The 12-Day War

On the morning of the twenty-fourth of June 2025, after 12 days of fierce and devastating war between Israel and Iran, a ceasefire agreement was reached. Air strikes by Israel ceased, and air attacks with missiles and drones by Iran stopped. This was a war that Israel initiated, having meticulously prepared for it over many years and coordinated with the American administration regarding its timing and objectives. However, despite the significant human, material, and psychological losses suffered by both warring parties, the "12-Day War" remained incomplete, meaning it ended without a clear victory for either side. As we know, an incomplete war warns of a resumption of fighting in the not-too-distant future, especially if an agreement cannot be reached between the parties involved and the other main stakeholders regarding the points of contention that led to its outbreak in the first place. It is worth noting that the United States participated in the attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, alongside its involvement with other countries in addressing Iranian ballistic missiles and drones targeting deep within Israel.

Israel initiated the "12-Day War" at a timing it deemed favorable. Apart from the claim that Iran was only weeks or months away from acquiring a nuclear bomb, two other factors favored the chosen timing: the first relates to Trump's presence in the White House, and the second relates to what Israel had accomplished during twenty months of its war on Hamas and its allies in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, coupled with Syria's exit from the axis headed by Iran. Syria's departure from that axis and the silencing of missiles and drones launching from both Gaza and Lebanon significantly reduced the fiery belt around Israel, thereby decreasing its human and material losses and allowing it a greater opportunity to focus on targeting Iran in its own territory. Moreover, Trump's position at the helm of the American administration provided it with all the necessary political and international legal cover, as well as intelligence and military support. As we witnessed, the American president played two complementary roles in the 12-Day War: a participant in the war, both defensively and offensively, and an extinguisher of its flames, if only temporarily.

I am neither a military expert nor an expert on Israeli or Iranian affairs. One does not need such qualifications to deduce the following:

1. The "12-Day War" has ended, but without completion, that is, without a clear victory for either of the warring parties over the other. Despite the painful military strikes inflicted on both sides, which caused substantial losses and damages, victory for either side remained elusive. Specifically, Israel could not undermine Iranian missile capabilities or destroy the Iranian nuclear facilities as it desired and planned. Conversely, Iran was unable to destroy what it claimed it could in Israel. An incomplete war signals a resumption of military confrontation in the not-too-distant future, especially in the absence of political solutions that address its underlying causes.

2. The role and position of the United States were more pivotal than ever during the 12-Day War. Without the American green light, Israel would not have dared to ignite the fire, and without the American red light, it would not have agreed to extinguish it. The centrality of the American role encompasses, among other things, leading negotiations regarding the Iranian nuclear file in the weeks and months to come, aiming to reach an agreement that reassures Israel's concerns while respecting Iran's right to have a nuclear reactor for peaceful purposes.

3. In the 12-Day War, as well as during the twenty months preceding it of war on Gaza, and during its conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Arab countries, individually and collectively, were on the margins in terms of influencing the course of the war and fighting. They could not deliver a single pill, a handful of flour, or a single wounded person for assistance without the consent of the occupying forces. This was despite their willingness and readiness to provide necessary and sufficient humanitarian aid and their adoption of a plan related to the governance of Gaza and its reconstruction after the war. Despite differing concerns and stances toward both Israel and Iran and their proxies, the Arabs of the Arab East remained mere spectators of Iranian missiles and drones and Israeli interceptors violating the sanctity of their airspace, as if it did not concern them. They have lost their way!

4. After nearly 21 months of destructive war on Gaza, which was interspersed with the 12-Day War on Iran, and following months of stagnation, the negotiations file concerning the status and future of Gaza has returned to the forefront of the agenda for the main parties involved. In this regard, I tend to believe that a deal for a ceasefire is imminent. I also believe that its terms will not be better, and are likely to be worse, than those of the deal that led to the ceasefire in Lebanon.

In any case, the position of the American president will prevail, just as his position has prevailed in other conflict arenas.

Finally, those who believe the Palestinian cause will emerge victorious from the confrontation ignited by the "Al-Aqsa Flood", a fire whose flames have spread to Tehran and beyond, are mistaken. It is a gross error to think that the solution of a single democratic state, or a two-state solution consistent with Palestinian national constants, has become closer than before. On the contrary. The situation in Gaza is worse than it has ever been since the ceasefire agreements of 1949, the situation in the West Bank and Jerusalem is worse than it has been since the "Protective Wall" operation about a quarter of a century ago, and the situation of the Palestinians within Israel recalls, in some respects, the days of military rule six decades ago, while the conditions of Palestinians in Lebanon and Syria, like those in neighboring Arab countries, do not bode well (to say the least).

In conclusion, and in the spirit of instilling hope, I say: the Palestinian people have endured, over more than a century of struggle for Palestine, difficult periods where hope was scarce. Yet, they have known how to rise, shake off the dust, and challenge the odds. For those who say this has become impossible in light of what has occurred over the past 21 months, I echo what our great poet said: "The impossible is a generation away," and perhaps even less than that if we know how to manage our national affairs wisely, and if "the cunning of reason in history" works in favor of the justice of our cause!