The Two-State Solution is a Mirage and the One-State Solution is a Fantasy... What Comes Next?

The two-state solution is today described as an unattainable illusion, while the one-state solution is deemed a fantasy. What remains after both options have been discarded? ... Opponents of the two-state solution believe that the reality imposed by occupation, especially the settlement of over one million settlers in the West Bank and their infiltration into Israeli decision-making centers, makes the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state along the 1967 borders impossible. According to this view, the removal of settlements and settlers is considered an existential threat to Israel, potentially leading to a civil war within it.

Conversely, those who reject the one-state solution view it as fanciful and unattainable; in practice, a single democratic state would mean the end of the Jewish character of the state, as Palestinians would soon become the majority, which is overwhelmingly rejected within Israel, even more than the rejection of the Palestinian state itself.

Despite their differing perspectives, both sides are united in their submission to the reality and assume it is unchangeable, thus refraining from proposing a practical alternative that is achievable. It is as if they are saying: "Nothing can be done," as they divide between those who accept anything and those who reject everything while awaiting the unknown, with some advocating for a rights discourse that neglects to address the colonial, settler, and racist nature of the Zionist movement, and obscures the liberatory character of the Palestinian cause, forgetting that the Palestinian people is steadfast on its land, determined in its struggle. The presence of over five million Palestinians, most of whom are in the West Bank against one million settlers, along with the wide international recognition of the Palestinian state (160 countries including four veto-wielding states), makes the struggle for liberation and national independence worthy of pursuit; indeed, it is difficult but not impossible. If it fails, the door remains open for adopting other alternatives, including the one-state solution.

As for those who oppose the Palestinian state, they argue—albeit with valid arguments—that the two-state solution has become a liquidation project, as the state would be established on only 22% of historic Palestine, thereby conceding the rest of the land and rights, a major concession of national, historical, legal, and political rights. They see this approach, which has offered significant concessions in exchange for limited Israeli concessions that have mostly been rescinded, as encouraging Israel to continue its refusal to recognize the Palestinian people and their rights and to demand further concessions, until the two-state solution is proposed in the form of 'the maximum limit' after accepting the establishment of the state within the 1967 borders, agreeing to land swaps, annexing settlement blocs, and accepting a demilitarized state with diminished sovereignty as unconditional concessions offered upfront without any Israeli reciprocity.

Practically, the situation has turned into the acceptance of the limited autonomy of the Palestinian Authority as an actual program for leadership, especially after unilaterally accepting to implement Oslo commitments, establishing a ceiling of "security and economy" as a higher ceiling for Palestinian-Israeli relations without negotiations or a political process since 2014. In fact, political participation in the Palestinian system has recently become contingent upon commitment to the organization’s program and its commitments, which empties plurality and democracy of their competitive essence, deepens the subservience to the existing reality, and represents a continuation of abandoning the Palestinian historical narrative in favor of moving closer to meeting the demands for recognizing Israel as a state for the Jewish people, impacting the unity of the people, land, and cause.

On the other hand, those who reject the one-state solution view a commitment to the option of complete liberation or a single state, whether through dismantling the Zionist project or otherwise, as a form of jumping over the balance of power and choosing the 'impossible,' which leads to the dismissal of the available possible. They believe that abandoning the goal of ending the occupation in favor of a rhetoric that transcends reality opens the door to the liquidation of, or at the very least, returning the Palestinian cause to a previous phase of guardianship and containment before the world recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Historically, the Palestinian national program began after the Nakba with the goal of complete liberation and return, then shifted gradually after 1967 and the October War (1973) and entering the negotiation process to focus on establishing a state on the lands of 1967. Had this shift not occurred after the official Arab stance changed from complete liberation and the slogan 'What is taken by force cannot be returned except by force' to 'Removing the effects of aggression' and seeking a settlement through negotiations, the organization would have been excluded from the international and Arab political equation. However, the flaw was not in adopting the program of self-determination, return, and statehood, but in transforming it into a final ceiling rather than a transitional program, and in making extensive unconditional concessions upfront without obtaining statehood, rather than limited self-rule constrained by the Oslo Accords and its unfair commitments.

This program could have been transitional if linked to ending the occupation and achieving independence while continuing the struggle to attain strategic goals, rather than abandoning resistance and various forms of political action associated with it before achieving its aims, through struggle and political and fieldwork to change the balance of power and modify the realities imposed on the ground.

What is required now?... Should we return to the slogans of the past and call for complete liberation, despite the changes in Arab, international, and Palestinian circumstances to the extent that what is currently proposed is to seek a political path that 'may' lead to a state, imposing colonial guardianship on the Gaza Strip that excludes the organization and Palestinian factions, finding a Palestinian body subjected to the colonial peace council in the strip, undermining the authority in the West Bank, and working to rehabilitate it to transform from an authority cooperating with the occupation to a client authority or authorities, making Palestinian options oscillate between genocide, apartheid, annexation, and displacement, leading to the least bad scenario of arriving at a 'new Oslo' plus or minus. Here, betting on what is not in our hands, namely on the unseen and expectations for the downfall of Israel, which cannot be realistically anticipated, ignores that the occupation state is part of a global colonial camp, which will not relinquish it quickly and easily until its retreat continues and reaches advanced levels. This corresponds with the continuation of the approach of 'there's nothing better than what has been,' to salvage what can be salvaged? Or should we adopt a new national democratic approach that combines realism, ambition, and struggle, free from submission to reality and adventurous leaps over it?

What is required is to adopt a new national project based on three pillars: Priority of steadfastness: Strengthening the lasting presence of the Palestinian people on their land and keeping their cause alive, preserving whatever remains of their gains, and thwarting the Israeli plans aiming at a final resolution of the conflict through annexation, displacement, apartheid, and genocide. The central national goal for this phase: Ending the occupation and achieving independence as a pathway to accomplish the remaining goals, including the right of return and full equality for Palestinians inside Israel. Unity of the cause, people, and land: The Palestinian issue cannot be resolved or minimized to just a state along 1967 borders, but is rather a national liberation issue for an entire people, and solving it requires ensuring their right to self-determination in all its components, achieving unity of the cause, people, and land.

If politics is the art of realizing the best possibilities, and not just the art of what is possible, without giving up on rights, grand goals, and principles, and given that the current racist settler state exists and continues to sustain its existence by seeking to secure the largest area of land with the least number of inhabitants, the immediate goal today is steadfastness and struggle to end the occupation and realize independence, because the fate of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is what the Israeli entity is trying to finalize, toward reaching a historic, fundamental democratic solution.

The road may be difficult—indeed it is—but it is feasible in light of the crises facing the occupying state and the growing global uprising for freedom and justice for Palestine, as well as the region and the world moving toward a new world, which fundamentally differs from the notion of a two-state solution that relied on negotiations, concessions, and proving worthiness before a side that does not recognize any compromise whatsoever. Changing the equation requires compelling Israel, after altering the balance of power, to choose between continuing the occupation or maintaining itself as a Jewish state, which can only be achieved through prolonged, multi-faceted struggle, aligning the forms of struggle with the objectives while taking into account the characteristics and nature of the conflict, and ensuring that the right to resistance is guaranteed while navigating its course toward its goals, under resilient steadfastness, a clear unified national program, and a broad national front comprising various individuals and forces unified by shared national and democratic goals and principles.