Gaza Between Trump's Plan and Israeli Realities: A Difficult Wait for a Foggy Phase

Today, Gazans live on the margins of an incomplete political phase; a phase that is supposed to mark the beginning of reorganizing the reality of the sector after two years of extermination war, yet it appears to be stuck between the American plan and the realities of occupation, between a UN decision laden with promises and an Israeli policy determined to abort it before it is even born. At the heart of this scene, Palestinians stand before a future whose details are being drawn outside their borders, while their fate is placed on the table of security understandings that disregard their very existence. Since the approval of Trump's plan in the Security Council, it has been treated as a transitional platform: disarming factions, the army withdrawing from eastern areas, initiating reconstruction, and bringing in a multinational international force. However, what is happening in practice is moving in the opposite direction; Israel is working to solidify its presence in the eastern Gaza Strip and to draw field separation lines through what is called "the yellow line," categorizing Gaza into red and green areas, in a clear contradiction to the essence of the American plan. In this way, the occupying state is re-producing its fixed strategy: permanent security control and keeping the sector in a state of disintegration that prevents it from formulating a political future within the Palestinian system. What is most evident today is the Israeli insistence on building an "alternative humanitarian reality": city camps in Rafah, mobile homes, and buffer zones under the pretext of organizing the lives of residents. But behind this field engineering lies a deeper vision: reconfiguring Gaza demographically and socially, transforming it into a security-subjugated space, devoid of sovereignty, managed by a temporary administrative authority that lacks decision-making power. This is reflected in the idea of the "Peace Council" and the "Stability Authority," which are intended to manage people's lives under foreign leadership, while real control remains in the hands of the occupation. As for the promised international force, it has shifted from a "peacekeeping force" to an "enforcement force," whose primary mission - as Israel wants - is to disarm Hamas and the factions. This is something that Arab and Islamic countries refuse, fearing a direct confrontation with Palestinians or appearing as partners in stripping them of the tools of power. Therefore, Israeli assessments indicate that the chances of establishing this force are now almost non-existent, and that the second phase of the plan is threatened with complete paralysis. Based on Israel's experience with international decisions, this disruption does not seem incidental, but part of a fixed strategy: taking what serves its interests from the American plan and obstructing what contradicts it. Israel will accept the presence of a technocrat authority in the regions under its control, but it will tie everything to its absolute security control. As for other areas, they will be left in the same vacuum in which it manages the West Bank and southern Lebanon: remote management, intervention when needed, while keeping the crisis open as much as necessary. In parallel, the Palestinian Authority is moving - according to leaks - towards a new role through the "Presidential Committee," to serve as a parallel reference to the "Peace Council" led by the PLO. Although this path is not central to Israel today, the American promises to grant the Authority a role in the areas under occupation - similar to the model in the West Bank - seem enticing for the Authority seeking to regain a foothold in Gaza. This role may be acceptable to Palestinians if presented at the right moment. As for Hamas, it faces a new reality without a clear plan. The movement is dealing pragmatically, aware that its political survival depends on accepting the American plan without a direct civil or administrative role. It may have already received American signals keeping its political presence in exchange for its strict commitment to a post-war path. Meanwhile, attempts by Arab countries appear powerless to impose any tangible modification on the plan or on the pace of its implementation. Egypt is moving more actively than others, but the most it can do so far is to mitigate the effects of the transitional phase, without any real ability to change the direction set by Washington and imposed by Israel on the ground. Gaza today is not in a transitional phase as much as it is in a "suspended" phase, being re-engineered above the rubble, and the Palestinians are being redefined there between security lines and political borders on which they have no influence. This heavy wait is not just a political vacuum, but a reproduction of the logic of control: the occupation determines, the United States blesses, and the Arabs and Muslims are unable to influence, while the Palestinians pay the price alone. Unless a Palestinian will and ability crystallize to break this path, Gaza's future will remain tied to the will of others, not its own.