The Next Plan for the Israeli Army: Tomorrow is Worse
The announcement by the Planning Division of the Israeli General Staff about the launch of the first phase of the upcoming five-year "HUSHN" plan for this army reflects what is on the minds of the Israeli security establishment regarding the restructuring of the army for the coming years under the influence of the war on the Gaza Strip and other fronts, most importantly concerning the military power building program after the war.
According to what has been published in Israeli media, the army's vision is based on the inevitability of an upcoming military confrontation; therefore, there should be a focus on the necessary preparations from the army's perspective and their implementation. The most prominent conclusion publicly stated by the military institution during the announcement of the launch of this new five-year plan is that the future requires possessing more power. It is worth recalling that this same conclusion appeared during the preparation of previous army plans, however, it was also accompanied by another conclusion that "Israel's protection is also possible through peace," expressed by a considerable number of Israeli analysts. Now, however, the majority of analysts have chosen to talk about the risks of the upcoming war and its expected nature, more than discussing peace prospects. Thus, this majority aligns with the estimates of the political and security institutions that tomorrow is worse, especially from a security perspective.
Based on the general impression that can be drawn from what has been published on the occupation army's website and somewhat reported in the analyses of military commentators in Israel, the new five-year plan for the army generally incorporates the fundamental principles of the army at a relatively equal level of importance. It is notable that at its center are soldiers and the deepening of specialization in ground combat, or a return to the "basics of military work" according to one military analyst, after previous plans included a reduction in ground forces due to the diminishing threat of conventional war on all of Israel's border fronts, the most recent being the Syrian front, which necessitated an increase in spending on projects mainly related to intelligence agencies, and the advanced combat capabilities of air, ground, and naval forces, and on projects related to cyber warfare in various aspects, particularly intelligence gathering, defense, and attack. All of this is alongside what can be considered a renewed vision for future wars that relies on advanced technology, including the introduction of artificial intelligence, the integration of robotics, and the use of highly lethal weapons.
Regarding the changes that this new plan will bring to the construction of the Israeli army's power, focus has been placed on two new arenas not included in previous plans: the first is the space arena, where since the Iranian attack in April 2024, a comprehensive plan has been pushed forward to launch dozens of small satellites into space, which are tasked with photographing and providing a complete picture of what is happening across the Middle East, from the Horn of Africa passing through Iran and neighboring countries. There is promotion in Israel that this system enables the ability to know what is happening in every street and every neighborhood in the Gaza Strip and provides early and accurate warning before any missile launch from Iran, Yemen, Lebanon, allowing interception and radar systems to receive a more accurate "green light" to strike missiles at distances further from Israeli territory.
The second arena is the maritime arena, which has been confirmed in the last war, based on the plan's justifications, to be of great importance, not only in defense and intercepting drones coming from Yemen, Iran, Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria but also in attack, where naval vessels formed a firepower and reconnaissance force from the western side during land maneuvers in Gaza and Lebanon. Moreover, the naval arm has better capabilities for fire control and continuous monitoring over long distances in battlefields far from Israel's borders. For this reason, the Israeli army plans to significantly expand its combat naval fleet.
The Next Plan for the Israeli Army: Tomorrow is Worse
The National Committee for Managing Gaza: A Temporary Rescue Opportunity or a Test of Nati...
Awaiting Lincoln... Lessons from Ali Khamenei on the Soviet Experience
Economy Without Keys: How We Are Managed by Abundance and Trapped by Decision
A New Global Era of Concern
Trump's Mandate: Who Needs Palestinians to Manage Their Lives in Gaza?
Gaza Committee: Between Humanitarian Necessity and the Trap of Conflict Management