The Next Phase of Trump's Plan in Jeopardy

After nearing the completion of the first phase of U.S. President Donald Trump's plan, doubts are increasing about the possibility of proceeding to the subsequent phases. Following the delivery of the six remaining Israeli bodies, the maneuvering room for the Israeli government is expected to narrow, especially after linking the transition to the second phase with conditions contrary to the plan itself, the most notable of which is the release of the bodies. Furthermore, Israel continues to violate the ceasefire agreement by failing to open the Rafah crossing and allowing only a quarter of the agreed humanitarian aid to enter, in addition to ongoing ceasefire violations that have led to the martyrdom of more than 250 Palestinians and numerous injuries, along with extensive destruction of the remaining homes, buildings, and infrastructure, particularly in areas that are still directly controlled by the occupation. A major indication that Trump's plan is doomed to failure is the draft of the proposed U.S. resolution submitted to the Security Council, which carries serious risks that go beyond the hopes it portrays. The draft does not make the Security Council a reference for the "proposed international stabilization force" but rather grants it the authority to form it only, without being responsible for monitoring its work or holding it accountable.

The more dangerous aspect is that this force is tasked with executive duties that include disarmament, even though the resolution does not rely on Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which permits the use of force. This practically means imposing a colonial guardianship on the Gaza Strip under international legitimacy, under the guise of the "Peace Council" chaired by Trump, assisted by Tony Blair or Jared Kushner, or similar figures.

The plan discusses an "international stabilization force" involving Arab and foreign troops, responsible for imposing security and disarmament, rather than peacekeeping. Its deployment may occur before the withdrawal of Israeli forces or simultaneously with it, or after their withdrawal to a new line while remaining in the buffer zone, which opens the door to multiple authorities and the likelihood of power conflicts and armed confrontations. Complicating matters further, Netanyahu is seeking U.S. guarantees that allow the continuation of the Israeli aggression under the pretext of preserving "Israeli national security," which means that the occupation will remain the central player even in the presence of an international force.

The expected reality in the event of the plan's implementation includes a proliferation of armed groups in the sector; Arab and foreign forces within the "stabilization force"; Palestinian police officers to be trained in Egypt and Jordan; police elements affiliated with the de facto authority in Gaza; military wings of local factions and militias linked to families; and pro-occupation militias. This multiplicity of authorities is a recipe for inevitable failure, likely leading to chaos and bloody confrontations. For this reason, the potential participating countries in the force are hesitant unless the decision's format changes radically and the mechanisms for coordination and complete Israeli withdrawal are controlled.

The draft resolution calls for the establishment of a "Peace Council" headed by Trump, serving as a transitional authority ruling for two years, subject to extension, meaning there is no clear or definitive timeframe. This council will control Palestinian decision-making and the fate of the Gaza Strip until the Palestinian Authority implements an "acceptable" reform, according to the Security Council’s judgment, and not based on Palestinian will. Even reconstruction and opening crossings are sought to be linked to political and security conditions, such as disarming resistance, Hamas stepping down from governance, exclusion of the Palestinian Authority from direct administration, and the necessity of removing "extremism" from the sector. Furthermore, the plan allows for partial implementation in areas considered "free of terrorism," meaning the entrenchment of a division in Gaza into two areas: a region subject to support and reconstruction (the "yellow area"), and another besieged, punished, and exposed to incursions, assassinations, and bombing. This opens the door for a new internal displacement and the establishment of a "Middle Eastern Riviera" in part of the sector, in exchange for the continuation of the blockade and suffering in the other part.

There are many possible scenarios, foremost among them the continuation of the status quo, with no progress in implementing the plan, as Israel continues to control more than half the sector, benefiting from Hamas's rule to entrench division and separate the West Bank from Gaza, using it to persist in the blockade and aggression. Israel also fears falling into the trap of an international force or into a political horizon that could lead to a Palestinian state, especially as it approaches internal elections with unclear outcomes, where the electoral fever intensifies extremism, aggression, and racism.

There is a difficult-to-achieve scenario: implementing the plan as Trump wants. Although challenging, it is possible given Trump's threat of renewed war if the U.S. resolution does not pass. However, its prospects weaken due to Russian and Chinese opposition to the draft resolution, with the possibility of them utilizing their veto power, based on widespread Palestinian, Arab, and international opposition to the draft. The most likely scenario remains a compromise between Trump's proposal and Arab and international demands, granting the authority a real role open to expansion, while linking disarmament to gradual and parallel steps pertaining to rebuilding, national reconciliation, and the political horizon, along with long-term calm. This scenario could gain international acceptance, especially if the Peace Council is assigned the powers of sponsorship, oversight, and monitoring, rather than ruling, with its reference being the Security Council and not Trump, and if trustworthy Arab and international figures are included in it, and if the conflict of powers between it and the various existing formations, which will be established, is resolved. This then balances between reality, possibility, and ambition, but it remains fragile unless built on genuine Palestinian unity and a crystallized Arab, Islamic, and international position pressuring Trump.

While the possibility of renewed war is not anticipated, it remains a plausible scenario. The reasons that ended the genocide war still largely exist, and Israel has begun to live in an electoral atmosphere charged with rivalry and extremism, which may push towards new rounds of aggression to gain votes that allow the ruling coalition (or a similar one) to win again. However, the wars will be at different paces, and will not take the form of genocidal war and total destruction, as what it failed to achieve over two years will not be easy to realize, especially as Israel becomes globally isolated and despised, while people’s uprisings stand guard against it.

The Palestinian Authority remains the weakest link in the scene. Its political and popular legitimacy is eroded, its strategy is one of survival, waiting, and removing pretexts, and its institutions are nearly paralyzed. If it does not reject Trump's plan, especially colonial guardianship and the delegation of the "stabilization force" with powers to impose security and disarmament by force, without a political horizon leading to ending the occupation and realizing independence, and if it accepts (implicitly or explicitly) its exclusion from the current political process in the Gaza Strip... if it does not do that, it facilitates its own erasure from the equation later on everywhere. Therefore, it must initiate the recovery of political legitimacy through genuine national consensus on a central national goal and forms of struggle to achieve it until elections, in which the people elect those who represent them. Expanding the representation and legitimacy of the technocrats committee with the participation of factions, civil society, youth, women, and the diaspora, and providing it a reference point for it and for the Authority as a whole, it would be better to be the temporary leadership framework for the organization. It must undertake substantial reforms in the institutions of the national authority and the PLO (this applies to the factions), especially combating rampant corruption that responds to Palestinian interests, needs, and priorities, not to the dictates and conditions of others. It should declare a clear rejection of any guardianship council or force seeking to disarm by force, as the right to resist occupation and defend oneself is a sacred right. Conversely, Hamas should show actual willingness to relinquish power in favor of genuine national partnership and a unified national reference.

Trump's plan is doomed to fail because it ignores the roots and causes of the conflict, contradicting the most fundamental components of freedom, justice, and sovereignty for the Palestinian people, and reproducing the occupation in a styled international format. The only realistic alternative is Palestinian, based on a democratic national consensus of struggle that rebuilds the Palestinian political system on realistic, national, democratic, and militant foundations, and genuine partnership, rather than being imposed a colonial guardianship council that decides on behalf of the Palestinians who is "qualified to rule" and who deserves to live and receive support.