The Sweida File Between the National Guard, Humanitarian Corridor, and Agreements Between Damascus and Tel Aviv

Author: مهيب الرفاعي

The military, political, and humanitarian maps in Sweida are complexly intertwined, making the region a testing ground for the balances of power. The military test began in the July 2025 battle, with fighting between tribes, public security forces, and Druze in the province, resulting in substantial human and material losses and a siege affecting the city, particularly from the northern and northwestern crossing near Tal Hadeed, overlooking the towns of Tha'la, Summa al-Hunidat, Arra, al-Kum, Rasas, reaching Kanakir. Local Druze factions, tribes, the new central authority in Damascus, and even regional powers that see the south as an open area of influence— all aspire to control southern Syria generally, as it is a rich and strategically bordered region. However, this volatile reality has produced new developments that have taken on fiercer military paths towards separatism. The headquarters of the spiritual presidency in Sweida witnessed a large mobilization for the "Men of Dignity" movement, the largest Druze military faction, led by Sheikh Abu Dhiab Maziid Khadaj, in an attempt to unify the ranks within the province of Sweida, the stronghold of the Druze community, and to enhance sectarian protection, especially after Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajri announced support for the National Guard and its accompanying legal committee. Following this announcement, a commitment speech was made regarding the Druze military wing and its role in protecting land and honor; it carried religious and sectarian dimensions, where al-Hajri called on "free states and free peoples" and the international community to stand by the Druze and their right to self-determination and separation in a region that guarantees the safety of the sect and unites them within it, citing the humanitarian role of the Guard and the support of Israel and the Druze community from within Palestine as a primary backer of the sect in the face of regional challenges.

The Birth of a New Military Force

The most significant shift in recent days was the announcement of the formation of the National Guard in Sweida on August 23, 2025. This formation did not occur in a vacuum; it came after years of factional fragmentation, local divisions, and differing opinions regarding military action in Sweida. About 15 Druze armed groups were integrated into a unified military framework that spiritually follows the religious authority represented by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajri, granting the formation unprecedented spiritual and social legitimacy in the province. The National Guard is not a replica of previous factions, but an attempt to create an organized force with its political and military identity. Previous brigades and battalions, such as the Mountain Brigade, announced their dissolution and joining the Guard. Even the Men of Dignity, known for their independence and slogans rejecting custodianship, were forced to adopt a supporting narrative for the Guard, considering it the sole guarantee for protecting the Druze community in light of the ongoing security collapse and the central state's diminishing ability to maintain its presence.

Thus, the National Guard has transformed into what resembles a "Druze military institution," especially as it is based on the discourse of identity and self-protection, while attempting to overcome internal divisions and opening up to a broader political role. Nevertheless, the issue surrounding this formation remains: Will it be merely a modified version of previous factions, or is it the beginning of an organized local army that can negotiate on its behalf with Damascus and international powers?

The events of July 2025 pushed these entities toward two options: continued fragmentation, implying a collapse of communal security, or unification under one umbrella; hence, the National Guard emerged as a force comprising about 4–5 thousand fighters, presenting itself as the protector of the mountain's identity. This entity resembles a hybrid body, carrying social legitimacy and a defensive identity discourse, yet may face weaknesses in funding and military doctrine. The establishment of the National Guard came with a nearly complete break with Damascus, alongside an opening to security coordination with the neighborhood (Amman and Tel Aviv), placing it in a sensitive regional position. Its statement was signed by dozens of local formations that viewed the combination of military umbrella and religious legitimacy as a step toward formalization, such as the Sheikh of Dignity forces, the Alia forces, local powers, the Tal al-Jabal forces, the Conquerors, and the Areeen al-Jabal forces. However, this formula raises suspicions of subservience to regional axes that might reproduce the experience of the "Lahad Army," especially with Israel's interest in stability in the mountain as a buffer zone, and Jordan's view of it as a condition for its border security.

Humanity and Politics

Alongside these military developments, there has been repeated talk about opening a humanitarian corridor from the occupied Golan towards Sweida to transfer urgent assistance to the besieged population due to economic and security crises. The idea, proposed by American and Israeli circles, resonated with some local factions, especially amid shortages of basic materials and the decline of supply channels through Damascus. However, this proposal quickly collided with Syrian concerns, both in the street and at the leadership level, as Damascus considered that opening the corridor through territory controlled by Israel would solidify an unacceptable normalization reality and a direct violation of its sovereignty. On the other hand, many residents of Sweida see the corridor from a pragmatic angle: Is the priority today the symbolism of sovereignty or rescuing the community from hunger and collapse? This contradiction reflects the scale of the humanitarian-political impasse experienced in the south. In the background, this issue cannot be separated from the ongoing negotiation track between Damascus and Tel Aviv, where Israel uses the humanitarian corridor as leverage to impose new realities on the ground, while Damascus believes that any acceptance of the corridor must be part of a comprehensive agreement under international sponsorship.

Agreements to Redefine the Scene

Diplomatically, Paris has been witnessing unprecedented meetings since August 2025 between Syrian Foreign Minister As'ad al-Shaybani and Israeli representatives led by Ron Dermer, mediated by American and European efforts. The essence of these meetings revolves around a security-political agreement that reactivates the lines of the disengagement agreement of 1974 on the Golan front and imposes strict restrictions on the entry of Iranian weapons or Hezbollah positioning in southern Syria.

Israel seeks, through these understandings, to build a stable buffer zone on its borders, while Damascus hopes that any agreement may open the door to reconstruction projects funded by Gulf and European sources. However, the major obstacle remains in the clause regarding the Iranian role: Damascus is forced to balance between its need for financial and political support from the Gulf and the West, and its military ties with Tehran, which have been for decades a lifeline supporting the Assad regime. The discussions also include a "special humanitarian mechanism" for Sweida, directly linked to the humanitarian corridor file from the Golan. Israel pressures to make it an official humanitarian outlet under UN supervision, while Damascus insists that any corridor must originate from its internal territories.

This tug-of-war reflects that the Sweida file is no longer local but has become part of the regional negotiation table. The new agreement is presented as a step aimed at restoring balance to Syria after long years of sectarian war, by reducing sources of threat on the northern border and distancing Damascus from the circle of direct Iranian influence. For Israel, these arrangements are seen as a strategic security gain, despite the inherent risks that still accompany them.

The agreement includes a series of provisions, the most notable being preventing Ankara from playing a role in rebuilding the Syrian military institution, a clause that Tel Aviv considers crucial for its national security. The agreement also emphasizes prohibiting the entry of strategic weapons into Syrian territory, including missile systems and air defenses, to ensure continued Israeli air superiority and freedom of movement in the region's skies.

Among the most sensitive points in the agreement is the issue of opening a humanitarian corridor towards Jabal Arab in Sweida, given the tense conditions faced by the Druze community and the ongoing need to secure humanitarian aid access to it. The agreement also includes arrangements for disarmament from the Syrian Golan stretch to Sweida, aiming to neutralize any potential threat from armed groups on Israel's borders. The terms of the agreement discuss a plan for the reconstruction of Syria with American support and Gulf funding, as part of a broader effort to stabilize and weaken the Iranian presence in the Syrian scene. Nevertheless, the Golan Heights remains a major point of contention, as it has been an open file for the Syrian-Israeli conflict since its occupation in 1967, and the new Syrian authorities have yet to express a clear position regarding what is leaked through Israeli media concerning these understandings.

The South and Border Conflict

The southern Syrian region, which stretches from the western and southern outskirts of Damascus, Daraa, Quneitra, and Sweida, is not merely topography, but provinces that determine who holds the power in security and stability in post-Assad Syria. Controlling any of them means controlling deterrent equations and the communication channels between Damascus and Tel Aviv; the discussion becomes about how to manage these areas, who is responsible for their security, and what conditions they impose. Israel appears deeply embedded in this region after executing several incursions into villages in Beit Jinn in rural Damascus and villages in the provinces of Quneitra and Daraa, establishing military points there to delineate new buffer zones. In this context, the National Guard emerges as a new player trying to assert itself within these equations. The humanitarian corridor, meanwhile, serves as a negotiation lever that may reshape the relationship between Syria and Israel. Ultimately, the agreements in formation remain subject to power balances to answer a critical question regarding the understandings about the fate of the south: Will it transform into a zone of negotiated stability, or will it remain an open battlefield between conflicting projects?

Today, southern Syria stands militarily at the birth of the National Guard as a local institution aiming to protect the Druze community, while humanitarily facing a corridor from the Golan that may alleviate suffering but raises major sovereignty issues; Damascus is trying to emerge from the Damascus-Tel Aviv negotiations with security that outlines a new phase that may change the rules of the regional game. In this sense, the heated tin that has characterized Sweida since July, at the earliest, is merely a symbolic reflection of a broader battle over the identity of southern Syria and its loss between the concepts and principles of sovereignty, nationalism, treachery, and separatist aspirations.