Zamir Calls for the Formation of an Official Investigation Committee and Study the Relationship Between Political and Security Levels

SadaNews - The Chief of Staff of the Israeli army, Eyal Zamir, called in a document distributed to senior military officers regarding the conclusions of the committee chaired by reserve General Sami Terjuman, which investigated the army's inquiries into the failures of October 7, hinting at the necessity of forming an official investigation committee.

Zamir stated in the document that "the relationship between the political level and the military level must be studied," adding that "the Israeli army bore the responsibility and investigated itself, but this is not only its task, and it was not worthy to direct all the attention solely towards it."

He added that "in order to reach the truth and the complete lessons at the national level, an external and objective investigation committee should be formed, as was done after the Yom Kippur War (in 1973). This must include an investigation into the relationship between the political and security levels, and into the political and security concepts that preceded the war."

Zamir addressed the government’s plan to weaken the judiciary system, which has created division in Israeli society, writing that "in 2023, warnings were sent to the military and political levels, which were general warnings about monitoring developments in understanding our enemies, and according to them, Israel is undergoing an internal weakening process that affects its deterrence and increases the likelihood of escalation. The relationship between the political and military levels regarding deterrence should be studied, alongside investigating why the military level, which sent the warnings, did not prepare the forces and readiness towards it."

Zamir listed the failures of the General Staff and accused former Israeli army chiefs of staff, Herzi Halevi and Aviv Kochavi, stating that "no relevant and effective plans were put in place, and plans aimed at defeating Hamas were neglected and even overlooked."

Zamir emphasized that senior officers in the army failed on the night of October 7, and that on that same night, "situation assessments and decision-making were carried out unprofessionally. The information available warranted raising the level of alert at least."

Zamir pointed out that the Israeli aggressive military operations in the Gaza Strip, since the aggression of 2008, and particularly since the aggression of 2014, helped to consolidate the perception that led to the attack on October 7.

He added that "all military operations carried out according to the goals set by the political level and at the recommendation of the military level addressed weakening the enemy and restoring deterrence, not defeating it. The idea was to keep Hamas deterred and undermined in order to buy time. This concept of restraint allowed Hamas to carry out a wide-ranging operation to strengthen its military power."