Gaza: Restructuring Project and Palestinian Home Requirements

The situation in the Gaza Strip is no longer just a humanitarian crisis; it has become an expression of an advanced stage of Israeli genocide, which takes multiple forms of killing, bombing, and assassinations, leading to starvation, suffocating sieges, and a reduction in humanitarian aid. At the same time, Israel continues to impose new ground realities by expanding what is known as the "buffer zone" or "yellow line," which now covers nearly 70% of the Gaza Strip, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatens to continue the war and refuses any clear commitment to end it.

In contrast, Palestinians in Gaza are awaiting the results of ongoing discussions between Palestinian factions and intermediaries amid mounting pressure to reach a ceasefire agreement that redefines the political and security future of the Strip, particularly concerning arms, civil administration, and security arrangements.

However, what is happening today cannot be reduced to negotiations for a ceasefire; it seems to be part of a broader attempt to create a new political, geographic, and demographic reality in Gaza, making the results of the war a point of departure for a different stage, not its end. And here arises a question that transcends the details of the negotiation to the nature of the stage itself: Are we at the end of the war or at the reformatting of Gaza's shape and future?

In this context, international pressure becomes part of the political scene accompanying the war. The international community, along with some Arab parties, continues to pressure Palestinian factions to fulfill their commitments under the American plan, while any similar pressure on Israel to comply with its commitments is absent.

The recent American-Gulf statement clearly reflected this paradox, emphasizing the disarmament of factions and linking the reconstruction of Gaza to security and administrative arrangements, without any demands on Israel or the United States to fulfill their commitments outlined in the ceasefire plan and Security Council resolution. This disregard reflects the continuation of an international approach that places the burden of obligations solely on Palestinians while exempting Israel from any political or legal accountability.

This imbalance extends to both the Arab and Islamic positions, which have so far failed to exert effective political pressure on the United States to compel Israel to cease the war, lift the siege, and guarantee Palestinian rights. Moreover, Arab political and economic tools have not been employed to restore balance to the Gaza file, making it part of a broader regional equation instead of remaining a battleground imposed upon by one party's conditions.

Thus, the problem is not limited to the inability to stop the war; it has taken on a deeper form characterized by providing international and regional political cover for its continuation, transforming it from an open military war into a political path intended to reshape the reality of the Gaza Strip in line with Israeli visions.

From this angle, the American plan does not seem to be a response to the results of the war but rather a political extension of it. What Israel has failed to achieve through military force, it seeks to impose through long-term political, security, and administrative arrangements that make control over the Strip less costly and more sustainable, without ending the occupation or recognizing Palestinian national rights.

Therefore, the current phase is not a "post-war" phase but a stage of transitioning the war from its direct military tools to quieter political, security, economic, and administrative tools that are no less dangerous. The battle is no longer just about a ceasefire but about who sets the rules for the next day and who determines Gaza's shape, its inhabitants, administration, and future.

This is evident in the field realities: the expansion of buffer zones, tightening restrictions on the entry of humanitarian aid, controlling its distribution mechanisms, preventing reconstruction, and the continuation of daily targeting are not separate actions but interconnected links in a single project aimed at reshaping Gaza demographically, geographically, and politically. In this sense, what military war fails to impose by force is being established through the management of populations and resources and controlling living conditions, turning the "transitional phase" into a permanent reality.

Additionally, the focus on the imbalance of power between Palestinians and Israelis, while accurate, conceals a deeper imbalance related to the absence of genuine international will to impose mutual and equal obligations. Experience has proven that the international community has not only failed in supervision and enforcement, but has practically adopted a logic that obliges Palestinians to fulfill their obligations immediately and bindingly, while Israeli commitments are treated as issues that can be postponed, reinterpreted, and renegotiated.

Thus, pressure on Palestinians is no longer just a reflection of the power imbalance but has become part of the conflict management mechanism, where they are considered the party most amenable to pressure and extraction of concessions, while the stronger party is left to impose facts on the ground and then renegotiate them later. In this sense, international pressure is no longer separate from the Israeli project; rather, it has directly or indirectly become one of the tools for consolidating its results.

Moreover, this matter is not limited to Gaza alone; the proposed model exceeds the boundaries of the Strip. Linking reconstruction to security considerations, tying human rights to political conditions, and reshaping Palestinian administration to align with Israeli requirements are all indicators of an effort to reframe the relationship between Palestinians and the occupation on new bases, making occupation less costly while increasing Palestinians' dependence on external arrangements that dictate the shape of their political and economic lives.

In this context, prolonging the transitional phase becomes a means of gradually consolidating field realities, so that temporary measures turn into a permanent reality, and crisis management becomes a goal in itself rather than a phase leading to a just political solution.

However, this reality, harsh as it is, does not mean that its outcomes are predetermined. The success of any project to reshape Gaza does not solely depend on international and regional power balances; it is also influenced by the ability of Palestinians to build a unified national stance that limits Israel's capacity to exploit division and impose its new realities. The more division increases, the more the occupation expands its capacity to convert temporary realities into permanent arrangements.

Despite all this, Palestinians remain faced with a central challenge manifested in their ability to rebuild their internal house, regain at least a minimum of political unity, and formulate a common national strategy capable of protecting the Palestinian individual, preserving the land, preventing displacement, and thwarting reformatting projects in Gaza, thereby restoring initiative to the Palestinian cause instead of merely reacting to what the occupation imposes.

In the end, the question is no longer how the war will end but what reality it will leave behind. The real battle is no longer military only, but has become a battle over the shape of Gaza, the future of the Palestinian cause, and the ability of Palestinians to prevent the catastrophe from becoming a permanent political system that reshapes their existence, rights, and future.