Between Exaggeration and Reality: Is the Gap Between Israel and the United States Really Widening?

In recent days, a wide wave of articles and assessments discussing an "unprecedented crisis" between Israel and the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has dominated the analytical scene, alongside an impending confrontation with Benjamin Netanyahu regarding the second phase of the Gaza plan. These analyses, despite their differing tones, share one hypothesis: that Washington is on the verge of imposing realities on Israel, and that Netanyahu stands at a critical moment between submission or isolation.

However, when this discourse is subjected to calm examination, it appears closer to the political and media exaggeration of Israel than to a realistic characterization of the power dynamics or the nature of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, which has historically proven its ability to absorb disputes and turn them into tools of management rather than a strategic rupture or confrontation.

The first paradox lies in the glaring contradiction within these same analyses. The commentators warning of "Trump's anger" and "Washington's impatience" are the very ones who acknowledge that the U.S. administration has not yet formed an effective international force, nor secured clear funding for reconstruction, nor developed a practical mechanism for disarming Hamas or ensuring the outlines of the "day after" in Gaza.

If Washington is incapable of producing tangible executive tools, how can it impose decisive dictates on Israel?
And if the U.S. plan itself is stalled, where lies that "deep gap" that is said to be widening?

In the same vein, the assassination of Raed Saad is presented as evidence of Israel's challenge to Trump's will, but this characterization overlooks a fundamental truth: Israel has never stopped testing the limits of American patience, neither in Gaza nor in Lebanon nor in the West Bank. The assassination does not represent a rupture in the relationship, but rather a calculated tactical message: to Washington, indicating that Israel still maintains a margin for military and security action, and to the Israeli interior, showing that the leadership has not relinquished its tools of power. The American response thus far confirms this understanding, as it has not exceeded the bounds of verbal caution, reflecting the continuing principle of "managed disagreement" rather than open confrontation.

The talk of a "strategic rift" ignores the deep structure of the relationship between the two parties. The United States does not view Israel as a party that can be dispensed with or pressured to the point of breaking, but as a fundamental pillar in its regional sphere of influence. Conversely, Israel realizes that Washington is not a neutral mediator, but a biased partner that sometimes disagrees with it on methodology, not on substance.

The existing disagreement today revolves around the management of the phase rather than the ultimate goal. Washington seeks politically marketable progress internationally, while Israel wants to maintain the upper hand militarily. This is not a zero-sum equation, but a permanent negotiation space, where differences are managed rather than resolved.

Some Israeli analysts portray Netanyahu's upcoming visit to Washington as a moment of historical submission, while reality indicates that it is closer to a session to bridge the gaps between an ambitious American discourse and a complex field reality. Trump does not yet have practical answers to the questions that Netanyahu will raise: Who controls? Who pays? Who enforces disarmament? And who guarantees that chaos does not return? In light of this void, the ability to pressure turns into an ability to persuade, which is an area in which Netanyahu excels in maneuvering, especially if he relies on the stagnation of the U.S. plan itself.

As for the transition to the second phase, it is presented as a political breakthrough, but in reality, it could be a reproduction of the crisis in a different format. It is a phase based on fragile balances, incomplete understandings, and international powers whose shape of participation or ability to influence has yet to be determined. Here, it does not seem that the U.S.-Israeli disagreement has reached the point of confrontation; rather, it is a disagreement over the pace and sequence of steps, amplified in intensity by the media – especially by Israeli opposition analysts – more than it is truly manifested on the ground.

However, the most dangerous aspect of this analytical debate, and the mutual exaggeration about the "gap" between Washington and Tel Aviv, is that it is happening while Gaza pays the full price. While U.S.-Israeli disputes are managed as a variation in style or timing, Israel is practically granted wide freedom to continue military operations, delay withdrawal, and obstruct reconstruction, under the pretext of joint U.S.-Israeli plans that do not aim to stop the crime, but to organize and prolong it.

In this context, talking about American pressure becomes a political deception. The United States is not pressuring to stop the killing, but negotiating its form, ceiling, and timing. It does not disagree with Israel on the essence of what is happening in Gaza, but on how to market it internationally, how to manage its political cost, and who bears the burden of the "day after" without infringing on Israel's military operational freedom.

In this sense, "managed disagreement" is not a flaw in the relationship, but part of its function. It is the mechanism that allows for the ongoing annihilation without breaking the alliance, and for sustained support without assuming direct responsibility. Washington threatens with pressure, and Israel shows reluctance, while Gaza is left to pay the price alone: killing, starvation, destruction, and an open delay for any political or humanitarian horizon.

Ultimately, the gap between Israel and the United States does not seem to be widening to the extent portrayed. It is a rhetorical gap more than a political one, used in the media for pressure, in politics for bargaining, and in analysis to fill the void of the absence of solid data. As for the relationship itself, it remains governed by a constant rule: Israel is a constant in U.S. politics, disagreements are manageable, while interests are unbreakable. And between exaggeration and simplification, the most important question gets lost: not whether Washington will pressure Israel, but how this pressure will be managed without changing the essence of the existing equation and without stopping the bleeding in Gaza.