The Great Israeli Lie

For a long time, a discourse has echoed in Israel and abroad that attributes the ongoing wars solely to Benjamin Netanyahu, portraying the Israeli crisis as a problem of leadership and personality, rather than a comprehensive political project. The Zionist opposition is presented as a more moderate and rational alternative, while the idea of a fundamental difference between the Zionist right and left regarding war and peace is promoted. However, the ongoing war since October 7 has revealed more than ever that this difference, if it exists, pertains to style and tactics, not principle and purpose.

The parties that are now attacking Netanyahu did not oppose the war on Gaza, nor the aggression against Lebanon and Syria, or the attacks on Iran. In fact, many of their leaders called for expanding and intensifying military operations when Netanyahu was forced to retreat under American or international pressure. When they accuse him of failing to translate "military achievements" into "political achievements," they are not criticizing the war itself, but demanding he make more use of its results.

Netanyahu has raised his goals to unrealistic levels: overthrowing the Iranian regime, destroying the nuclear program, ending the ballistic missile project, and stopping Tehran's support for resistance movements in the region. However, none of these goals have been fully realized, as acknowledged by increasing Israeli confessions. Nevertheless, this failure does not lead to a reassessment of the military option, but rather demands for further escalation.

Here, the fundamental truth is revealed: the problem in Israel is not just Netanyahu, but the political and security consensus that sees military might as the only tool for managing the conflict. The opposition that accuses him today of weakening Israel's standing in Washington or enhancing Qatar's influence adopts the same view towards war and relations with the Palestinians and the region, and does not offer a genuine political alternative.

After October 7, Netanyahu realized that the shock that struck Israeli society could be turned into fuel for a long and open war. Instead of facing his responsibility for the security and political failure, he chose to convert the war into a permanent condition. More importantly, he understood that the majority of Israeli political forces would grant him the necessary cover for this, regardless of the humanitarian and political costs of the war.

This is the great lie revealed by the war: there is no camp seeking peace facing a camp seeking war, but rather internal disagreements among forces that agree on the essence of the same project. Thus, reducing the crisis to Netanyahu obscures a deeper and more dangerous reality, which is that the structure of the entire Israeli political system has become more inclined towards perpetual war than ever before.

More importantly, the current war has revealed the fragility of traditional classifications in Israeli politics. Terms that have been circulated for decades, such as "right" and "left," no longer explain the reality, if they ever did. What is called "Zionist left" has shrunk to the point of fading, while parties described as "center" or "center-left" have moved to political and security positions that do not differ in essence from the right, and in some cases, adopted stances more hardline than Netanyahu himself on issues of war and security.

Recent years have proven that disagreements within the Zionist camp revolve around managing the conflict, not ending it, and around the form of power used, not on rejecting its use. Therefore, it was not surprising that opposition parties supported most of the wars and military operations Israel conducted in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran, and that many of their leaders called for expanding them when the government appeared hesitant or subjected to external pressures.

The experience of what was termed the "change government" in 2021 provides a clear example of this. Although it was presented as an alternative to Netanyahu, it did not constitute a break from his core policies; rather, it continued the same approach in dealing with Palestinians, settlement issues, and the use of military force. The change was not in the essence of the political project, but in the individuals managing it. Thus, Israel quickly returned to the same point with Netanyahu's return to power.

Therefore, opinion polls that give the current opposition an edge over Netanyahu's camp should not be understood as an indication of a real political shift. Even if these parties succeed in forming a government in the future, or come close to it by obtaining an majority of about 60 seats, all indicators suggest that the wars will not stop. Within the dominant Zionist camp, there is no influential political force calling for an end to the war on Gaza or reviewing the security doctrine that has governed Israeli policy for decades.

Thus, the great Israeli lie lies not only in portraying Netanyahu as the root of the problem but also in claiming the existence of an alternative Zionist camp that carries a different project. The conflict within Israel is not between advocates of war and advocates of peace, but between forces that differ on details and converge on a single essence: managing the conflict by force and maintaining the project itself. Therefore, changing the government, if it happens, may change the faces and the style, but it will not change the fundamental policies, nor will it necessarily be a gateway to ending the wars.