; a leadership that arises from society, relies on popular participation, and restores respect for organized popular resistance as a comprehensive political and social project.

The question today is not only: are we on the verge of a new intifada? Intifadas do not start by decision, but explode when society reaches the conviction that silence has become more costly than action. All indicators suggest that Palestinians are approaching this moment of explosion.

But the real question is: what kind of intifada will it be?

Will it be a return to the 1987 model, where popular anger transforms into an organized national project led by a unified vision? Or will it be scattered explosions that the occupation consumes, with the danger not being the absence of the capacity to resist—this capacity has been proven by the Palestinians time and again. The real danger lies in the absence of vision, unity, and leadership capable of turning this capacity into political power.

Therefore, the grand national task today is not to maintain a reality that has exhausted its justifications but to rebuild a national movement capable of restoring the meaning of leadership, meaning that the authority should be a tool in the service of the people, not vice versa, and that its main priority is to provide the essentials for survival, steadfastness, and the capacity to confront.