Ideology in the Service of the State: What Did Gaza Reveal About Iran and Its Axis?

The war on Gaza, along with the subsequent regional confrontations and American-Iranian negotiations, has raised an old question about the nature of the relationship between ideology and politics in the behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Does Iran operate under a revolutionary doctrine that transcends borders, placing Palestine and the "Axis of Resistance" at the heart of its strategic decisions? Or is it a state that ultimately acts according to national interest calculations like other countries?

In reality, the answer does not lie in either side but in the combination of both. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Iran has not just been a traditional nation-state; it has also not been a purely ideological state. For decades, it has succeeded in merging ideology with interest, transforming ideology into a tool for regional influence and a source of domestic and external legitimacy.

Within this framework, the Palestinian issue has occupied a central position in Iranian discourse. Palestine was not merely a cause of solidarity; it became part of the political and revolutionary identity of the regime, a fundamental pillar in building the regional alliances later recognized as the "Axis of Resistance." However, recent events have revealed that the centrality of Palestine in discourse does not necessarily mean it occupies the same position in the hierarchy of strategic priorities.

During the war on Gaza, the Palestinian issue did not become a condition in Iranian negotiations with the United States, nor did stopping the war or lifting the siege form part of the agreements pursued by Tehran. Although Gaza is presented as one of the main arenas of confrontation with Israel, negotiations focused on issues directly related to Iran: sanctions, security, economy, and regime stability.

Here arises another question that pertains not only to Iran but also to "Hamas." The movement entered the battle on October 7 based on its own calculations, perhaps assuming that the expansion of the confrontation would lead to broader involvement from the axis under the banner of "Unity of Fronts."

Nonetheless, the course of the war revealed that each party has its own calculations, limits, and priorities. Even when countries adopt a shared ideological discourse, they do not abandon the logic of national interest in making crucial decisions.

From this perspective, the issue appears not only connected to the limits of Iran’s commitment to its allies but also to how well "Hamas" understands the nature of the relationship between resistance movements and the states that support them.

Political and military support does not necessarily equate to unity of decision or unity of destiny, nor does alliance negate the differences between the logic of the state and that of the movement. One of the questions that will impose itself on the movement post-war is whether it will reassess some of its previous bets on the role of allies and the limits of their intervention during major confrontations.

This issue becomes even more complicated when considering the Shiite forces within the axis. The relationship between these forces and Iran is not based solely on political or military interests, but it also intertwines ideological, sectarian, and political elements, which for some of these forces relate to the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih and the role they grant to Iranian leadership. However, the recent war demonstrated that this ideological dimension, despite its importance, did not negate the reality that the final decision remains that of a state governed by calculations of power, survival, and Iranian national interest.

While some of these forces view the relationship with Iran as a political and ideological partnership, Tehran sees the axis from a broader perspective linked to the security of the Iranian state and its strategic interests. Thus, the underlying tension emerges between the logic of the state and that of ideology, as well as between the calculations of the center and the expectations of the periphery.

This does not mean that Iran has abandoned Palestine or its allies, but rather it indicates that support for these allies remains constrained by the ceiling that does not threaten the supreme interests of the Iranian state. When ideology aligns with interest, they move together; when there is a clash between them, national interest prevails over all else.

Herein lies one of the most significant paradoxes within the axis itself. While Tehran deals with its revolutionary slogans with a considerable degree of political pragmatism, some allied forces, particularly those that derive their legitimacy from the ideological dimension, treat these slogans as a fixed commitment transcending circumstances. Therefore, what is permissible for Iran in terms of negotiations, settlements, and agreements appears prohibited when it relates to its allies or their political environments.

The recent war revealed that the so-called "Axis of Resistance" is not a homogeneous ideological block but rather an uneven network of alliances led by a state with its specific interests and national calculations. Within this network, Iran retains the right to make crucial decisions according to its national priorities, even when its allies bear exorbitant costs defending the shared project.

The war on Gaza demonstrated that ideology in the Iranian project is not a substitute for the state but one of its tools. Iran does not abandon its slogans, but it always reinterprets them in ways that serve its strategic interests. In this lies the strength and continuity of the Iranian project on the one hand, and the source of ongoing tension between it and its allies on the other. The closer the moment of testing, the more apparent the difference between a state that sees ideology as a tool to serve its interests and forces that see ideology as a goal that supersedes other calculations.

Perhaps the most important question after all that has happened is: Have Iran's allies, especially "Hamas" after October 7, realized that "Unity of Fronts" does not necessarily mean unity of decision or unity of destiny? And that an alliance, no matter how strong its ideological and military power, does not negate the fact that states ultimately act according to their national interests first and foremost?