Disarmament Without Settlement: An Open Recipe for the Continuation of War in Gaza

Political and security indicators coming from Doha converge, particularly the meeting held by the U.S. Central Command regarding the "international force" in Gaza, around one conclusion: there is no real breakthrough, no practical answers, and no international consensus to build upon. According to media reports, the meeting was neither decisive nor fruitful compared to U.S. administration expectations, and the abstention of several countries from participating was a clear indication of the fragility of the idea itself and the depth of international division regarding it.

From the Israeli perspective, these indicators appear exceptionally negative. Israel insists on reducing the role of any potential international force to one issue: disarming Gaza. At the same time, it does not hide its lack of trust in these forces, effectively declaring that it is the only entity capable—or authorized—to carry out this mission, even if the price is a return to war or the implementation of a long-term draining plan. The direct result of this approach is the entrenchment of the status quo in Gaza: there is no actual end to the war, no reconstruction, and no political horizon.

In this context, it becomes clear that disarmament outside the framework of a comprehensive political settlement, with "Hamas" as a key party, is nothing but an empty slogan. Experience, along with field realities, proves that any purely security-based approach, disconnected from a realistic political solution, is doomed to fail. If the positions of Israel and "Hamas" do not change, and mediation efforts do not succeed in producing sustainable solutions, then the final decision will remain in the hands of the U.S. administration, which will eventually have to deal with this complex impasse, rather than merely managing it.

In this scenario, the Israeli government continues to move forward through a policy of assassinations. The assassination of the Hamas leader Raed Saad, whom Israel describes as one of the planners of the October 7 attack and responsible for rehabilitating the military wing of the movement, was met with widespread approval in Israel. However, this celebration conceals the true intentions of Israel: a refusal to commit to agreements and an evasion of any serious political path.

Even Israeli military analysts admit that Saad's killing does not deliver a knockout blow to "Hamas". The movement, despite losing a significant part of its senior leadership and suffering heavy losses, remains the only party capable of asserting itself in Gaza. As one analyst wrote: "No one in Gaza challenges Hamas, which has quickly returned to being the uncontested owner of the house," at a time when the United States has been unable to formulate a multinational force capable of taking on security responsibilities or enforcing a disarmament path.

According to Israeli analysts, anxiety is rising in Israel with the emergence of the "Group of Eight" alliance, which includes five Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Qatar) and three Islamic countries (Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia). This alliance represents a new phenomenon in regional political arrangements, as it links non-neighboring countries with differing political orientations and interests.

The roots of this alliance can be traced back to the Arab-Islamic summit in Riyadh in November 2023, an exceptional step aimed at demonstrating a unified stance regarding the war on Gaza, which bothers Israel and drives it to work tirelessly to attempt to dismantle it.

In the same context, the disagreement between Tel Aviv and Washington over Turkey's role deepens. While U.S. officials believe Ankara should be part of the stability force, given its military capabilities and channels of influence in Gaza, Israel views this as a red line. From its perspective, a party that maintains relations with "Hamas" cannot be classified as a stability force, and involving it could undermine the core goal of the international force.

This disagreement reflects a broader crisis in vision: the United States seeks to manage the crisis, while Israel insists on perpetuating it under the banner of "security".

According to Israeli analysts, President Donald Trump’s patience seems to be wearing thin. The anticipated visit of Netanyahu comes within a political hourglass aimed at paving the way for a decisive meeting between the two. Washington wants to verify whether Netanyahu is prepared to move to the next stage of the U.S. plan, and what the limits of his flexibility are regarding Gaza and the international force.

From Israel's perspective, this moment represents a test of how to say "yes" to a political path without conceding, even nominally, from the "red lines" security-wise. From the perspective of the United States, the question is simpler and more dangerous: Is Netanyahu a reliable partner, or a leader who prefers to keep the arenas ablaze?

It is no longer possible to characterize what is happening in Gaza as a failure of mediation or American incapacity to exert pressure. The accumulated data clearly indicates that the United States is not incapable of pressuring Israel; it chooses not to do so. Washington, which possesses unprecedented political, military, and financial pressure tools, continues to grant Tel Aviv an open margin to thwart any serious political path, under security pretexts that have become transparent.

Israel, for its part, is systematically working to obstruct anything that could end the war. It drains the concept of the international force of its content, reducing it to the issue of disarmament, then questions its efficacy and insists on monopolizing its implementation by force, even if this leads to new rounds of fighting or a long-term war of attrition. In this way, every political initiative becomes a tool for managing the war, not for ending it.

The U.S. administration also provides the political cover for this behavior, as it continues to talk about "calm planning" and "lasting peace," while allowing Israel to set new conditions, delay the transition to the second phase, and link any withdrawal to open-ended criteria related to disarmament. The more dangerous point is that the U.S. administration understands that disarming "Hamas" outside a comprehensive political settlement is an unrealistic demand, yet it continues to present it as a precondition, which provides Israel with the perfect pretext to perpetuate the occupation and the war.

Thus, the continuation of the war in Gaza is not a result of miscalculation, but rather the result of a complete political partnership: Israel refuses to end the war, and the United States abstains from imposing that on it. Between this refusal and that abstention, Gaza is left a hostage to killing, starvation, and destruction, while the discourse of "stability" is recycled to justify the continued crime.

The Israeli government is not prepared to advance any serious political path, nor to shape the next day or launch a genuine process for reconstructing Gaza. What is happening is not an attempt to achieve stability, but a conscious management of an open war in various forms and without horizon, for which Israel and the U.S. administration bear direct responsibility.