American Ambiguity: What is Being Hatched for Gaza Within the Multinational Security Coordination Center?

Anyone following the political and security scene related to the Gaza Strip realizes that what is officially announced is just a very small part of what is actually happening behind closed doors. The ambiguity of the American position and the uncertainty surrounding everything related to the 'next day' after the war are no longer just a journalistic observation or an informational gap; they have become a deliberate structure and a fundamental pillar in the way the United States leads the process of shaping the future of the sector. This ambiguity is not incidental, nor a result of confusion or disagreements within the U.S. administration, but rather a functional element in managing a transitional phase that Washington wants to be the sole holder of its keys.

The most dangerous aspect of the current phase is what occurs within the Civil-Military Coordination Center, a body that now brings together representatives from more than fifty countries, along with strategic experts, military advisors, and Western intelligence officers. This center, which is presented in the media as a framework for 'organizing aid' or 'ensuring stability,' actually reveals the extent of international involvement in shaping a new security architecture for the Gaza Strip—an architecture that goes far beyond humanitarian narratives or Israeli claims about 'combating terrorism.'

The presence of such a large number of countries with this level of expertise cannot be explained by any simple narrative. We are facing a multinational operations room that is drawing lines and plans that the Palestinians have no right to access, let alone participate in shaping. It would be more accurate to say that the United States is establishing—through this center—a global security system used to tame future scenarios and solidify a new reality on the ground, a reality that may bear little resemblance to Gaza as we have known it politically or security-wise.

By tracking American movements over the past months, several clear indicators can be read: First, Washington is determined to prevent Hamas from returning to power in any form. Second, it is working on structuring a new security framework, which may be a hybrid between modified local forces and elements returning from some previous agencies, under international—primarily American—supervision that controls the sensitive joints. Third, the security file in Gaza will remain separate from any broad political process, including issues of sovereignty, borders, and halting settlement activities in the West Bank.

These indicators do not fall under hypothetical scenarios; they are shown by the nature of activities within the security coordination center: joint trainings, the presence of experts in counterinsurgency, closed meetings including intelligence officers from European and Asian countries, and direct oversight of the movement of goods and crossings, in addition to discussions surrounding the formation of 'border security' with new arrangements along the Salah al-Din axis. All of this means that the United States is not reacting to an existing reality but planning to create a new one, ensuring that this reality will serve its priorities and those of Israel.

However, alongside all this, the ground appears to be more exposed than ever. More than fifty days have passed since the announcement of a ceasefire, but everything that was supposed to be 'calm' has turned into a series of daily violations committed by Israeli forces: assassinations, limited shelling, gunfire aimed at farmers and fishermen, and repeated incursions that keep death present, even if the form of war has changed. The ceasefire has transformed into a cover for low-intensity military operations, while the siege has remained unchanged, especially with the continued closure of the Rafah crossing and the prevention of vital supplies from entering.

This reality deepens the Palestinians' feeling that everything happening behind the scenes is a continuation of the war with different tools, and that the ceasefire was nothing more than a technical pause that allows Israel to reposition itself and allows Washington to complete the engineering of the 'next day' away from the clamor of the battlefield. Under the intensified siege, no real improvements have occurred in the humanitarian situation, neither in quantity nor in quality. The signs of famine are spreading, and the majority of the population has become entirely dependent on scant aid that can only enter through joint American-Israeli restrictions.

The problem is not only related to food but also to medicine, water, and basic services. According to the World Health Organization, what arrives in the sector is barely 10% of the actual medical needs, while the camps are becoming more overcrowded with the onset of winter. Displaced individuals face rain inside tattered tents, and the flooding of some camps in recent days was an explicit expression of the collapse of the humanitarian infrastructure deliberately left in a state of incapacity.

Therefore, the most pressing question becomes: What is the nature of the future being drawn for Gaza?
So far, there is no single official document that outlines the contours of this future, nor any vision presented to the Palestinians for discussion or negotiation. What is offered to them are vague phrases such as 'a new security system,' 'local governance,' and 'stability mechanisms,' without an explanation of the nature of this governance or the forces that will oversee it, and whether Gaza will be part of a comprehensive political process or an isolated security area shaped by American-Israeli designs.

With this ambiguity, Washington maintains the full ability to change direction at any moment. If Israel needs additional time, the ambiguity prolongs. If Washington wants to pass new arrangements, the scene remains vague until the moment the announcement becomes imposed as a fait accompli. The Palestinians are the only ones outside the calculations, stuck between a bloody present and a future they are not allowed to see.

What is happening today is neither reconstruction nor a discussion about the form of governance; it is more about re-establishing a security-political system that may extend for many years, possibly as an alternative to direct occupation. Nonetheless, the Palestinians remain outside any formal or informal framework that would enable them to participate in shaping the features of their upcoming reality.

The American ambiguity is not merely a curtain; it is policy. Unless this curtain is broken and the space is opened for a real Palestinian regional discussion, Gaza will continue to move toward a future being shaped away from the land and its people, a future led by Washington and supported by dozens of countries from within a security coordination room that no one knows what emerges from it or where it wants to take the sector.